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Introduction
The efficient exchange of goods and services is the core theme of economics and has been
extensively studied for decades. However, with respect to some repugnant types of goods
like organ and blood donations, personal data, or CO2 emissions, there seems to exist an
aversion to trade these goods at all or at least if money is involved. As Nobel Laureate
Al Roth emphasizes, “distaste for certain kinds of transactions can be a real constraint
[. . . ], every bit as real as the constraints imposed by technology or by the requirements
of incentives and efficiency” (Roth 2007, p. 38).
In this thesis, I study situations of economic exchange in terms of their ethical accept-
ability. Particularly, I investigate the scope and limits of social and monetary incentives
by means of experiments in lab, online, and field settings. In the first two chapters, I look
at what conditions make people refrain from fostering the implementation of their favored
outcome for others. More precisely, I examine people’s willingness to intervene in others’
decision-making by monetary incentives along with choice-prescribing bans (Chapter 1)
or along with information (Chapter 2). My results demonstrate that the perseverance
of others’ autonomy to decide for themselves (Chapter 1) as well as people’s aversion
to make others do something which the latter are not convinced of (Chapter 2) play an
important role when judging the acceptability of economic interventions. In Chapters 3
and 4, I zoom in on one particular good, whose trade may be considered as repugnant,
namely the sharing of personal data, and investigate issues with personal data sharing. In
Chapter 3, I point out that personal data disclosure competition in modern online mar-
kets with both social comparison and high incentives for information sharing can increase
information available in the economy, but may come along with a hidden cost of perceived
pressure on disclosure-unwilling individuals with high privacy concerns. Focusing not on
competition via personal information disclosure but on personal data as contributions
to a public good, Chapter 4 highlights that making privacy protection salient together
with public benefits may increase personal data contributions to a public good. Taken
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together, the four chapters of my thesis highlight important ethical but yet economically
underesearched issues that have to be taken into account when designing new forms of
economic exchange.
In what follows, I provide a short overview of each of the four chapters. In Chapter 1,
titled “Protecting Autonomy versus Intervening to Promote Prosocial Behavior”, which is
joint work with Axel Ockenfels (University of Cologne), we investigate people’s willingness
to intervene in others’ prosocial decision-making in light of a trade-off between promoting
prosocial behavior and protecting the affected party’s autonomy to decide for herself.∗
In an experiment, in which one group of participants determines the experimental rules
for another group of participants within an charitable donation paradigm, we find that a
majority of subjects who would donate to charity themselves refrains from interfering at
all with others’ autonomous charitable decision-making. People who intervene perceive
interventions - which correspond to choice-prescribing bans and monetary incentives in
the experiment - as more acceptable to promote prosocial behavior the more the interven-
tions respect the autonomy of affected parties. More precisely, choice-prescribing bans are
preferred if they first grant a feeling of perceived autonomy to let others decide for them-
selves, and monetary incentives prevail less acceptable if they are implemented against
instead of aligned with one’s own previous wants.
Chapter 2 studies an aversion to monetary incentives to make other people change
their behavior and is accordingly called “The Aversion to Monetary Incentives for Chang-
ing Behavior”. I provide evidence that monetary incentives are disliked because they
are powerful in changing what people do but not why they do it besides for money. In
an experiment, one group of participants decides about interventions which try to change
others’ behavior such that the latter donate to charity. I vary between treatments whether
subjects can intervene by means of convincing information or monetary incentives. In ad-
ditional treatments, the intervention corresponds to monetary incentives for subjects, who
already received information, or of incentivizing information acquisition. While partici-
pants consider monetary incentives as more effective in changing behavior than informa-
∗Both authors contributed equally to this project. They invented the research question and the
experimental design together. Viola Ackfeld planned and conducted the experiment, analyzed the data,
and prepared the first draft. Both authors wrote the final version of the paper together.
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tive interventions, they are still less willing to intervene by monetary incentives compared
to informative interventions to foster their preferred outcome, especially if people already
made an informed decision. A comprehensive set of elicited beliefs supports the idea that
this aversion to incentives stems from incentives’ lack of changing one’s reason to act.
Chapter 3 is named “Personal Information Disclosure under Competition for Benefits:
Is Sharing Caring?” and is joint work with Werner Güth (LUISS Rome and Max Planck
Institute for Research on Collective Goods).† In this paper, we investigate monetary in-
centives and social comparisons with other people’s information sharing as motives for
extensive personal information sharing. Moreover, we study consequences thereof. More
precisely, in an experiment, we analyze the interaction of peer comparison and incentives
to disclose potentially privacy-sensitive information. We find that information sharing
is higher under incentives and further increases with additional peer comparison. In-
dividuals, who initially disclose less information, react the most to the combination of
incentives and social comparison, but also report to feel more compelled to disclose infor-
mation. While increasing the availability of information, reliance on extensive information
sharing does not prevail as a useful device to screen prosocial types. Our results provide
an explanation for the current information-sharing trend, but also point to potentially
neglected side effects of extensive personal information sharing.
The last chapter is called “Increasing personal Data Contributions: Field Experimental
Evidence from an Online Education Platform” and is joint work with Tobias Rohloff
(Hasso Plattner Institute and University of Potsdam) and Sylvi Rzepka (University of
Potsdam).‡ In this paper, we study personal data sharing as a contribution to a public
good. In a field experiment on an online education platform, users are prompted to
complete their user profiles. We examine whether public good contributions in form of
personal data increase when varying the salience of public benefits and perceived privacy
†Both authors contributed equally to this project. They invented the research question and the
experimental design together. Viola Ackfeld planned and conducted the experiment, analyzed the data,
and prepared the draft. Werner Güth gave feedback on the draft.
‡All authors contributed equally to this project. Sylvi Rzepka and Viola Ackfeld developed the
research question and the experimental design together. Tobias Rohloff implemented the experiment on
the online platform and provided the necessary data. Viola Ackfeld analyzed the data. Sylvi Rzepka
gave feedback on the statistical analysis. After Viola Ackfeld prepared the first draft of the paper, Viola
Ackfeld and Sylvi Rzepka wrote the final version of the paper together. Tobias Rohloff gave feedback on
the draft.
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costs. Relative to a control message, we find that salience of the public benefits increases
the number of contributed profile information. This effect further increases when adding
a reference to privacy protection. However, we do not find proof that such treatments can
also motivate users, who initially do not provide any personal data, to start contributing.
These results highlight that even in a fast-paced environment like an online platform,
reference to the social benefit may increase people’s willingness to contribute personal
data, but primarily for those who are somewhat willing to share such information.
Taken together, the results in all four chapters of this thesis contribute to a better
understanding of ethical factors that influence economic decision-making and the scope
and limits of social and monetary incentives. While insights from psychology and sociology
have made their way into economic research via behavioral economics in the last decades,
the inclusion of ethical aspects is still rare. This thesis highlights that including insights
from the ethics literature can improve our understanding of decision-making further and
prepares the ground for a new direction of interdisciplinary research.
4
Chapter 1
Protecting Autonomy versus Intervening
to Promote Prosocial Behavior∗
joint with Axel Ockenfels
Abstract
We experimentally investigate people’s willingness to intervene in others’ prosocial
decision-making when facing a trade-off between promoting prosocial behavior and
protecting the affected party’s choice autonomy. We find that a majority of subjects
who would give for charity themselves refrain from interfering at all with others’
autonomous charitable decision-making. For those who intervene, the interventions
– bans and monetary incentives – are more acceptable to promote prosocial behavior
the more the interventions respect the autonomy of others.
∗This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European
Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement No 741409 - EEC). Ackfeld
acknowledges additional support from the Joachim Herz Foundation via an Add-On Fellowship for In-
terdisciplinary Economics. Further support of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) is gratefully
acknowledged. The project was approved by the Ethics Review Board (ERB) of the Faculty of Man-
agement, Economics, and Social Sciences, University of Cologne, and by the European Research Council
Executive Agency (ERCEA) under the working title “Unwanted Circumstances for Doing Good”. We
thank Kiryl Khalmetski, Felix Kölle, and audiences in Cologne and at CCBE Tel-Aviv for helpful com-
ments. All views are the authors’ own.
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1.1 Introduction
The question which interventions increase prosocial behavior has gained much attention in
empirical economic research (see for example Andreoni (2015) and Lacetera et al. (2013)
for reviews on how to increase charitable fundraising and blood donations, respectively).
However, the question which interventions are “acceptable” has gained much less atten-
tion. In this paper, we investigate which interventions third-parties are willing to use in
order to influence others’ prosocial behavior. In particular, we study a trade-off between
promoting prosocial behavior and interfering with the affected party’s autonomy to de-
cide for himself. According to scholars in philosophy, autonomy – freedom from external
control or influence – possesses a non-instrumental, inherent value, which should be re-
spected (Feinberg 1978; Rawls 1971, 1980; Young 1982). Previous research in behavioral
economics has shown that autonomy may affect economic outcomes (Bartling et al. 2012;
Benz and Frey 2008; Cassar and Meier 2018; Fehr et al. 2013; Leider and Kessler 2016).
Thus, a demand for autonomy may limit the acceptability of interventions to promote
social behavior.
In this paper, we consider two kinds of interventions, for which this trade-off is partic-
ularly strong:1 bans that remove the selfish option and thus directly enforce the prosocial
action, and monetary payments incentivizing the prosocial action. While bans are effec-
tive, they leave no room for autonomous choice. In contrast, monetary incentives allow
choice, but still may stand in conflict with some notion of autonomy – if trying to dissuade
people from the choice they would have made without being incentivized (Grant 2006,
2011).
In our study, we let participants in an online experiment, called judges, decide about
the rules that other participants in a subsequent lab experiment, called decision-makers,
face. The former decide whether to use bans and incentives to channel the latter’s choice
between a charitable donation of 10€, which yields only a small payoff of 3€ for the
decision-maker, and a large payoff of 10€ for the decision-maker that precludes, however,
the donation. Each donation finances an eye surgery against blinding in Ethiopia. Judges
1A third interventional tool to consider would be nudges (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). However,
nudges are a rather soft form of intervention, not affecting one’s choice menu, so they do not create an
equally strong trade-off between autonomy and outcomes.
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can first either take away one of the two choice options from the decision-maker or leave
his choice set unaffected. We vary whether the decision-maker is informed about the
judge’s decision before or after he made his own choice. While the former leaves no room
for the decision-maker to make a choice himself, the latter grants autonomy for doing
good, but may still subsequently alter the outcome in case the donation is not chosen. In
a second decision, judges can offer those decision-makers who initially chose to be selfish
an additional private bonus of 2€ if they change their decision into a donation. In a
control treatment, the bonus is offered to those choosing the donation anyway.
Suppose a judge values a dollar for the charity higher than a dollar for herself (and thus
would donate herself), yet values a dollar for herself higher than a dollar for the decision-
maker (a reasonable assumption if judges and decision-makers are randomly drawn from
the same subject population). Then, if the autonomy of the decision-maker is irrelevant for
the judge, this judge should be willing to use bans and incentives to promote a donation.
However, we find that more than half of the judges who donate themselves do not
intervene at all. Among those judges who intervene, we observe that bans are more
acceptable if the decision-maker is informed about the intervention only after he made his
choice and the intervention only comes into effect in case the choice is inconsistent with
the ban. Monetary incentives are more acceptable if the incentive is not used to dissuade
a decision-maker who previously decided not to donate. We interpret this overall pattern
of interventions as evidence for many judges respecting the decision-makers’ demand for
autonomy. Moreover, our data suggest that while judges dislike to incentivize decision-
makers to act “against their own will”, subsequently banning preferred outcomes does not
seem to raise much concerns. Indeed, we do not find a statistical relationship between
subjects’ willingness to use bans and incentives to influence others’ donation behavior
on the individual level, which reinforces our view that judges do not only care about
outcomes, but also about the decision process by which this outcome is reached. Different
interventions may therefore be perceived differently threatening to autonomy.
Our paper is related to several interdisciplinary strands of literature. Autonomy is
an important concept in philosophy. Besides its instrumental value of enabling people
to decide for themselves, scholars also attribute a non-instrumental, inherent value to it
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(Feinberg 1978; Rawls 1971, 1980; Young 1982). Additionally, autonomy together with
relatedness and competence is a key component in self-determination theory (Deci and
Ryan 1985; Ryan and Deci 2000) in psychology to motivate people, generating actions of
superior quality than under extrinsic rewards like money (Lepper et al. 1973; Lepper and
Greene 1978; Titmuss 1970). Recent economic research supports both empirically and
theoretically that intrinsic motivation matters (Bénabou and Tirole 2003, 2006; Bowles
and Polania-Reyes 2012; Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997). In the context of prosocial
activities, Ashraf et al. (2014) and Gneezy and Rustichini (2000b) find that paying sub-
jects for charitable fundraising activities decreases effort. When looking at autonomy in
particular, there is laboratory evidence that people reduce their effort when experiencing
more control and thereby less autonomy (Bartling et al. 2012; Fehr et al. 2013). Leider
and Kessler (2016) highlight that this negative reaction to control stems from procedu-
ral fairness concerns being violated. Similarly, using survey data, Benz and Frey (2008)
show that self-employed people seem to gain procedural utility from being able to decide
autonomously. While the conflict of bans with autonomy is rather obvious, incentives
conflict with autonomy according to political scientist Grant (2006, 2011) insofar that
they do not respect a choice an individual, capable of making moral choices, makes on
his own. According to Grant, incentives may therefore be considered as a form of power
trying to change one’s own decision. This may lead to a decision “against own better judg-
ment” which interferes with autonomy. We provide empirical support for the importance
of autonomy in decision-making along those lines.
With reference to research on philantrophy, there are many different attempts like
matching donations (Eckel and Grossman 2003; Huck and Rasul 2011; Huck et al. 2015;
Meier 2007), seed money and refunds (List and Lucking-Reiley 2002) or peer comparison
(Meer 2011) to increase charitable giving. See Andreoni (2015) for a collection of influen-
tial papers. Similarly, several studies test monetary as well as non-monetary incentives to
increase blood (Goette and Stutzer 2008; Lacetera and Macis 2010, 2013; Lacetera et al.
2014) as well as organ donations (Eyting et al. 2016; Kessler and Roth 2012; Mellström
and Johannesson 2010). Our project extends this research by looking at third-parties’
willingness to intervene into others’ prosocial decision-making. While Jacobsson et al.
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(2007) look at what kind of donations people prefer to give to others, in their case in-kind
rather than monetary donations, our focus lies on the interventional tool people use to
channel the donation behavior of others in light of its conflict with autonomy.
We investigate the trade-off between promoting prosocial behavior and granting others
choice autonomy by looking at third-parties’ willingness to use bans and incentives as two
forms of interventions to influence the prosocial behavior of others. From a methodological
perspective, our experimental design overlaps with studies deploying so-called spectator
designs (Almas et al. Forthcoming; Cappelen et al. 2013) to investigate third-parties’
willingness to intervene into others’ outcomes, most often in redistribution settings. In
a setting with time-delayed payments, Ambuehl et al. (2019) use a related design to
study paternalistic interventions into others’ choice set and find substantial intervention
rates. Taking the perspective of third-parties into account is important because only
investigating what works to increase prosocial behavior ignores that some tools may not be
considered as acceptable (similar to repugnance in the domain of organ or blood donations
(Roth 2007, 2018)). We provide evidence that many subjects are not willing to intervene
at all to promote charitable giving, and that those who are willing seem to value and try
to preserve the affected parties’ choice autonomy. Moreover, we contribute new insights
that the perceived appropriateness of incentives substantially diminishes if they are used
as a means to dissuade people from their previous, autonomous choice. This supports the
concerns raised by Grant (2006, 2011) that incentives can constitute a threat to autonomy.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 1.2, we present our ex-
perimental design. Section 1.3 presents and discusses the results, while the last section
concludes.
1.2 Experimental Design
Our experiment consists of an online experiment and a laboratory experiment. Par-
ticipants in the online experiment, henceforth called judges, can set the rules for the
subsequent laboratory experiment, thereby determining the choice sets and payoffs of lab
participants, called decision-makers. In what follows, we refer to a judge as “she” and to
decision-maker as “he”. Figure 1.1 depicts the structure of the experiment. Screenshots
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Figure 1.1: Structure of the experiment
Online: Judges
Instructions
Allowance of choice options (A, B, or both):
Participant is informed about allowed options
Before choice 50% After choice 50%
Allowance of incentive: add 2€ when donating
a) if opposing own choice 33%
b) if aligned with own choice 33%
c) directly before any choice 33%
MPL, incentivized beliefs, own choice
Post-experimental questionnaire
Lab: Decision-makers
Instructions
Real effort task:
Count "4" in block
of numbers, 40x
Payoff choice
conditional on
treatment and
judge’s decision
Post-experimental
questionnaire
50%
50%random
order
Notes: Probabilities reported as %. Treatment differences in italics. MPL refers to the multiple
price lists for constructing altruism controls.
of how treatment differences are implemented as well as instructions for both parts of the
experiment can be found in Appendix 1.B.
Laboratory experiment
Decision-makers in the laboratory experiment first have to fulfill a real-effort task, and
can choose between two payoff alternatives afterwards. The real-effort task consists of
correctly counting how often the number "4" is included in a block of numbers, and is
repeated 40 times. An example for such a counting task can be found in the instructions
in Appendix 1.B.2. The task is a version of that used in Abeler et al. (2011), generates
no value for the experimenter nor pleasure for subjects completing it, but requires costly
effort, which in turn might increase the subjects’ perception of entitlement to a larger
payoff.
After finishing the real-effort task, decision-makers can pick one of two payoff alterna-
tives. They can choose between receiving a payoff of 10€ without donating money (option
A), and receiving a payoff of 3€ while donating 10€ to the German charity “Menschen für
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Menschen” (option B). The donation finances an eye surgery in Ethiopia against blinding
from the disease trachoma, the world’s most common bacterial reason for blindness. We
show pictures of the surgery and provide details regarding the causes and consequences
of the disease in the instructions. We inform participants that we are going to upload
donation receipts on our website after the experiment. After the payoff choice is made,
the laboratory experiment ends with a brief post-experimental questionnaire.
Online experiment
Judges in the online experiment determine the rules for the laboratory experiment. Their
own payoff for participation is 4€ plus some bonus options as explained below, and
does not relate to their decisions (not) to intervene. Since we recruit more judges than
decision-makers, we randomly draw whose judges’ decisions are implemented, and then
match each of these judges to one decision-maker. Judges make two kinds of decisions
which are implemented with 50% probability each. The first decision concerns the choice
set of decision-makers. Judges can choose between allowing both options A and B, thereby
letting the decision-maker choose the outcome himself, or limiting his choice set to the
egoistic option only (option A), or the donation option only (option B), respectively.
Suppose a judge values a dollar for the charity higher than a dollar for herself (and
thus would donate herself), yet values a dollar for herself higher than a dollar for the
decision-maker. Then, if the autonomy of the decision-maker is irrelevant for the judge,
this judge would use her tools to promote a donation. Moreover, even if a judge would
for herself selfishly decide against a charitable donation, she might value a donation to
the charity higher than the decision-maker’s payoff and thus enforce charitable giving by
the decision-maker. On the other hand, if judges respect the decision-makers’ autonomy,
they may abstain from an intervention even if they donate themselves. This leads us to
the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1a (Selfish intervention): Judges use bans to enforce charitable giving, in
particular if they would donate themselves.
Hypothesis 1b (Autonomy): Judges do not use bans to enforce charitable giving, even if
they donate themselves.
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We randomly assign subjects into two treatments. In the After treatment, the decision-
maker makes a choice and learns afterwards whether this choice is allowed by the judge
matched to him.2 If it is allowed, it is implemented. Otherwise, it is overridden by the
other option, the only one which the judge allowed, which is then implemented. In the
Before treatment, options not allowed are already blanked out on the choice screen of
the decision-maker so he does not have to make a choice at all. In contrast, in the After
treatment, any interference only emerges after the decision-maker had the opportunity
to do good himself, and only if he decided in misalignment with what his matched judge
allowed. In that sense, in the After treatment, judges can let decision-makers first decide
on their own, preserving a feeling of autonomy for the donation-willing individuals, and
at the same time enforce the prosocial outcome for those who are not willing to donate.
Preserving a feeling of autonomy is not possible in the Before treatment. This leads us
to our second set of hypotheses.
Hypothesis 2a (Outcome-based judgment): Judges use bans equally often in the Before
and After treatment.
Hypothesis 2b (Preserving perceived autonomy): Judges use bans less often in the Be-
fore than in the After treatment.
An alternative hypothesis is that choice is regarded by judges as a burden rather
than an opportunity (as pointed out by Heath and Tversky (1991), Loewenstein (1999),
Sunstein (2014, 2015), and Tversky and Shafir (1992)), and judges may want to altruis-
tically free decision-makers from such a burden. In this case, we might see the opposite
relationship between treatments.
Hypothesis 2c (Unburdening from choice): Judges use bans more often in the Before
than in the After treatment.
The second decision that judges make concerns whether or not the decision-maker
should get a 2€ extra incentive which is added to the decision-maker’s private payoff
2Whenever a decision-maker makes a choice, he knows that another participant has previously deter-
mined the rules for the lab experiment, but does not know what particular choice is affected and how.
Importantly, he does not know that his choice may be overridden or that there may be the possibility to
revise his choice.
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if he donates. If used, the decision-maker’s own payoff from option B increases from
3€ to 5€. Here, judges have to make three within-subject decisions out of which one is
randomly chosen and implemented with equal probability. They have to decide about an
Opposing incentive, an Aligned incentive, and a Direct incentive. We consider an incentive
as Opposing if it is offered to the decision-maker for donating after he initially decided not
to donate, i.e., after he chose option A. The Aligned incentive is added after the decision-
maker initially donated, thereby only raising the decision-maker’s payoff of the option
he already chose. In both cases, decision-makers get the opportunity to subsequently
revise their choice and we preselect the initial choice on screen as the default. Moreover,
we randomize the order by which the judge decides about the Opposing and the Aligned
incentive. The Direct incentive serves as an additional control to rule out an aversion
to adding 2€ per se, and is always implemented third. It does not yield a subsequent
payoff increase like the other two incentives, but an increase in the payoff right from the
beginning. This means that if the judge allows the Direct incentive, her matched decision-
maker in the lab does not even see the initial version of option B (3€ for decision-maker,
10€ donation), but directly gets his own payoff in case of donation displayed as 5€, i.e.,
with the 2€ extra incentive added on top.
If judges are concerned about decision-makers’ autonomy, we predict (following Grant
(2006, 2011)) a less frequent use of the Opposing compared to the Aligned incentive since
the former actively tries to change the decision-maker’s own, initial choice and thereby
openly disrespects his autonomy. To the contrary, an outcome-focused judge, in particular
when she would donate herself, would use the Opposing incentive more often than the
Aligned one since it can attract additional donors.
Hypothesis 3a: (Attracting more donors): Judges intervene more frequently byOpposing
than by Aligned incentives.
Hypothesis 3b (No seduction to change autonomous choice): Judges intervene less fre-
quently by Opposing than by Aligned incentives.
While our autonomy hypothesis provides no clear prediction regarding how the use of
bans and incentives are related, purely outcome-based reasoning of judges would predict
that whatever tools judges have at hand, they should use either all or none of the tools to
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increase the donation level. Therefore, we should expect a positive relationship between
the willingness to enforce the donation by a ban and the willingness to use the Opposing
incentive. Contrarily, if procedural factors play a role, the relationship may be ambiguous.
Hypothesis 4a: (Outcome-based interventions): Judges, who intervene by a ban, inter-
vene more frequently by the Opposing incentive.
Hypothesis 4b (Procedural factors matter): There may be no relationship between judges’
intervention behavior by bans and by the Opposing incentive.
After the main decisions are made, we collect several beliefs, attitudes, and additional
measures related to our setting. Most importantly, judges have to make a choice between
the two payoff alternatives for themselves, and we randomly pick one judge for whom
this decision is implemented. Choosing the donation herself serves as our first measure
of whether a judge cares about the charity. Additionally, we give 10% of decision-makers
the chance to delegate the payoff choice to a judge, and let judges make a separate
decision between the two payoff alternatives for such a situation. This serves as our second
measure to identify to what extent the judge cares about the charity. Moreover, we control
for contextual factors that might influence judges’ perception of decision-makers’ choice
situation, namely effort costs and duration of the previous real-effort task.3
On top of that, we measure judges’ general valuation for allocating money to the
decision-maker or the charity, respectively, via multiple price lists. One list item is ran-
domly chosen and implemented in 10% of the cases independently from any previous
choice. Judges can deduct up to 3€ from the payoff of the decision-maker or the charity,
respectively, or add up to 5€ to it. Based on these decisions, we construct a measure
of altruism, i.e., we call a judge “altruistic” if he always gives money to and never takes
money from the decision-maker. We use an equal measure with reference to the charity.
This way, we can control for potential confounds, e.g., spite toward the decision-maker.
3We ask for judges’ willingness to accept completing the real-effort task themselves using the BDM-
mechanism (Becker et al. 1964). Judges can state any integer amount between 0 and 20€, and we
randomly choose one judge who has to solve the 40 counting task on her own after the online experiment
if her willingness to accept is low enough. With reference to the tasks’ duration, judges guess how long it
takes for decision-makers to finish the real-effort task. We elicit this belief in an incentive-compatible way
by offering the judge with the guess closest to the true value a bonus of 5€, paid out after the laboratory
experiment. In the same way, judges guess which fraction of decision-makers considers the choice between
the two payoff alternatives as difficult, and which fraction would like to delegate it.
14
Furthermore, we elicit demographics and several attitudes related to our setting in a
post-experimental questionnaire.
We recruited both judges and decision-makers from the subject pool of the Cologne
Laboratory for Economic Research (CLER) using ORSEE (Greiner 2015). Data collection
for both parts of the experiment took place in August 2018, programmed in oTree (Chen
et al. 2016). In total, 216 subjects participated in the online experiment and 61 in the
laboratory experiment. Participants in the laboratory experiment earned on average
11.66€ in 45-minute sessions including a 4€ show-up fee. Online sessions took place
within one week and lasted 13 minutes on average. Judges received 4€ lump-sum in
cash for participation in the week after the experiment.4 Except the bonus for the real-
effort tasks, bonuses for judges were paid out separately after the laboratory experiment
had taken place. We informed participants via email and via our homepage about who
received a bonus. All cash payments were executed via anonymous participation codes.
1.3 Results
1.3.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 1.1 shows descriptive statistics of our sample in terms of demographics and factors
important for the analysis. We have 216 judges, of which 128 are female, with an average
age of 25.7 years. 37.5% study a major in economics, business or in a related field5. While
the latter share is only 29.5% in the sample of decision-makers, both judges and decision-
makers are similar in terms of age and gender. With reference to behavioral measures,
70.4% of judges choose to donate themselves and 79.2% select it as the delegated choice
for the decision-maker. Regarding altruism, we use dummy variables which equal one
if the judge always adds and never takes away money in the independent distribution
task via the multiple price lists. We construct such dummy variables both for altruism
towards the charity and the decision-maker, and find that 74.5% and 57.9% of judges
4Judges collected their payoff at our office on campus. Besides the one-week payout period, we added
three more days for payoff: One day the week after the bonus was announced (i.e., two weeks after the
laboratory experiment) and two days in the first week of the new lecture period. We decided to announce
the two subsequent payoff days since we run our experiment during the term break, which resulted in a
rather low pick-up rate of payoffs. In total, 47.2% of judges picked up their payoff.
5As a business or economics related field, we consider majors which include a substantial part of
courses in business or economics, for example, business law, business informatics, or health economics.
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behave altruistically towards the charity and the decision-maker, respectively. Descriptive
statistics regarding the behavior of decision-makers can be inferred from Table 1.A.1 in
the Appendix.
Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics: Sample characteristics
Judges Decision-makers
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Female 0.593 0.492 0.590 0.496
Age 25.7 5.2 26.1 8.5
Business/econ major 0.375 0.484 0.295 0.444
Would donate herself 0.704 0.458
Donation as delegated choice 0.792 0.407
Altruistic towards decision-maker 0.579 0.495
Altruistic towards charity 0.745 0.437
N 216 61
Notes: Except age, all variables reported as fractions.
1.3.2 Use of bans
When pooling our data over treatments, as shown in the left bar of Figure 1.2, Panel A,
the majority of judges leaves the choice set unrestricted, thereby granting decision-makers
full autonomy to decide themselves. 43% of judges use bans. While a few judges, 6%, take
away the option to do good and do not allow the donations, 37% enforce the donation.
In X2-goodness of fit tests, the fractions of judges not intervening, enforcing the dona-
tion, or enforcing the egoistic option, respectively, are highly statistically different from
a distribution in which all judges intervene (p < 0.001). The distribution is also different
from one in which judges randomize between the three options in case they do not care
(p < 0.001). When restricting the sample to judges choosing the donation themselves,
56% leave the choice set unrestricted as displayed in the left bar of Figure 1.2, Panel
B. Observing the majority of judges refraining from an intervention by a ban, although
they would donate themselves, suggests that they take decision-makers’ autonomy into
account when considering to intervene. This confirms Hypothesis 1b.
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Figure 1.2: Use of bans overall and by treatment
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Notes: Full sample and restricted sample of judges donating themselves.
Result 1: The majority of judges does not intervene into the prosocial decision-making
of others despite being willing to sacrifice their own payoff for the charitable outcome.
When also considering the point of time when the decision-maker is informed about the
available choice set, either Before or After he makes his choice, the right and the middle
bars of Figure 1.2, Panel A, show that the share of judges enforcing the donation is with
41% higher in the After treatment than with 31% in the Before treatment. While this
difference is not statistically different in a ranksum test (p = 0.128), it indicates a trend
towards a higher willingness of judges to intervene into the choice of the decision-maker if
they can grant a choice first. When restricting our sample to judges who donate themselves
in Panel B of Figure 1.2, the effect becomes significant at the 10% level (p = 0.072). The
general intervention pattern remains unchanged with the exception that the share of
judges enforcing the egoistic option disappears. Our second measure of charity valuation,
selecting the donation as delegated choice, leads to the same conclusion (p = 0.079). The
corresponding bar charts for this sample split as well as for judges choosing egoistically
themselves can be found in Figure 1.A.1 in the Appendix.
We investigate the treatment effect in more detail using a multinominal logit model,
which allows us to predict changes in the probability which category an observation falls
into based on our treatment dummy. Table 1.2 reports average marginal effects from the
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Table 1.2: Average marginal effects of allowing full/restricted choice set by treat-
ment
Probability to be type allowing both options
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Donor Delegate
Treatment: After -0.105 -0.136∗∗ -0.135∗∗ -0.173∗∗∗ -0.163∗∗ -0.157∗∗
(0.066) (0.063) (0.063) (0.055) (0.076) (0.070)
Donor -0.117 -0.098 0.158∗∗ -0.060
(0.074) (0.074) (0.063) (0.093)
Probability to be type allowing only donation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Donor Delegate
Treatment: After 0.100 0.128∗∗ 0.135∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗ 0.165∗∗
(0.064) (0.062) (0.061) (0.051) (0.076) (0.070)
Donor 0.245∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗ -0.016 0.071
(0.066) (0.065) (0.058) (0.094)
Demographics No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Altruism controls No No Yes Yes No No
Survey Controls No No No Yes No No
N 216 216 216 216 152 171
Pseudo R2 0.007 0.109 0.132 0.403 0.054 0.074
Notes: Average marginal effect from multinominal logit regression to be the type al-
lowing both choice options, allowing only donation, or allowing only the egoistic op-
tion as the dependent categorical variable, with the latter category being omitted.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. "Donor" corresponds to restricted sample of
judges who would donate themselves; "Delegate" to judges choosing the donation as
the delegated choice for the decision-maker. Demographics include age, gender, and a
dummy for business/economics students. Altruism controls include the unconditional
giving/taking measures constructed from the multiple price lists. Survey controls cap-
ture the belief regarding duration and valuation of the real-effort task as well as the
full set of attitudes elicited in the post-experimental survey. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01.
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multinominal logit regressions of being the type allowing both choice options or being the
type allowing only the donation, with allowing only the egoistic option as the baseline cat-
egory.6 Column (1) shows no significant difference between Before and After treatments
without controls. However, when controlling for whether the judge would donate herself
in column (2), which is highly predictive for being the type allowing only the donation, as
well as demographic factors like age, gender, and economics background, the treatment
dummy becomes significant. Subjects in the After treatment are 13.6 percentage points
less likely not to intervene into the choice of the decision-maker and 12.8 percentage points
more likely to enforce the donation than in the Before treatment, with both marginal ef-
fects significant at the 5% level. Taking into account the judge’s altruism towards the
decision-maker and the charity, respectively, in column (3) does not change this result.
The treatment effect also remains unchanged when controlling for the full set of attitudes
elicited in the post-experimental survey as well as for contextual factors like the valuation
of the real-effort task or beliefs about its duration in column (4).
Columns (5) and (6) show regression results for the restricted sample of judges do-
nating themselves and judges choosing the donation as the delegated option, excluding
judges who may not care about the charity. In these restricted samples, we find even
16 percentage points more enforcement of the donation in the After treatment. Table
1.A.2 in the Appendix replicates all findings in a simple linear probability model, ignor-
ing judges forbidding the donation. Overall, this provides evidence in line with Hypothesis
2b favoring the idea that doing good autonomously is preferred.
Result 2: Judges use bans more often in the After than in the Before treatment to
intervene into the choice of decision-makers.
Intervention behavior seems not to be driven by different assumptions about decision-
makers’ valuation of the real-effort task or diverging beliefs about the latter’s duration
6For each independent variable, the differences between the upper and the lower panel equals the
probability change to be the type forbidding the donation. Judges donating themselves fall 13.9 percent-
age points less likely into the category of forbidding the donation (p = 0.002) in model (2). However,
we draw no further inference regarding treatment effects here since only 13 observations fall into this
category.
19
since the corresponding estimates show exact zero effects. Remarkably, judges studying
a business or economics related major are 18-22 percentage points more likely to allow
both choice options, which is significant at the 1% level. With a magnitude of 11-12
percentage points, the same holds for women at the 10% significance level. Furthermore,
age turns out to affect the probability not to intervene positively. Figure 1.A.3 in the
Appendix plots the regression coefficients and 95% confidence intervals of these results,
of the altruism dummies, as well as of all other control variables used in column (4) of
Table 1.2, which turn out to be significant at least at the 10% level. Additional insights,
which emerge from the post-experimental survey questions, are discussed in the Appendix.
Remarkably, judges stating a one standard deviation higher intention to benefit primarily
the decision-maker with their choice are 19.7 percentage points more likely to allow both
choice options and 18.0 percentage points less likely to enforce the donation, with both
effects being significant at the 1% level. This provides additional support for our idea
that judges who care for the decision-maker want to preserve as much of his autonomy as
possible.
The additional survey evidence and the significance of the After treatment dummy
speak against the argument that judges’ restrictions of the decision-makers’ choice set
are mainly motivated by unburdening him from the choice between the two alternatives
(Sunstein 2014, 2015). Rather, it favors the idea that judges prefer to preserve as much
of decision-makers’ autonomy as possible. Nonetheless, they trade off the autonomy they
grant donation-willing decision-makers against an increased prosocial outcome level by
enforcing the donation on donation-unwilling individuals afterwards. Therefore, while
the act of doing good seems to be positively valued by judges, bans seem to be perceived
as a valid means to change outcomes by many judges.
1.3.3 Use of incentives
We now focus on judges’ willingness to use subsequent monetary incentives to change
others’ behavior into the direction of a donation. Figure 1.3 displays and Table 1.3 reports
the corresponding regression results from a linear probability model. We find that almost
all judges are willing to allow the subsequent incentive if it is added to the private payoff
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Figure 1.3: Coefficient plot: Use of incentives
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Notes: Coefficient plot from column (2) of Table 1.3. Vertical lines represent standard errors.
Order controls set to value of first period.
of the decision-maker in case he decided to donate anyway. The share of judges allowing
this Aligned incentive, captured by the constant in column (1) of Table 1.3, is with 96.0%
statistically not different from one (p = 0.259). In contrast, the corresponding share of
judges allowing the Opposing incentive is only 73.0%. This 23.0 percentage points drop
is captured by the dummy variable for the Opposing incentive in the regression, which
reveals a highly statistically different willingness to use the Opposing incentive compared
to the Aligned one (p < 0.001).
We can exploit that we elicited the allowance of incentives in a within-subject design by
using a panel data structure to take into account both the decision regarding the Aligned
and the Opposing incentive of each judge. From column (2) on, we estimate the effect
of the Opposing subsequent incentive including judges who decided about this incentive
after having already decided about the Aligned incentive first and vice versa. We cluster
standard errors on the individual level to account for individual heterogeneity. We add
a dummy variable capturing that an option is displayed second and interact it with our
Opposing treatment dummy of interest to control for order effects, which exist but do not
differ significantly between treatments.7
7Taking the chronological order into account may be important since Roth (2007) mentions that
incentives can serve as a "slippery slope" into perceiving transactions as less repugnant over time. However,
Elias et al. (2015) do not find empirical evidence for such an effect. We find that the incentive shown
as second is always less likely allowed by roughly 10 percentage points. However, the interaction affect
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Table 1.3: Linear probability model: Use of incentives
Probability to allow subsequent incentive
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Donor Delegate
Opposing incentive -0.230∗∗∗ -0.230∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗∗ -0.224∗∗∗ -0.217∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.047) (0.051) (0.048)
Displayed 2nd -0.100∗∗∗ -0.091∗∗ -0.094∗∗ -0.055 -0.077∗
(0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.040)
Opposing inc. # Displayed 2nd 0.082 0.066 0.070 0.022 -0.023
(0.074) (0.075) (0.075) (0.080) (0.080)
Direct incentive allowed 0.048 0.036 -0.014 0.049
(0.049) (0.051) (0.048) (0.054)
Donor 0.086∗ 0.066
(0.044) (0.050)
Constant 0.960∗∗∗ 0.960∗∗∗ 0.960∗∗∗ 0.942∗∗∗ 1.245∗∗∗ 1.010∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.020) (0.117) (0.123) (0.095) (0.141)
Demographics No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Altruism Controls No No No Yes No No
Survey Controls No No No Yes No No
N 216 432 432 432 304 342
R2 0.097 0.065 0.081 0.129 0.114 0.107
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Only judges’ first decision considered in column (1)
under use of robust standard errors. Panel structure exploited from column (2) on with standard
errors clustered on participant level. "Donor" corresponds to restricted sample of judges who
would donate themselves; "Delegate" to judges choosing the donation as the delegated choice for
the decision-maker. Demographics include age, gender, and a dummy for business/economics
students. Altruism controls include the unconditional giving/taking measures constructed from
the multiple price lists. Survey controls capture the belief regarding duration and valuation of
the real-effort task as well as the full set of attitudes elicited in the post-experimental survey. *
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
We observe a strong treatment effect of the Opposing incentive in form of a 22-23
percentage points drop in incentive usage compared to the Aligned incentive across all
full sample specifications in Table 1.3. When controlling in column (3) for demograph-
ics, whether judges would donate themselves, and whether they would allow a directly
implemented incentive of the same value, effect size and significance of our treatment
variable do not change. Thus, we can rule out that some kind of aversion to the 2€
incentive per se drives our results. The corresponding variable regarding the allowance of
the Direct incentive is insignificant. Our results are also robust to additionally including
between the Opposing treatment dummy and the order dummy is not statistically significant, which
means that the order effect does not differ systematically between Aligned and Opposing incentives as
the second choice.
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altruism controls from the multiple price list, various attitudes related to our setting from
the post-experimental questionnaire, and contextual factors like judges’ valuations of the
real-effort task or beliefs about its duration in column (4). Here, the fact that including
altruism controls leaves the treatment effect unchanged enables us to further rule out
that judges generally do not like to give extra money to potentially donation-unwilling
decision-makers. When restricting the sample to judges donating themselves or choosing
the donation as the delegated option in columns (5) and (6), respectively, i.e., our controls
for sufficient altruism towards the charity, results do not change.
While we cannot fully rule out that judges withhold the additional incentive to donate
because of a desire to punish initially donation-unwilling decision-makers, this appears
to be an unlikely motive in our context. Since the decision-maker’s payoff only increases
in case he donates, this punishment would only be effective if it prevented the decision-
maker from being altruistic. Hence, successful punishment would result in egoistic choices,
implying higher material payoffs for the decision-maker and fewer donations to charity,
which would stand in contrast to the preferred outcome of most judges.
Overall, we conclude that incentives are perceived as a less appropriate means to chan-
nel behavior if they are implemented to dissuade somebody from his previous, autonomous
choice. This confirms Hypothesis 3b.
Result 3: Subsequent incentives are less often allowed if they are implemented to
dissuade the decision-maker from his previous choice in the Opposing treatment compared
to incentives implemented Aligned with the decision-makers initial choice.
1.3.4 Relationship between the use of bans and incentives
How are the willingness to use bans and incentives related to each other? Purely outcome-
based reasoning of judges, as stated in Hypothesis 4a, predicts that whatever tools judges
have at hand, they should either always or never use these tools to increase the donation
level. Therefore, we should expect a positive relationship between the willingness to
enforce the donation by a ban and the willingness to use the Opposing incentive. When
splitting our sample into judges allowing or forbidding the Opposing incentive, we do not
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Figure 1.4: Use of bans by use of Opposing incentive
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Notes: Sample split between judges using or not using theOpposing incentive as an interventional
tool.
observe any differential pattern regarding the use of bans. The distribution of judges
allowing only the donation, only the egoistic option, or both choice options looks highly
similar in Figure 1.4 and is indistinguishable in Fisher’s exact test (p = 0.622).
Moreover, the dummy for the allowance of theOpposing incentive does not result in any
significance and possesses weak exploratory power (PseudoR2 = 0.002) when included as
a single explanatory variable into a multinominal logit model in column (1) of Table 1.4.
Additionally, it does not change previous results when added into the multinominal logit
regressions from Table 1.2 as columns (2) to (4) of Table 1.4 show. The previous results
and the treatment effect remain unaffected. This also holds when only considering the
restricted samples of judges donating themselves or choosing the donation as the delegated
option in column (5) and (6), respectively. For a graphical depiction of the relationship
between bans and incentives by treatment, see Figure 1.A.2 in the Appendix.
We conclude that there is no statistical relationship between the willingness to use
bans and incentives as a means to intervene into others’ prosocial decision-making on the
individual level. This supports our earlier finding that purely outcome-based reasoning
cannot explain the patterns of judges’ interventions and supports Hypothesis 4b.
Result 4: There is no statistical relationship between the use of bans and incentives.
24
Table 1.4: Average marginal effects of allowing full/restricted choice set by allowance
of Opposing incentive
Probability to be type allowing both options
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Donor Delegate
Opposing incentive 0.032 0.045 0.057 0.014 -0.101 -0.088
(0.075) (0.073) (0.072) (0.066) (0.111) (0.106)
Treatment: After -0.132∗∗ -0.131∗∗ -0.173∗∗∗ -0.163∗∗ -0.157∗∗
(0.064) (0.063) (0.055) (0.076) (0.070)
Donor -0.120 -0.102 0.156∗∗ -0.061
(0.074) (0.074) (0.064) (0.093)
Probability to be type allowing only donation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Donor Delegate
Opposing incentive -0.002 -0.030 -0.041 0.004 -0.085 -0.161
(0.073) (0.071) (0.068) (0.063) (0.111) (0.109)
Treatment: After 0.127∗∗ 0.134∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗ 0.162∗∗
(0.062) (0.061) (0.051) (0.076) (0.070)
Donor 0.247∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ -0.016 0.075
(0.066) (0.065) (0.058) (0.095)
Altruism controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographics No No Yes Yes No No
Survey Controls No No No Yes No No
N 216 216 216 216 152 171
Pseudo R2 0.002 0.111 0.134 0.403 0.058 0.080
Notes: Average marginal effect from multinominal regression to be the type allowing
both choice options, allowing only donation, or allowing only egoistic option as the
dependent categorical variable, with the latter category being omitted. Robust stan-
dard errors in parentheses. "Donor" corresponds to restricted sample of judges who
would donate themselves; "Delegate" to judges choosing the donation as the delegated
choice for the decision-maker. Demographics include age, gender, and a dummy for
business/economics students. Altruism controls include the unconditional giving/taking
measures constructed from the multiple price lists. Survey controls capture the belief
regarding duration and valuation of the real-effort task as well as the full set of attitudes
elicited in the post-experimental survey. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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1.4 Conclusion
Many judges refrain from intervening to promote others’ charitable giving, even if they
would be willing to sacrifice for charity themselves. Many of those who do intervene ap-
pear to be affected by a desire to respect others’ choice autonomy as much as possible.
Interventions by bans are more attractive to judges if they leave room for choice first,
thereby creating (an illusion of) autonomy. Also, there is a strong drop in judges’ willing-
ness to use financial incentives to promote prosocial choice if the incentive conflicts with
the decision-makers’ previous choice. That is, judges dislike dissuading somebody from
his previous, autonomous choice by monetary incentives. We do not find evidence for
unburdening others from having to make a choice as a contrary main intervention motive,
as the idea of choice as a burden to the individual may suggest. Observing unaffected
parties granting others as much autonomy as possible emphasizes that procedural factors
and the resulting utility thereof matter and should be considered when deciding which
policies to implement.
Remarkably, our results show an increased willingness to intervene by bans if the
ban affects those who autonomously decide not to donate, but a decrease if monetary
incentives are used to change an autonomous choice. There is one crucial difference
between bans and incentives: While the judge implementing a ban determines the final
outcome, it is still the decision-maker who has to make the final choice and change his
behavior under incentives. While knowing that the donation does not correspond to the
decision-maker’s own choice seems not to hinder judges from intervening per se, knowing
that the decision-maker has to actively act against his autonomous, initial choice himself
may render an intervention less appealing. This provides empirical support for concerns
raised by Grant (2006, 2011) that actions against “one’s own wants” caused by incentives
may be problematic. In summary, we infer from our results that the concept of autonomy,
which both forms of intervention stand in conflict with, might have very different facets
depending on how autonomy is affected. While people seem to value giving others’ the
opportunity to express their own preferences, but nonetheless are willing to trade off
autonomy against outcomes by bans, they dislike monetary temptations which try to
distract someone from his autonomous choice.
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Since our investigation is in many aspects exploratory, the effects we detect and the
perspective we take leave room for further investigation. Subsequent research may focus
on whether being self-affected or unaffected by the rules one determines alters how people
set rules. Moreover, the strong drop in the willingness to use monetary incentives to
make people change their behavior deserves further attention as does the importance of
procedural factors like autonomy in general when deciding for others. We see our project as
a first attempt in the prosocial domain to better understand the delicate conflict between
fostering a desired outcome and maintaining the autonomy of affected parties to decide
for themselves, which any intervention comes along with. Given the trade-off at play, our
results may also explain the appeal of nudges (Thaler and Sunstein 2008), whose conflict
with reducing autonomy is likely not equally strong as it is for bans and incentives.
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1.A Appendix: Additional results
Table 1.A.1: Descriptive statistics: Decision-makers
Treatment Before After Opposing Aligned Direct Total
Fraction 0.262 0.262 0.148 0.164 0.164 1.000
Donation chosen by DM 0.100 0.500 0.222 0.300 0.500 0.346
Donation implemented 0.275 0.563 0.222 0.300 0.500 0.410
N 16 16 9 10 10 61
Notes: “DM” corresponds to decision-maker. Donation chosen by decision-maker is restricted
to the 10 decision-makers who are not restricted in their choice by judges and have the
possibility to choose themselves in the Before treatment.
Table 1.A.2: Linear probability model of enforcing donation by treatment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Donor Delegate
Treatment: After 0.109 0.137∗∗ 0.136∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗ 0.161∗∗
(0.068) (0.067) (0.066) (0.057) (0.081) (0.074)
Donor 0.212∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗ -0.081
(0.070) (0.071) (0.061)
Altruism controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographics No No Yes Yes No No
Survey Controls No No No Yes No No
N 203 203 203 203 150 168
R2 0.012 0.088 0.110 0.412 0.064 0.081
Notes: Analysis ignores judges forbidding the donation. Baseline category is allowing
both choice options. Standard errors in parentheses. "Donor" corresponds to restricted
sample of judges who would donate themselves; "Delegate" to judges choosing the
donation as the delegated choice for the decision-maker. Demographics include age,
gender, and a dummy for business/economics students. Altruism controls include
the unconditional giving/taking measures constructed from the multiple price lists.
Survey controls capture the belief regarding duration and valuation of the real-effort
task as well as the full set of attitudes elicited in the post-experimental survey. *
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Figure 1.A.1: Use of bans overall and by treatment
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Notes: Restricted samples of judges choosing the donation as the delegated option and judges
not donating themselves.
Figure 1.A.2: Relationship between bans and incentives by timing of ban implementation
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As Figure 1.A.3 displays, apart from the factors discussed in the main text, several
survey questions predict the use of bans. There is a clear pattern that subjects, who judge
not donating in the experiment one standard deviation more morally reprehensible, are
15 percentage points more likely to enforce the donation and 14 percentage points less
likely not to intervene into the decision (both p < 0.001). If judges state a one standard
deviation higher preference for actions based on intrinsic motives, they are 4 percentage
points more likely to allow only the egoistic option (p = 0.057) but 7 percentage points less
likely to enforce the donation (p = 0.027), speaking in favor of the idea that judges may
value if doing good is free of external influence. Moreover, for every standard deviation
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that subjects decide more in order to benefit the decision-maker, they are 20 percentage
points more likely not the restrict the choice set and 18 percentage points less likely to
enforce the donation (both p < 0.001). This suggests that the interventions we observe
may not be driven by a paternalistic motive. Rather, judges stating to care more about
the decision-maker than about the charity try to preserve his freedom of choice, which
supports our autonomy hypothesis. Note that the high explanatory power of the items
just discussed causes a reversal of the effect of the judge’s own willingness to donate on
her intervention behavior. Altruism towards the charity affects intervention behavior only
insignificantly in the full model specification, but is depicted for the sake of completeness.
Figure 1.A.3: Coefficient plot of factors significantly affecting the use of bans
Treatment: After
Donor
Belief: Duration RET
WTA for RET
Altruistic towards DM
Altruistic towards charity
Decide s.t. DM benefits
Not donating immoral
Intrinsic motive preferred
Age
Female
Business/Econ major
-.4 -.2 0 .2 .4
Both options Only egoistic Only donation
Effect size (+ 95% CI)
Notes: The figure plots average marginal effects and corresponding 95% confidence intervals
with robust standard errors from the multinominal logit regression as specified in column (4) of
Table 1.2 not to intervene by a ban (squares), to forbid the donation (triangles), or to enforce
the donation (circles). While all post-experimental survey items are considered in the regression,
only those significant at least at the 10% level are depicted.
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1.B Appendix: Experimental material
1.B.1 Screenshots of treatment differences
Figure 1.B.1: Decision screen judges: Bans Before treatment
Figure 1.B.2: Decision screen judges: Bans After treatment
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Figure 1.B.3: Decision screen judges: Opposing incentives treatment
Figure 1.B.4: Decision screen judges: Aligned incentives treatment
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Figure 1.B.5: Decision screen judges: Direct incentives treatment
Figure 1.B.6: Decision screen decision-makers: Bans Before treatment
Figure 1.B.7: Decision screen decision-makers: Bans After treatment
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Figure 1.B.8: 2nd decision screen decision-makers: Opposing incentives treatment
Figure 1.B.9: 2nd decision screen decision-makers: Aligned incentives treatment
Figure 1.B.10: Decision screen decision-makers: Direct incentives treatment
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[Translated from German. Treatment differences marked in different colors, 
randomizations in square brackets and italic] 
 
Instructions online experiment 
 
Information prior to participation 
Study title: Online experiment UCDG 
Supervisors: Viola Ackfeld, Axel Ockenfels 
 
Description: You participate in a research study on individual decision-making. You will 
be asked to read instructions on screen, answer questions, and make several choices which 
determine the amount you are going to be paid. 
 
Participant rights: If you have read this form and have decided to participate in this project, 
please understand that your participation is voluntary and that you have the right to discontinue 
participation at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. 
Payoff: You must answer questions and make decisions in full to receive your payoff. You are 
going to receive your payoff the week after the experiment in cash in the „Studierenden Service 
Center“ building of the University of Cologne. 
Data protection: All statements are made anonymously, and your individual privacy is 
maintained in all published data resulting from the study. Data generated will be analyzed by 
researchers of the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research (CLER) as well as further 
authorized researchers, and are stored on a secure server to which only authorized people 
have access. 
 
I understand that I may contact the supervisor of this experiment if I require further information 
about the research, and that I may contact the supervisor of this experiment or the Ethics 
Commission in charge if I wish to make a complaint related to my involvement in the research. 
I agree to these conditions. 
 
[Yes, participate. / No, don’t participate] 
 
Contact information 
Viola Ackfeld: ackfeld@wiso.uni-koeln.de 
Ethics Commission: otten@wiso.uni-koeln.de 
 
1.B.2 Instructions
35
 Instructions 
 
Information regarding the experiment 
This experiment consists of two parts. You were randomly chosen from the pool of registered 
participants of the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research (CLER) to participate in the first 
part of the experiment, the online experiment. The second part of the experiment consists of a 
laboratory experiment, in which further randomly chosen participants, who are registered for 
experiments at the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research (CLER) as you are, will 
participate. It is not possible to participate in both parts of the experiment. The second part of 
the experiment is going to be executed within the next weeks. 
Your task in this online experiment is to specify the rules of the subsequent laboratory 
experiment. Thus, the choice options and the payoff of a participant in the laboratory 
experiment depend on your decision. If you allow that participants in the laboratory can choose 
a particular action, they will be able to do so. If you do not allow it, then participants will not be 
able to select it. Please take these consequences into account when making your decisions. If 
there will be more participants in the online experiment than in the laboratory experiment, we 
will choose randomly with equal chance among all participants of the online experiment whose 
decisions are going to be implemented. 
The online experiment will take about 15 minutes, in a few cases longer. Your payoff in case 
of full participation in this experiment is 4€. You receive your payment in cash in the week of 
August 20 to 24, 2018, at the “Studierenden Service Center”. Additionally, you have the 
possibility to earn a bonus. The bonus will be paid out in cash after the laboratory experiment 
will have taken place. 
 
Working task 
Participants in our laboratory experiment first have to complete a working task: They have to 
count how many times the number “4” is contained in a block of numbers. The working task is 
considered to be fulfilled if the participant has successfully completed 40 of such counting 
tasks. Counting incorrectly does not affect his payoff but extends his time in the laboratory. You 
find an example of such a counting task below: 
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Payoff decision 
After finishing the 40 counting tasks, participants can choose between two payoff alternatives. 
In case of choosing the first alternative, they earn a higher payoff for themselves; in case of 
choosing the other alternative, they earn a smaller payoff for themselves, but donate money to 
the charity “Menschen für Menschen”. The donation finances an eye surgery in Ethiopia worth 
10€ which saves one patient with the disease trachoma in an advanced stage from blinding. 
After the experiment, we are going to upload the donation receipts on our website 
ockenfels.uni-koeln.de under the category „Aktuelles”. 
 
 
Information about the disease trachoma 
Trachoma is an eye disease which is caused by infection with Chlamydia trachomatis bacteria, 
and which is the most common infectious cause of blinding. It is considered as one of the „most 
neglected tropical diseases” by the World Health Organization (WHO). It most prominently 
occurs in Africa. Due to trachoma, 1.9 million people suffer from visual impairment or blindness. 
Blindness from trachoma is irreversible. With your donation, you finance a surgery (called 
trichiaris surgery) in Ethiopia, which prevents the blinding of one patient due to trachoma. 
References: WHO Trachoma fact sheet (2018), Quarcoo and Bundschuh (2015), www.menschenfuermenschen.de, 
Rainer Kwiotek/Zeitenspiegel 
 
Your decision in this online experiment 
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 In this experiment, you are going to make two consecutive decisions. We are going to randomly 
draw one out of these two decisions with 50% chance each, and implement it in the laboratory 
experiment. This means that either your first or your second decision is going to be 
implemented in the laboratory experiment, but not both. Since it is uncertain at this point of 
time which of your decisions will be implemented, please make each of your decision as if it is 
the one that counts. 
 
First decision 
After having solved the 40 counting tasks, participants in the laboratory experiment can choose 
between two payoff alternatives. More specifically, they can choose between these two 
alternatives: 
A) Receive 10€ as your own payoff, do not donate money 
B) Receive 3€ as your own payoff, donate 10€ 
You decide whether the participant in the subsequent laboratory experiment should be given 
the choice between the two alternatives, or whether you only allow one of the two alternatives. 
If you do not allow one of the alternatives, this determines that the other alternative will be 
implemented for the participant in the laboratory experiment. In this case, he will not make a 
decision himself. The participant in the laboratory experiment first selects one of the 
alternatives, and learns afterwards whether the execution of this alternative was allowed. If 
you allow this alternative, it will be implemented. If you do not allow this alternative, the other 
alternative, the one you allow, will be implemented instead. 
Which alternatives should be offered to the participant in the experiment? 
– Both alternatives A and B (participant decides) 
– Only alternative A (Alternative A is thereby determined) 
– Only alternative B (Alternative B is thereby determined) 
 
Second decision 
With a probability of 50% your second decision is going to be implemented in the laboratory 
experiment. 
In this decision, you can alter the payoff of the participant in the laboratory experiment. We are 
going to show you three versions of payoff alterations of which one is randomly chosen with 
equal probability and implemented. 
 
No. 1 of 3 [order of 1 and 2 randomized] 
You can increase the participant’s own payoff in case of a donation subsequently by 2€ if he 
initially decides against donation. Instead of 
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 A) Receive 10€ as your own payoff, do not donate money 
B) Receive 3€ as your own payoff, donate 10€ 
the participant can then choose between 
A) Receive 10€ as your own payoff, do not donate money 
B) Receive 5€ as your own payoff, donate 10€ 
Please note: The increased own payoff in case of a donation will only be offered to the 
participant if he first decides against a donation, i.e., if he chooses alternative A. If you allow 
the payoff increase, we will show the participant the increased payoff after he initially chose A, 
and ask him whether he wants to change the decision and choose B if he thereby can earn 5€ 
for himself. 
Do you allow the subsequent payoff increase of 2€ of alternative B if alternative A was initially 
chosen?   yes/no 
 
No. 2 of 3 [order of 1 and 2 randomized] 
You can increase the participant’s own payoff in case of a donation subsequently by 2€ if he 
initially decides for donation. Instead of  
A) Receive 10€ as your own payoff, do not donate money 
B) Receive 3€ as your own payoff, donate 10€ 
the participant can then choose between 
A) Receive 10€ as your own payoff, do not donate money 
B) Receive 5€ as your own payoff, donate 10€ 
Please note: The increased payoff in case of a donation will only be offered to the participant 
if he first decides for a donation, i.e., if he chooses alternative B. If you allow the payoff 
increase, we will show the participant the increased payoff after he initially chose B, and ask 
him whether he wants to stick with choice B if he thereby can earn 5€ for himself. 
Do you allow the subsequent payoff increase of 2€ of alternative B if alternative B was initially 
chosen?   yes/no 
 
No. 3 of 3 
You can increase the participant’s own payoff in case of a donation by 2€ not just subsequently 
but right from the start before participants see the two alternatives A and B for the first time. 
Instead of 
A) Receive 10€ as your own payoff, do not donate money 
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 B) Receive 3€ as your own payoff, donate 10€ 
the participant can then choose from the outset between 
A) Receive 10€ as your own payoff, do not donate money 
B) Receive 5€ as your own payoff, donate 10€ 
 
Do you allow the direct payoff increase of 2€ of alternative B?  yes/no 
 
Additonal payments [order of blocks randomized] 
Independent of your previous decisions, there is a 10% chance that there will be a bonus or 
deduction payment for the participant or the charity at the end of the laboratory experiment. In 
that case, one of the ten options stated below is randomly selected with equal probability. You 
decide whether we implement the corresponding bonus or deduction.  
 
Subtract 3€ lump-sum from donation yes/no 
Subtract 1€ lump-sum from donation yes/no 
Add 1€ lump-sum to donation yes/no 
Add 3€ lump-sum to donation yes/no 
Add 5€ lump-sum to donation yes/no 
 
Subtract 3€ lump-sum from participant’s payoff yes/no 
Subtract 1€ lump-sum from participant’s payoff yes/no 
Add 1€ lump-sum to participant’s payoff yes/no 
Add 3€ lump-sum to participant’s payoff yes/no 
Add 5€ lump-sum to participant’s payoff yes/no 
 
 
Bonus decisions 
At this point, you have the possibility to earn a bonus which will be added to your fixed payoff 
of 4€. The bonus will be paid out in cash after the laboratory experiment will have taken place. 
We are going to announce on our homepage who receives a bonus. 
Below, you see the two payoff alternatives again. Which alternative would you choose for 
yourself? For you or another randomly drawn participant in the online experiment, we are going 
to execute this choice. Thus, you could receive the corresponding monetary amount as a 
bonus for yourself, and, if applicable, we would donate 10€ for eye surgery. 
A) Receive 10€ as your own payoff, do not donate money 
B) Receive 3€ as your own payoff, donate 10€ 
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Bonus decisions 
How strongly are you convinced that one should choose alternative [A/B] in this choice 
situation? You can adjust your answer on a 7-point scale from “fully disagree” to “fully agree”. 
 
Bonus decisions 
What do you think, which fraction of the participants in the laboratory experiment, having the 
choice between both alternatives, will choose the donation? The participant in the online 
experiment with the closest guess is going to receive a bonus of 5€. 
_____% donate 
 
What do you think, which fraction of the participants in the laboratory experiment considers the 
choice between the two payoff alternatives as difficult (this means they answer the statement 
“I consider the decision between the two payoff alternatives as difficult.” with 5, 6, or 7 on a 
scale from 1 (fully disagree) to 7 (fully agree))? The participant in the online experiment with 
the closest guess is going to receive a bonus of 5€. 
___% consider the decision as difficult 
 
Below, you see the two payoff alternatives again. We are going to offer some of the participants 
in the laboratory experiment the opportunity not to have to make the decision between the two 
payoff alternatives themselves, but to follow the choice of a participant in the online experiment. 
If the participant in the laboratory experiment decided to delegate the choice to you, which 
alternative would you select for him in this case? 
A) Receive 10€ as your own payoff, do not donate money 
B) Receive 3€ as your own payoff, donate 10€ 
 
What do you think, which fraction of the participants in the laboratory experiment would like to 
delegate the choice? The participant in the online experiment with the closest guess is going 
to receive a bonus of 5€. 
____% would like to delegate the choice 
 
What do you think, how long do participants in the laboratory experiment need on average to 
solve the 40 counting tasks? The participant in the online experiment with the closest guess is 
going to receive a bonus of 5€. 
 ___ minutes 
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 For which monetary amount would you be willing to solve the 40 counting tasks yourself? For 
you or another randomly drawn participant in the online experiment, we are going to execute 
this choice. If the number you stated is smaller than a number randomly generated by the 
computer, you have to solve the counting tasks, and receive the higher amount as a bonus. If 
the number is bigger, you will not receive the bonus. Under these conditions, the best you can 
do is to state the true amount for which you are willing to solve 40 counting tasks. You can 
state [1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20] € (no decimal numbers) as the 
amount you want to receive, and you have to solve the 40 counting tasks at the end of the 
experiment if you are randomly chosen among all participants in the online experiment. You 
receive the bonus for the counting tasks together with your fixed payment next week. 
I request ____€ to solve 40 counting tasks. 
 
Questionnaire 
Please answer the following questions. You can adjust your answer on a 7-point scale from 
“fully disagree” to “fully agree”. 
I consider the decision between the two payoff alternatives as difficult. 
The participant in the laboratory experiment holds it against me if I take the possibility to 
decide between the two payoff alternatives himself away from him. 
I decided such that the participant benefits first and foremost. 
I wish that the participant in the laboratory experiment receives a fair payoff for solving the 
counting tasks. 
In this experiment, it is immorally reprehensible not to donate. 
 
Questionnaire 
Please answer the following questions. You can adjust your answer on a 7-point scale from 
“fully disagree” to “fully agree”. 
One should not try to dissuade somebody from a decision he made himself. 
People are glad if they are not confronted with a difficult decision. 
It is okay to override the decisions of others if it is in their own interest. 
It is better if people act by intrinsic motives (e.g., interest, conviction, …) than by extrinsic 
motives (e.g., duty, payment, …). 
If somebody is willing to donate an organ, nobody should hinder him from doing so. 
People should get money for donating an organ. 
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 Personal information 
Please provide the following information about yourself: 
Age: ____ years 
Gender: male, female, other 
Department: WiSo Fakultät, Rechtswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Medizinische Fakultät, 
Philosophische Fakultät, Mat-Nat Fakultät, Humanwissenschaftliche Fakultät, other, I’m not a 
student 
Major: ______________________ 
Semester: ___ 
Nationality: _________________ 
How much disposable money do you have per month?  [0 – 200 €], [200 – 400 €], [400 – 600 
€], [600 – 800 €], [800 – 1000 €], [1000 – 1200 €], [more than 1200 €], [I prefer not to answer] 
Comments: __________________ 
 
[if selected for counting task & WTA small enough] Counting task 
You were selected to solve the 40 counting tasks yourself, and stated an amount of [WTA]€ for 
doing so. You now have to solve the tasks, and you are going to receive a bonus of y€ in 
exchange. 
 
[if selected for counting task & WTA small enough] Counting task 
Task solved so far: [z] 
 
How often do you count the number “4”? ________ 
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 The experiment is finished now! 
Below, you see a code. Please write down the code or take a picture of it, and show us the 
code when collecting your payoff. You receive your payoff of 4[+y]€ in the week of August 20 
to 24, 2018, in the “Studierenden Service Center” building (SSC), room 4.226, daily from 10am 
to 12pm, and from 1am to 4pm. We are going to inform you about bonus payments 
subsequently via our homepage ockenfels.uni-koeln.de. 
Your code is [Code]. 
Thank you very much for your participation in this online experiment and your support of our 
research! 
Address questions regarding this experiment to ackfeld@wiso.uni-koeln.de, and complaints to 
ackfeld@wiso.uni-koeln.de or to otten@wiso.uni-koeln.de as the representative of the ethics 
commission in charge. 
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 Instructions laboratory experiment 
 
Information prior to participation 
Study title: Laboratory experiment UCDG 
Supervisors: Viola Ackfeld, Axel Ockenfels 
 
Description: You participate in a research study on individual decision-making. You will 
be asked to read instructions on screen, answer questions, and make several choices which 
determine the amount you are going to be paid. 
 
Participant rights: If you have read this form and have decided to participate in this project, 
please understand that your participation is voluntary and that you have the right to discontinue 
participation at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. 
Your right to receive a show-up fee of 4€ is preserved even when discontinuing the experiment. 
Payoff: You must answer questions and make decisions in full to receive your payoff.  
Data protection: All statements are made anonymously, and your individual privacy is 
maintained in all published data resulting from the study. Data generated will be analyzed by 
researchers of the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research (CLER) as well as further 
authorized researchers, and are stored on a secure server to which only authorized people 
have access. 
 
I understand that I may contact the supervisor of this experiment if I require further information 
about the research, and that I may contact the supervisor of this experiment or the Ethics 
Commission in charge if I wish to make a complaint related to my involvement in the research. 
I agree to these conditions. 
[Yes, participate. / No, don’t participate] 
 
Contact information 
Viola Ackfeld: ackfeld@wiso.uni-koeln.de 
Ethics Commission: otten@wiso.uni-koeln.de 
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 Instructions 
 
Information regarding the experiment 
This experiment consists of two parts. You participate in the second part of the experiment, the 
laboratory experiment. Other participants, who are registered for experiments at the Cologne 
Laboratory for Economic Research (CLER) as you are, and who were also randomly chosen, 
have already participated in the first part of the experiment, the online experiment. It is not 
possible to participate in both parts of the experiment. 
Participants in the online experiment determined the rules for this laboratory experiment. 
These rules are now implemented. Independent of the decisions of the participant matched to 
you and your own decisions you are guaranteed to receive a show-up fee of 4 €. 
 
Working task 
As a participant in our laboratory experiment, you first have to complete a working task: You 
have to count how many times the number “4” is contained in a block of numbers. The working 
task is considered to be fulfilled if you have successfully completed 40 of such counting tasks. 
Counting incorrectly does not affect your payoff but extends your time in the laboratory. 
 
Payoff decision 
After finishing the 40 counting tasks, you can choose between two payoff alternatives. In case 
of choosing the first alternative, you earn a higher payoff for yourself; in case of choosing the 
other alternative, you earn a smaller payoff for yourself, but you donate money to the charity 
“Menschen für Menschen”. The donation finances an eye surgery in Ethiopia worth 10€ which 
saves one patient with the disease trachoma in an advanced stage from blinding. After the 
experiment, we are going to upload the donation receipts on our website ockenfels.uni-
koeln.de under the category „Aktuelles”. 
 
 
Information about the disease trachoma 
Trachoma is an eye disease which is caused by infection with Chlamydia trachomatis bacteria, 
and which is the most common infectious cause of blinding. It is considered as one of the „most 
neglected tropical diseases” by the World Health Organization (WHO). It most prominently 
occurs in Africa. Due to trachoma, 1.9 million people suffer from visual impairment or blindness. 
Blindness from trachoma is irreversible. With your donation, you finance a surgery (called 
trichiaris surgery) in Ethiopia, which prevents the blinding of one patient due to trachoma. 
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 References: WHO Trachoma fact sheet (2018), Quarcoo and Bundschuh (2015), www.menschenfuermenschen.de, 
Rainer Kwiotek/Zeitenspiegel 
 
You can choose between the following two payoff alternatives: 
A) Receive 10€ as your own payoff, do not donate money 
B) Receive 3/5€ as your own payoff, donate 10€ 
 
We offer 10% of the participants in the laboratory experiment the possibility to delegate the 
choice between the two alternatives. In that case, the decision of one of the participants in the 
online experiment will be executed, who already made a decision for such a case. We will 
inform you whether you belong to that 10% before you may have to decide. 
 
First, please work on the working task consisting of 40 counting tasks. 
 
Counting tasks 
Task solved so far: [z] 
 
How often do you count the number “4”? ________ 
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 Counting tasks 
You solved 40 counting tasks. This means that the working tasks is finished. 
 
Delegation 
[if 10% + strategy method treatment] You belong to the 10% of participants who can delegate 
their choice between the two payoff alternatives. What do you want to do? delegate/choose 
yourself [jump to payoff if delegate chosen] 
 
Payoff decision 
You can now choose one out of the two payoff alternatives: 
A) Receive 10€ as your own payoff, do not donate money 
B) Receive 3/5€ as your own payoff, donate 10€ 
Which alternative do you want to choose? Please click on the corresponding line. 
[if before treatment] Remark: If a line is displayed in gray letters, you cannot select this 
alternative. This means that the participant in the online experiment matched to you did not 
allow this alternative. 
 
Payoff decision 
[if A + treatment 2a] 
You chose alternative A without donation. We offer you an increase of 2€ for your own payoff 
if you donate. This means you can choose between 
A) Receive 10€ as your own payoff, do not donate money 
B) Receive 5€ as your own payoff, donate 10€ 
If you want to stick with alternative A, click on „Continue“. If you want to switch to alternative 
B, first click on alternative B and then on „Continue“. 
 
[if B + treatment 2b] 
You chose alternative B with donation. We offer you an increase of 2€ for your own payoff if 
you donate. This means you can choose between 
A) Receive 10€ as your own payoff, do not donate money 
B) Receive 5€ as your own payoff, donate 10€ 
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 If you want to stick with alternative B, click on „Continue“. If you want to switch to alternative 
A, first click on alternative A and then on „Continue“. 
 
[if after treatment] Payoff decision 
You chose alternative A/B. The participant in the online experiment matched to you did [not] 
allow this alternative. Therefore, alternative A/B is implemented. 
 
Payoff 
Alternative A/B is implemented. You receive a payoff of 3/5/10€, and 0/10€ are donated for eye 
surgery in Ethiopia. 
 
Questionnaire 
Please answer the following questions. You can adjust your answer on a 7-point scale from 
“fully disagree” to “fully agree”. 
I consider the decision between the two payoff alternatives as difficult. 
I would hold it against the participant in the online experiment if he took the possibility to 
decide between the two payoff alternatives myself away from me. 
In this experiment, it is morally reprehensible not to donate. 
 
Questionnaire 
Please answer the following questions. You can adjust your answer on a 7-point scale from 
“fully disagree” to “fully agree”. 
One should not try to dissuade somebody from a decision he made himself. 
People are glad if they are not confronted with a difficult decision. 
It is okay to override the decisions of others if it is in their own interest. 
It is better if people act by intrinsic motives (e.g., interest, conviction, …) than by extrinsic 
motives (e.g., duty, payment, …). 
If somebody is willing to donate an organ, nobody should hinder him from doing so. 
People should get money for donating an organ. 
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 Personal information 
Please provide the following information about yourself. 
[if B + treatment 2a or A + treatment 2b] For filling in this questionnaire, you receive an 
additional payoff of 2€. 
 
Age: ____ years 
Gender: male, female, other 
Department: WiSo Fakultät, Rechtswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Medizinische Fakultät, 
Philosophische Fakultät, Mat-Nat Fakultät, Humanwissenschaftliche Fakultät, other, I’m not a 
student 
Major: ______________________ 
Semester: ___ 
Nationality: _________________ 
How much disposable money do you have per month?  [0 – 200 €], [200 – 400 €], [400 – 600 
€], [600 – 800 €], [800 – 1000 €], [1000 – 1200 €], [more than 1200 €], [I prefer not to answer] 
Comments: __________________ 
 
The experiment is finished now! 
[if bonus/deduction] In a further decision, the participant in the online experiment matched to 
you decided that a lump-sum of [x]€ is added/subtracted to/from your payoff.  
Including your show-up fee of 4€ and your payoff from the donation decision, you receive a 
final payoff of [4+3/5/10€+bonus/deduction]€. 
Please fill in this amount in the receipt provided, and wait until the experimenter calls you for 
payout. 
 
Thank you very much for your participation in this experiment and your support of our research! 
Address questions regarding this experiment to ackfeld@wiso.uni-koeln.de, and complaints to 
ackfeld@wiso.uni-koeln.de or to otten@wiso.uni-koeln.de as the representative of the ethics 
commission in charge. 
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Chapter 2
The Aversion to Monetary Incentives for
Changing Behavior∗
Abstract
In this paper, I study an aversion to monetary incentives to make other people
change their behavior. Particularly, I provide evidence that monetary incentives
are disliked because they are powerful in changing what people do but not why
they do it besides for money. In an experiment, one group of participants decides
about interventions which try to change others’ behavior. Between treatments,
I vary whether the intervention consists of convincing information or monetary
incentives. I find that participants consider monetary incentives as more effective in
changing behavior than informative interventions. Nonetheless, they are less willing
to intervene by monetary incentives compared to informative interventions to foster
their preferred outcome. A comprehensive set of elicited beliefs supports the idea
that this aversion to incentives stems from incentives’ lack of changing one’s reason
to act.
∗The experiment was financed by the Joachim Herz Foundation via an Add-On Fellowship for Inter-
disciplinary Economics. The author acknowledges additional funding by the European Research Council
(ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement
No 741409 - EEC). Further support of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) is gratefully ac-
knowledged. This project received ethics approval by the WiSo Ethics Review Board at the University
of Cologne, reference number 190005VA. I thank Sandro Ambuehl, Gary Bolton, Christine Exley, Uri
Gneezy, Matthias Heinz, Lukas Kiessling, Kiryl Khalmetski, Felix Kölle, Axel Ockenfels, and Roel van
Veldhuizen as well as audiences at the Spring School in Behavioral Economics 2019, San Diego, TIBER
2019, Tilburg, Nordic Conference in Behavioral and Experimental Economics 2019, Kiel, and JHS Fel-
low Meeting, Hamburg, for helpful comments. Kirsten Marx as well as Jonas Kernebeck and Benedikt
Tomaschko provided excellent research assistance. All views are the author’s own.
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2.1 Introduction
Monetary incentives are a common economic tool to steer human behavior (Angrist and
Lavy 2009; Bettinger 2012; Charness and Gneezy 2009; Finkelstein et al. 2007; John et
al. 2011; Just and Price 2013; Volpp et al. 2009), and in many situations in life, people
consider such monetary incentives as a legitimate form of influence. However, in some
morally loaded or repugnant contexts like organ or blood donation (Roth 2007), using
money may raise concerns. In other fields of social science, authors articulate an aversion
to using extrinsic rewards like monetary incentives to achieve an outcome (Ryan and Deci
2000; Sandel 2012; Satz 2010; Titmuss 1970). One potential reason causing this aversion
is that monetary incentives may lead to a deviation of what people genuinely want to do
and what they end up doing because of money.
Political scientist Grant (2006, p. 30) argues that this results from incentives cir-
cumventing the need to convince people: “Incentives attempt to circumvent the need for
persuasion [. . . ]. When incentives are employed, there is no need to convince people that
collective goals are good or to motivate them to pursue those goals by appeals to rational
argument or personal convictions.” Put differently, incentives change actions while leaving
the underlying reason to act1 unaffected, and people prefer that others act on the basis
of what the latter are convinced of. Thus, people do not only care about what others do
but also about why they do it.2
In this paper, I provide evidence for an aversion to monetary incentives for changing
behavior, and examine whether this aversion stems from the feature that incentives are
powerful in changing actions, but do not change the underlying reason to act. I test this
1“Reason to act” corresponds to the underlying motivational foundation of the intervention-free deci-
sion an individual makes. Hence, it describes an action not executed based on monetary considerations.
In induced value theory (Smith 1976), this part of preferences is to be neutralized. While the literature
on cognitive dissonance in psychology, dating back to Festinger (1957), claims that one may change what
one believes if the dissonance between actions and values becomes too strong, and Ambuehl (2017) finds
economic evidence for people’s attempts to persuade themselves under high incentives, my project focuses
on the aversion to making other people experience such a dissonance.
2In a standard economic framework, there is no such distinction. I assume that external parties,
who evaluate monetary incentives, have a preference for consistency of others’ decisions made in the
presence or absence of monetary incentives. While such a preference for consistency might be negligible,
for example, in the context of payment for work, which affected parties would not engage in without
being paid for, it may have profound effects in repugnant settings. Which transactions societies consider
as repugnant and thus the associated importance on the overlap of incentivized and non-incentivized
decisions may differ between societies and may change over time (Roth 2007).
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idea by comparing interventions which are either of informative or monetary nature, and
use these interventions to make people deviate from their previous choice.
While comprehensive information provision constitutes a form of convincing influence
according to Martinson (1996), information may have limited power to change outcomes.
In contrast, while monetary incentives are powerful in changing outcomes, they may
have limited power to convince. In light of this trade-off, I hypothesize that unaffected
parties are less willing to use monetary incentives to change others’ behavior compared
to informative interventions although they expect money to be more effective in altering
outcomes. Always implementing interventions in opposition to one’s own previous choice
allows me to study the aversion to monetary incentives in absence of concerns to crowd
out any intrinsic motivation.
In order to test the aversion to incentives, I let participants in an online experiment
decide about the rules of a subsequent laboratory experiment. Participants in the lab can
choose between taking money for themselves or donating it to UNICEF for vaccinations
against the disease tetanus. Online participants decide whether those laboratory partic-
ipants, who initially decide against the donation, should be targeted by an intervention3
that tries to change their decision into a donation. Initially generous individuals always
receive the intervention. I vary between treatments whether the intervention consists of
a private monetary incentive in the Incentives treatment or an informative video about
tetanus vaccinations in the Information treatment. More precisely, this means that, for
example, in the Incentives treatment, all subjects first choose between donating or not.
Those who donate always receive additional money at the end of the experiment. Those
who do not donate receive additional money if their matched online participant agrees
to intervene and if they switch to the donation in a subsequent choice, otherwise not.
At every decision stage, I closely track online participants’ beliefs regarding the donation
rate in the laboratory experiment as well as their beliefs regarding how informed and
convinced laboratory participants feel.
3In this paper, I refer to “intervention” as any attempt to change initially donation-unwilling individ-
uals’ behavior, while “treatments” refer to the different types of intervention in the different experimental
conditions. The term “incentives” always corresponds to monetary incentives.
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A difference in intervention behavior between treatments could be either driven by a
pure information level effect, i.e., that people do not want to intervene in uninformed par-
ticipants’ decision-making in general, or by an aversion to intervening against somebody’s
conviction. In order to distinguish these explanations, I conduct an additional Informed
Incentives treatment, in which lab participants see the informative video already before
they make their initial choice, and online participants can only subsequently intervene
by a monetary incentive. If unaffected parties refrain from using incentives also for more
informed individuals, it must be more than a pure information effect which drives a higher
willingness to intervene by the video in the Information treatment. In particular, those
individuals, who have seen the video in the Informed Incentives treatment but are still
unwilling to donate, are informed but not convinced to donate. Hence, an intervention
by money disrespects their previous wants and may therefore be similarly or even more
disliked in the Informed Incentives treatment than in the Incentives treatment at a lower
information level.
In a further treatment, the Paid Information treatment, I distinguish the willingness
to incentivize the donation outcome in the Incentives treatment from the willingness
to incentivize information acquisition. If money is accepted as long as it leaves room
to change more than just behavior, i.e., one’s reason to act, incentivizing information
acquisition may be a second best approach to make monetary interventions feasible.
I find that participants consider monetary incentives as the most effective tool to
change behavior. In contrast, they believe that incentives are less able to convince people
that the donation is the preferable option to choose. In light of this trade-off between
changing behavior and changing convictions, I observe a lower willingness of participants,
who favor the donation, to intervene by monetary incentives, particularly by Informed
Incentives, compared to information. Hence, unaffected parties refrain from using the
most effective tool to promote their favored outcome because of its lacking ability to
change people’s reason to act. This finding stands in stark contrast to the standard
economic idea of outcome-maximizing behavior. Consequently, my results show that not
only what others do matters for people but also why they do it.
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The paper primarily contributes to three strands of economic literature.4 First, it adds
to recent studies investigating people’s willingness to intervene in others’ decision-making.
Ambuehl et al. (2019) look at interventions in others’ time-inconsistent decision-making
via choice set restrictions and provide evidence for paternalism. Jacobsson et al. (2007)
find that subjects prefer to give others in-kind rather than cash transfers to promote
healthy behavior. In a vignette study regarding egg-cell donation, Ambuehl and Ockenfels
(2017) show that unaffected parties prefer not to incentivize uninformed people to become
donors. My project goes one step further by uncovering that even when being informed,
incentivizing others to act against their own intervention-free decision may be depreciated.
This extends the recent finding in Ackfeld and Ockenfels (2019) that third-parties do not
like to give money to others to make them act in opposition to their autonomous choice.5
Ackfeld and Ockenfels (2019) find that participants are generally willing to increase others’
own, private payoff, which is paired with a charitable donation, if these other people want
to choose the donation anyway. However, acceptance decreases if money is offered to those
who initially decided against the donation. In the present paper, I focus on the latter
case, i.e., interventions that stand in explicit conflict with one’s own wants, attempting to
change behavior. Particularly, I provide a new explanation why people may be reluctant to
use monetary incentives under such conditions: Monetary incentives only change behavior
but not the underlying reason to act. Since informative interventions leave room to also
change the reason to act and thereby the intervention-free choice, such intervention might
be preferred by unaffected parties.
Second, by studying incentives’ inability to convince, I provide empirical evidence for
concerns raised by political scientist Grant (2006) that incentives are used to circumvent
the need to convince. Similar concerns exists in other fields of social science (Deci 1971;
Deci and Ryan 1985; Deci et al. 1999; Lepper et al. 1973; Lepper and Greene 1978;
Ryan and Deci 2000; Sandel 2012; Satz 2010), in which actions based on extrinsic rather
4Using a paradigm which involves donations for medical interventions in developing countries to study
moral decision-making, the project also overlaps with research by Bartling and Özdemir (2017), Kirchler
et al. (2016), and Sutter et al. (2020). By letting unaffected parties decide about others’ outcomes,
the project is methodologically similar to experiments using so-called spectator-designs in redistribution
settings (Almas et al. Forthcoming; Cappelen et al. 2013).
5Unrelated to incentives but in a similar context, Kessler and Roth (2014) find that people think next
of kin prefer not to donate their deceased’s organs if the latter decided against being donors in an active
choice frame compared to an opt-in setting in which the latter may not made a previous choice.
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than intrinsic motives are considered as inferior. While there exists economic research
on crowding-out of intrinsic motivation as postulated by Titmuss (1970) and reviewed
by Bowles and Polania-Reyes (2012) and Frey and Jegen (2001)6, this research differs
from my approach since my interventions only target individuals who are intrinsically
unwilling to behave prosocially. Hence, by design, my interventions cannot crowd out any
intrinsic motivation. Finding an aversion to monetary incentives even when crowding-out
of intrinsic motivation is no concern establishes the aversion to monetary incentives as an
even more fundamental principle than previously assumed.
Third, my interpretation of incentives as a means to change behavior but not the
underlying reason to act may help to better understand the aversion to trade some goods
based on moral grounds, so-called repugnance (Roth 2007). For example, in a vignette
study by Ambuehl et al. (2015), up to about one quarter of participants disapprove very
high payments for participation in a medical trial. Similarly, Elias et al. (2019) show
that people are reluctant towards direct monetary payments to organ donors, while not
disapproving monetary compensation in general.
Besides repugnant transactions, incentives’ inability to change the reason to act may
serve more generally as a new explanation why incentives may not work in certain contexts
like promoting effort in prosocial fundraising (Ashraf et al. 2014; Gneezy and Rustichini
2000b) and why the effectiveness of incentives vanishes substantially once they are re-
moved (Charness and Gneezy 2009; Kesternich et al. 2016; Meier 2007). Investigating
how people judge interventions by monetary incentives may help to better understand
when and for what processes incentives are a powerful tool and under which conditions
they may not work as intended (Bowles and Polania-Reyes 2012; Gneezy and Rustichini
2000a; Gneezy et al. 2011; Kamenica 2012). In this attempt, I focus not only the per-
ception of incentives per se, but also test whether a policy, that incentivizes information
acquisition, can reduce the aversion to incentives. Leaving room for also changing the rea-
son to act, the aversion to incentives may attenuate if not the outcome but the information
acquisition process is incentivized. While I do not find that the aversion to incentives is
reduced when incentivinzing information acquisition, results show that it at least reduces
the controversy of this issue between opponents and supporters of an outcome.
6See Bénabou and Tirole (2003, 2006) for economic models incorporating intrinsic motivation.
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 describes the experi-
mental design and states corresponding hypotheses. Section 2.3 presents the experimental
results before Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 Experimental Design
General setup
The experimental design builds on Ackfeld and Ockenfels (2019) and consists of two parts,
namely a laboratory and an online experiment. Instructions for both parts can be found
in Appendix 2.B.2, and the structure of the laboratory experiment is displayed in Figure
2.1. Participants in the online experiment, so-called judges, determine the rules of the
subsequent laboratory experiment. This means that they can influence the outcomes and
payoffs of lab participants, henceforth called decision-makers.7 Decision-makers choose
between receiving a payoff of 5€ without donating money and a payoff of 1€ including
a 6€ donation to UNICEF.8 Each donation finances tetanus vaccinations for 20 people
in developing countries. All decision-makers read a brief text introducing them to the
symptoms and the transmission channel of tetanus in the instructions.
The tasks of judges in the online experiment is to decide about the implementation
of a subsequent intervention for those decision-makers who initially decide against the
donation. This means that decision-makers choose one of the two payoff options first.
If they decide not to donate, they may be subsequently treated by an intervention to
change their decision into a donation.9 A judge randomly matched to them decides
about implementing this intervention or not. If a decision-maker donates already in the
first period, the intervention is always implemented at the end of the experiment. The
allowance of the subsequent interventions for those decision-makers, who do not donate
at the beginning, is my main outcome of interest in the experiment. Hence, the focus lies
on the decision of judges.10
7For the sake of comprehensibility, I refer to a judge as “she” and to a decision-maker as “he” in what
follows.
8Donation receipts are uploaded on the research homepage after the experiment, and I inform both
judges and decision-makers about the upload in the experimental instructions.
9Whenever a subsequent intervention is implemented, the decision-maker’s previous choice is prese-
lected as the default on the second choice screen.
10Except from descriptive statistics, I only report results regarding judges’ behavior in this paper.
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Figure 2.1: Structure of the laboratory experiment
Period 1: donate? 5€ or 1€ +
Belief elicitation 1
Instructions +
InstructionsInstructions Instructions
Informed
IncentivesIncentivesInformation
Paid
Information
Informative
video
Increase
own payoff
Increase
own payoff
Offer 2€ for
watching video
+2€ +2€
Period 2: donate? 5€ or 1€/3€ +
Belief elicitation 2
if not:
judge can
intervene by
Notes: Treatment differences separated by vertical lines. Judges decide between-subjects about
executing the intervention after decision-maker decided against the donation. Decision-makers,
who donate in the first period, always receive the intervention at the end of the experiment. Icons
symbolize the informative video and the donation for vaccination (© Mykola Lytvynenko, Dreamstime.com),
respectively.
Using a charitable donation paradigm allows me to study monetary incentives, which
are implemented in conflict with subjects’ initial wants and try to change their decision,
while maintaining feasibility of the experiment from a research ethics perspective. Finding
an aversion to monetary incentives for changing behavior in such an ethically rather
modest paradigm speaks in favor of finding the same or an even stronger effect in the
field. A paradigm instead focusing on consumption goods (Ambuehl 2017; Ambuehl et
al. 2019) would rather evoke paternalistic choices than a trade-off between the ability to
achieve a desired outcome and the inability to convince. Hence, it would not suit the
context I am studying. Moreover, in a donation paradigm, in which people may value
and want to foster the charitable outcome, the circumstances speak against detecting an
aversion to monetary incentives. This is because people, who value the donation, should
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use whatever tool they have at hand to promote the donation. Hence, finding an aversion
to money in a setting, in which people care for the charity, strengthens my findings.
Treatments
Judges decide about interventions in a between-subject design, i.e., each judge decides
about only one particular intervention. Section 2.B.1 in the Appendix displays how those
interventions are implemented in the different treatments. In the Information treatment,
the intervention consists of a video which informs participants about the process and ad-
vantages of tetanus vaccination.11 In the Incentives treatment, the intervention increases
the private payoff of the decision-maker if he donates by 2€ . This means that he receives a
payoff of 3€ instead of only 1€ for himself when choosing the 6€-donation. Importantly,
judges in all treatments watch the video themselves. Hence, information asymmetries
cannot drive judges’ intervention behavior.
If the aversion to monetary incentives for behavioral change stems from their lack of
changing someone’s reason to act, and information leave room for changing more than
actions, interventions by Information should be more frequently allowed by judges than
Incentives. In order to distinguish the effect of acting better informed (Ambuehl and
Ockenfels 2017; Ambuehl et al. 2018) from acting against one’s own conviction when be-
ing incentivized, I add an additional treatment. In this Informed Incentives treatment,
decision-makers already watch the informative video before making their first choice and
can afterwards be targeted by the 2€ incentive if they do not donate. Individuals not
donating in this treatment are informed about the donation – as informed as they can be
in the Information treatment – but they are not convinced to donate. Thus, an interven-
tion by incentives still disrespects their own choice. If the aversion to incentives stems
from their lack of changing someone’s reason to act, I expect judges to allow not only
Incentives but also Informed Incentives less frequently than Information.
11The video is published by UNICEF, 2:10 minutes long, and available via YouTube under
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zDcFHHwaQ1E in German. An English translation of the text
can be found in Appendix 2.B.3. Whenever a participant watches the video, the participant has to
answer two comprehension questions correctly before being able to proceed with the experiment. This
guarantees that participants pay attention to the video.
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Hypothesis 1: Judges allow subsequent interventions by Information more often than
interventions by Incentives and Informed Incentives.
In addition, a natural extension is to distinguish whether people generally refuse mon-
etary interventions, or whether acceptance rises if money leaves room to change not only
someone’s action but also the reason to act. In order to shed light on this question, I
give judges in a fourth treatment the opportunity to offer decision-makers a 2€ extra
payoff for watching the informative video about tetanus vaccinations. Again, judges de-
cide about subsequently implementing this intervention for initially donation-unwilling
decision-makers. This Paid Information treatment allows to investigate how money can
still be beneficially used to increase a prosocial outcome level if directly incentivizing the
outcome raises opposition. On the one hand, if money for behavioral change is generally
disliked, one should observe a similarly low willingness to intervene by Paid Information
as by Incentives and Informed Incentives. On the other hand, in the Paid Information
treatment, money is only used to incentivize the information acquisition process and
thereby leaves room for the decision-maker to convince himself of the benefits of donation
on the way. Both factors may apply in light of an aversion to incentives for behavioral
change. Since in Ackfeld and Ockenfels (2019) we find that procedural concerns play an
important role when deciding to intervene, I state my hypothesis in line with the latter
proposition, while the former constitutes a reasonable alternative hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: Judges allow subsequent interventions by Paid Information more often
than interventions by Incentives and Informed Incentives.
Decision-makers, who select the donation already as their first choice, always receive
the intervention at the end of the experiment. Judges are informed about this. Hence,
in fact, judges decide about not implementing the intervention for initially donation-
unwilling decision-makers rather than implementing it at all. By always implementing the
intervention for initially generous decision-makers, I can rule out that a lower willingness
to intervene by money than by information is driven by judges not wanting initially
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egoistic decision-makers in the end to be better off than initially generous ones. As a
consequence, refusing to intervene by monetary incentives in order to avoid that initially
egoistic decision-makers are better off than initially generous decision-makers cannot drive
my results.
Table 2.1: Beliefs elicited regarding donation rate, information level, and feeling convinced
Fraction donating before intervention after intervention
Information level:
tetanus vaccinations
before intervention after intervention
for donors for non-donors for new donors for non-donors
Convinced to choose
donation
before intervention after intervention
for donors for non-donors for new donors for non-donors
Notes: All beliefs elicited for judges on treatment level between-subjects. Judges in the Paid
Information treatment additionally guess the share of decision-makers agreeing to watch the
video. Beliefs “after intervention” (rightmost columns) are restricted to decision-makers who
initially do not donate, and are elicited with pre-intervention beliefs regarding the fraction
donating and regarding non-donors informedness and conviction displayed on screen.
At every stage decision-makers choose between donating or not, I closely track judges’
beliefs about decision-makers’ behavior and attitudes.12 First, judges state their belief
regarding the share of decision-makers who choose the donation. Second, conditional on
decision-makers donating or not, I separately elicit judges’ beliefs about how informed
the corresponding decision-makers feel about tetanus vaccinations and how convinced
decision-makers are that the donation is the payoff alternative one should choose in this
experiment. Decision-makers report these measures on a scale from 0 for feeling not at all
informed (convinced) to 100 for feeling fully informed (convinced). Judges report their
corresponding beliefs on the same scale for all situations which the decision-maker can
encounter. The full list of beliefs elicited is summarized in Table 2.1. In the Paid Informa-
tion treatment, I additionally ask for judges’ belief regarding the number of participants
watching the video. For each belief elicited, I pay the five best-guessing judges a bonus
12When eliciting beliefs with respect to post-intervention outcomes, I display the judge’s own pre-
intervention beliefs as reference points on screen, i.e, which fraction of decision-makers she thinks donates
as well as her beliefs regarding how informed and how convinced initially donation-unwilling decision-
makers feel.
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of 2€ to guarantee incentive compatible, truthful reporting.13 This generates the main
bonus opportunity for judges in the online experiment.
In line with the reasoning above that incentives can change behavior but not the rea-
son to act, I hypothesize that judges expect Incentives and Informed incentives to be
more effective, i.e., to attract more additional donors, than Information and Paid Infor-
mation. Nonetheless, they expect Incentives and Informed incentives to be less able than
Information and Paid Information to also affect the reason to act.
Hypothesis 3a: Beliefs about the effectiveness to change the behavior of non-donors are
higher for Incentives and Informed Incentives than for Information and Paid Information.
Hypothesis 3b: Beliefs about the ability to convince non-donors are lower for Incentives
and Informed Incentives than for Information and Paid Information.
Additional measures
I collect several additional measures related to the experiment after the main decisions
are made. First, judges state their valuation for allocating money to another decision-
maker or the charity, respectively, by adding or subtracting 1€ from their payoff. Thus,
I can control for judges’ general attitude towards giving money to the decision-maker or
the charity, respectively. Moreover, judges decide about showing another decision-maker
another video about tetanus vaccinations.14 Hereby, I can control for judges’ general
attitude towards confronting decision-makers with visuals about tetanus vaccinations.
Except for the decision to add or subtract money to or from the charity’s payoff, judges
make all other decisions conditional on the decision-maker’s choice in the experiment,
i.e., whether the decision-maker donates right from the beginning, after the intervention,
or never. All decisions are implemented as binary yes/no decisions, and one of them is
randomly chosen and implemented in the lab experiment in 10% of the cases independently
13Ties are broken randomly. In order to rule out endowment effects and since beliefs can only be
validated after the laboratory experiment took place, judges learn about their bonus from belief elicitation
only when they pick up their payoff the week after the laboratory experiment.
14As the first one, the second video is also published by UNICEF and is available via YouTube under
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zZJTnZvman0 in German. An English translation of the text can
be found in Appendix 2.B.3. Only the sequence from 0:05-0:41 and the sequence from 1:52-2:07 of the
original video are used to avoid potentially unpleasant scenes. Judges can but do not need to watch the
second video themselves.
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from any previous choice. Based on these decisions, I can not only control for judges’
general willingness to intervene by money and an informative video, respectively, but can
also do so conditionally on decision-makers acting generously in the experiment or not.
Thus, when included in regression analyses, I can rule out that feelings like, for example,
spite towards an initially egoistic decision-maker make judges refrain from intervening by
money.
Second, judges choose between the two payoff alternatives themselves, and I randomly
pick five judges for whom this decision is implemented. Judges state their own information
level and their conviction that the donation is the payoff alternative one should choose.
Letting judges make a donation decision for themselves allows to distinguish which judges
indeed prefer and hence likely want to foster the donation. Excluding judges, who do not
choose the donation and may not value the donation sufficiently, reduces noise in inter-
vention behavior.15 Judges’ own choice between the two payoff alternatives as well as
an allocation decision to divide 6€ between oneself and another decision-maker in the
lab, which controls for social preferences and which is also implemented for five randomly
selected judges, generate bonus options for judges beyond bonuses for beliefs. As a second
measure for whether judges care about the charity, judges make a decision between the
two payoff alternatives in case the decision-maker wants to delegate it. I give 10% of
decision-makers in the lab experiment the opportunity to delegate their choice between
the two payoff alternatives to the judge and implement the corresponding choice.16 De-
mographics and several attitudes related to the setting are elicited in a post-experimental
questionnaire.
15Note that this might exclude judges who generally value the charitable donation, but not sufficiently
to sacrifice their own money for it.
16As a further indicator in the Incentives and the Information treatment, I give judges in 10% of
the cases the opportunity to switch to the other treatment. Particularly, I ask judges in the Incentives
treatment whether they want to replace their initial intervention decision (intervene by the 2€ incentive
or not) by showing the decision-maker the video about tetanus vaccinations and vice versa. Note that
switching to an intervention by showing the video makes no sense in the Informed Incentives treatment
since decision-makers already watched it. Since the Paid Information treatment does not incentivize an
outcome but information acquisition, switching may be possible but complicates the setting dispropor-
tionately.
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Procedural details
Both judges and decision-makers stem from the same subject pool of the Cologne Lab-
oratory for Economic Research (CLER) at the University of Cologne and are randomly
invited to one of the two parts. Since the experiment focuses on the behavior of judges,
I sample more judges than decision-makers. I randomly draw some of these judges and
implement their decisions in the laboratory experiment, which takes place the week after
the online experiment. Judges receive a fixed 5€ compensation for participation plus
additional bonuses from the incentivized belief elicitation tasks, their own choice between
the two payoff alternatives, and the independent distribution task to measure social pref-
erences. They collect their payoff in cash the week after the laboratory experiment, i.e.,
two weeks after the online experiment. In addition to the variable payoff from the decision
to donate or not, decision-makers in the laboratory experiment receive a show-up fee of
4€.
Data collection for both parts of the experiment took place in May 2019. The ex-
periment was programmed in oTree (Chen et al. 2016) with participants recruited via
ORSEE (Greiner 2015). 380 and 88 subjects participated in the online and laboratory
experiment, respectively. The latter earned on average 8.08€ in 25-minute sessions in-
cluding a 4€ show-up fee. Online sessions took place within one week, and participants
received 5€ lump-sum plus an average bonus of 0.36€, which were paid out in cash two
weeks after the experiment.17 For collecting their payment, online participants received
an anonymous participant code at the end of the experiment.
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 2.2 reports descriptive statistics of both the online and the laboratory sample.
Judges and decision-makers are on average 25.6 and 25.3 years old and in 60.3% and
52.3% of the cases female, respectively. Judges chose the donation as their own choice
in 60.0% of the cases and implemented it in 75.5% of cases as the delegated choice for
17The pick-up rate was 58%.
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the decision-maker. 34.1% of decision-makers choose the donation on their own.18 This
fraction increases to 44.3% after the intervention stage. Pooling all treatments, 83.9% of
judges decide to intervene. 70.3% of judges consider the video as informative and 71.7%
as convincing.
Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics: Sample characteristics
Judges Decision-makers
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Female 0.603 0.495 0.523 0.525
Age 25.6 6.9 25.3 8.1
Intervention implemented 0.839 0.368
Donor 0.600 0.491
Donation chosen for DM as delegated choice 0.755 0.430
Social preference / Amount kept out of 6€ 4.537 1.453
Video considered as informative 0.703 0.250
Video considered as convincing 0.717 0.251
Donor before intervention 0.341 0.477
Donor after intervention 0.443 0.500
N 380 88
Notes: Except age and social preference, all variables reported as fractions. “Donor after in-
tervention” includes both donors donating after the intervention and right from the beginning.
2.3.2 Beliefs
Pre-intervention beliefs
In this section, I first of all verify that the video in the experiment affects judges’ beliefs re-
garding donation rates and how informed and convinced decision-makers feel, respectively.
I do so by comparing judges’ beliefs regarding these outcomes in the pre-intervention pe-
riod in the Informed Incentives treatment with all other treatments, which do not exhibit
a video stage before the first donation. Table 2.3 reports the corresponding OLS regres-
18The difference between judges’ and decision-makers’ donation share may stem from the fact that
the payoff choice is decision-makers’ main decision in the experiment and is implemented in 100% of the
cases. For judges, the main decision is to set the rules for the subsequent laboratory experiment, which
is emphasized in the instructions. On top of that, the donation is only implemented for five randomly
drawn judges and constitutes one bonus opportunity amongst others.
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sion results with different beliefs as the dependent variable and whether the video was
shown before the first donation decision as the independent variable.
As column (1) shows, judges’ beliefs about the donation rate are with 7.9 percent-
age points significantly higher if decision-makers see the video before they make their
initial donation decision in the Informed Incentives treatment. This is a large effect in
comparison to the baseline belief of 39.8%. The increase can be attributed to the informa-
tive nature of the video. Judges state significantly higher beliefs regarding how informed
decision-makers feel about tetanus vaccinations if the latter saw the video before. This
applies both to decision-makers who decide for the donation (column 2) and for those
who decide against it (column 3).
Table 2.3: OLS regression results regarding judges’ pre-intervention beliefs
Donations Feeling informed Feeling convinced
Donors Non-Donors Donors Non-Donors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Video before 1st decision 7.933*** 7.848*** 4.390* 0.736 2.385
(2.902) (2.179) (2.581) (2.022) (2.772)
Constant 39.807*** 70.532*** 45.350*** 83.864*** 45.125***
(1.539) (1.214) (1.392) (1.129) (1.402)
N 380 380 380 380 380
R2 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. “Video before 1st decision” corresponds to first
stage of Informed Incentives treatment. All other treatments serve as baseline. “Donors” cor-
responds to decision-makers choosing the donation, “Non-Donors” to decision-makers choosing
the egoistic option. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
In contrast, there is no difference in judges’ beliefs in terms of how convinced decision-
makers feel if decision-makers see or do not see the video. Judges belief that those who
donate feel similarly convinced that the donation is the option one should choose in
the experiment in all treatments (column 4); those who do not donate also feel simi-
larly convinced (column 5). In other words, independent of the treatment, judges expect
decision-makers to donate if they are convinced to do so, and do not expect them to
donate if they are not convinced. This is important for the subsequent analysis since
interventions in the Informed Incentives treatment target decision-makers believed to be
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similarly unconvinced as in all other treatments. Hence, decision-makers only differ in
the information level about tetanus vaccinations from judges’ perspective.
When adding controls for judges’ age and gender, social preferences, the option chosen
as delegated choice, adding or subtracting money in the independent distribution task or
showing another video, respectively, and several controls from the post-experimental ques-
tionnaire in Table 2.A.1, or restricting the sample only to judges who donate themselves
in Table 2.A.2 in the Appendix, results do not change.
Post-intervention beliefs
If there is a trade-off between incentives’ ability to change an action and to change the
reason to act, the corresponding beliefs of judges about post-intervention behavior and
attitudes are expected to differ by treatment. Figure 2.2 plots these beliefs and their
corresponding 95% confidence intervals. Panel (A) focuses on judges’ beliefs about which
share of initial non-donors alters the initial decision and decides to donate after the in-
tervention. Panel (A) reveals that judges expect with roughly 53% a higher increase in
donations in the Incentives and Informed Incentives treatments than in the Information
and Paid Information treatments with only 40% to 43% (all individual differences between
the former and the latter treatments: p < 0.008, ranksum test19). Put differently, judges
expect monetary incentives to be more effective in changing behavior than information or
the incentivized acquisition thereof. This provides support for Hypothesis 3a.
Result 1: Judges consider Incentives and Informed Incentives as more effective in in-
creasing donation outcomes than Information and Paid Information.
The opposite pictures prevails when looking at judges’ beliefs regarding the increase
in how convinced decision-makers, who switch from not-donating to donating, feel that
one should donate. Panel (B) of Figure 2.2 shows the highest increase in feeling convinced
compared to the individual conviction level after the first donation if the intervention is
19All p-values from ranksum tests in this paper refer to two-sided ranksum tests.
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Figure 2.2: Bar plots of judges’ beliefs regarding increases in donations and in feeling
convinced by treatment
(A) Increase in donations
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(B) Increase in feeling convinced
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Notes: Increases in the number of initial non-donors, who donate after the intervention, and
how convinced these new donors feel after their post-intervention donation compared to their in-
dividual pre-intervention, non-donor level of conviction. Vertical lines represent 95% confidence
intervals.
by Information or Paid Information.20 While there is a drop in this value in the Incen-
tives compared to the Information treatment, it is not statistically significant (p = 0.357,
ranksum test). However, when looking at the Informed Incentives treatment, in which
it it is clear that decision-makers are similarly informed about tetanus vaccinations as
they can be in the Information and Paid Information treatments, but nonetheless are
not convinced to donate, the drop in judges’ belief regarding feeling convinced is signif-
icant (p < 0.001, Information versus Informed Incentives, ranksum test).21 Moreover,
besides looking at individual differences in feeling convinced to donate before and after
the intervention, I examine the absolute level of feeling convinced of initial non-donors,
who switch to the donation after the intervention. As depicted in Figure 2.A.1 in the
Appendix, the absolute levels of feeling convinced to donate are significantly lower in
both the Incentives and the Informed Incentives treatments than in Information and
Paid Information (all p < 0.001, ranksum test). Overall, these results provide evidence
for the lacking ability of incentives to convince people. Table 2.4 substantiates findings
by OLS regression results with and without control variables for age and gender, social
20See Figure 2.A.1 in the Appendix for the corresponding bar graph of judges’ beliefs about how
informed initial non-donors feel when switching to the donation.
21The drop in judges’ belief regarding conviction is also marginally significant in the Informed Incen-
tives relative to the Incentives treatment (p = 0.051, ranksum test).
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Table 2.4: OLS regression results regarding judges’ post-intervention beliefs
Increase donations Increase informed Increase convinced
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Incentives 13.226*** 15.957*** -14.037*** -14.232*** -2.215 -3.780
(3.767) (3.709) (3.040) (3.349) (3.949) (4.182)
Informed 12.352*** 13.143*** -15.526*** -15.805*** -9.956** -10.141**
Incentives (3.679) (3.812) (3.120) (3.504) (3.906) (4.153)
Paid Info 3.167 6.863* 0.919 1.832 2.041 1.031
(3.784) (3.951) (3.561) (3.711) (4.016) (4.385)
Constant 40.258*** 8.464 28.326*** 43.782* 29.236*** 58.270**
(2.764) (20.373) (2.273) (23.749) (2.826) (27.239)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 380 380 380 380 380 380
R2 0.05 0.21 0.11 0.18 0.03 0.13
Notes: Table reports judges’ beliefs regarding increases in the number of initial non-donors,
who donate after the intervention, and how convinced (informed) these new donors feel after
their post-intervention donation compared to their individual pre-intervention, non-donor level
of conviction (information). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Information treatment
used as baseline category. Controls include age, gender, social preferences, survey controls,
whether the donation is chosen as delegated choice and by the judge herself, and dummies
for showing the video and giving/taking to/from the charity/decision-maker. * p<0.10, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
preferences, the option chosen as delegated choice, adding or subtracting money in the
independent distribution task or showing another video, respectively, and several controls
from the post-experimental questionnaire. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.4 additionally con-
firm the informativeness of the video. Results remain unchanged when only considering
beliefs of those judges who donate themselves in Table 2.A.2 in the Appendix. Hence, for
Informed Incentives and directionally also for Incentives, I find support for Hypothesis 3b.
Result 2: Judges consider Informed Incentives as less able to convince non-donors
than Information and Paid Information.
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2.3.3 Intervention behavior
How does the perceived trade-off between incentives’ ability to change behavior but their
relative inability to change the reason to act transfer into judges’ intervention behavior?
Figure 2.3 plots the frequencies by which judges intervene for each treatment.
Figure 2.3: Bar plots of intervention behavior by treatment
(A) Full sample
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(B) Only donors
 , Q I R U P D W L R Q  3 D L G 
  , Q I R U P D W L R Q
 , Q F H Q W L Y H V  , Q I R U P H G 
  , Q F H Q W L Y H V
   
   
   
   
   
   
 ) U
 D F
 W L R
 Q 
 L Q
 W H
 U Y
 H Q
 L Q
 J
Notes: Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. “Donors” corresponds to restricted
sample of judges who would donate themselves.
In the full sample in Panel (A), there is no statistically significant difference between
any of the treatments (all individual treatment differences p ≥ 0.199 in ranksum tests).22
However, analyzing the full sample of judges ignores that some judges may not even value
the donation to charity and see no objective in enhancing it. In order to rule out such
a confound, Panel (B) studies only those judges, who choose the donation themselves.
In this sample, intervention behavior differs by treatment. Except one judge, all out of
55 judges allow the subsequent intervention in decision-makers behavior by Information,
which is not statistically different from 100% in a t-test (p = 0.322). In contrast, inter-
vention rates are significantly lower in all other treatments. Compared to the Information
treatment, participants are 10.5 percentage points less likely to intervene by Incentives,
which is a statistically significant decrease (p = 0.033, ranksum test). This decrease even
doubles if looking at the Informed Incentives treatment, in which judges know that they
target behavioral change of informed but still not convinced decision-makers. Under such
22Intervention rates are generally rather high and in particular higher than in Ackfeld and Ockenfels
(2019). This may be due to the fact that the donation in this experiment is financed by windfall money
and does not require a previous real-effort task as in Ackfeld and Ockenfels (2019).
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conditions, money is disliked the most. Note that finding a more pronounced drop in
the willingness to intervene by Informed Incentives compared to Incentives (p = 0.144,
ranksum test) reassures that not a pure aversion to give extra money to initially egoistic
types drives the aversion to use monetary incentives. In that case, intervention rates in the
Incentives and Informed Incentives treatment should be equal. Rather, setting monetary
incentives to evoke behavior in clear opposition to what one is convinced to do appears
to be the driving force behind the aversion to monetary incentives. Additional results
reported in Figure 2.A.2 in the Appendix and the discussion thereof further support this
idea by showing that judges more likely intervene the larger they perceive the convincing
effect of the intervention on decision-makers to be.
When looking at judges’ willingness to intervene in the Paid Information treatment,
which incentivizes the information acquisition process, I find a similar intervention rate
as that in the Incentives treatment (p = 0.701, ranksum test), i.e., a significantly lower
one than in the Information treatment (p = 0.014, ranksum test). This means that
incentivizing the information acquisition process instead of the donation outcome and
thereby leaving room to become convinced of the donation does not eliminate the aversion
to using money.
Regression results from a linear probability model in columns 1 and 3 of Table 2.5 con-
firm the effects just discussed for the full sample and for the restricted sample of donors,
respectively. All effects remain unchanged if various control variables are included in the
regressions in columns 2 and 4: demographic control variables for age and gender, social
preferences, the option chosen as delegated choice, adding or subtracting money in the
independent distribution task or showing another video, respectively, and several controls
from the post-experimental questionnaire. In all specifications, which exclude noise in
form of judges not donating and thus not sufficiently valuing the prosocial outcome, I
find an aversion to monetary incentives. Using probit and logit regression models in Ta-
ble 2.A.3 in the Appendix confirms these results and reveals even larger marginal effects
regarding donors’ aversion to monetary incentives for changing others’ behavior. In sum-
mary, I find evidence for Hypothesis 1, claiming that interventions by Information are
more often allowed than interventions by Incentives and Informed Incentives. However, I
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Table 2.5: Linear probability model of likelihood to intervene by treatment
Full sample Donors Non-Donors Full sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Incentives 0.011 0.021 -0.105** -0.117* 0.199** 0.253* 0.199** 0.222**
(0.050) (0.059) (0.048) (0.063) (0.099) (0.130) (0.099) (0.110)
Informed Incentives -0.055 -0.025 -0.208*** -0.197*** 0.192* 0.342*** 0.192* 0.276**
(0.054) (0.060) (0.057) (0.062) (0.100) (0.125) (0.100) (0.109)
Paid Information -0.057 -0.037 -0.130** -0.123* 0.074 0.087 0.074 0.090
(0.055) (0.060) (0.053) (0.063) (0.108) (0.128) (0.108) (0.112)
Donor 0.071 0.305*** 0.304***
(0.061) (0.085) (0.099)
Incentives -0.303*** -0.324***
# Donor (0.110) (0.122)
Informed Incentives -0.400*** -0.471***
# Donor (0.115) (0.123)
Paid Information -0.203* -0.194
# Donor (0.121) (0.127)
Intercept 0.865*** 0.901*** 0.982*** 0.675 0.676*** 1.172* 0.676*** 0.741**
(0.037) (0.335) (0.018) (0.427) (0.083) (0.631) (0.083) (0.327)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 380 380 228 228 152 152 380 380
R2 0.01 0.13 0.05 0.25 0.04 0.25 0.05 0.18
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Information treatment used as baseline cat-
egory. “Donors” corresponds to restricted sample of judges who would donate themselves,
“Non-Donors” to judges not donating. Controls include age, gender, social preferences, sur-
vey controls, whether the donation is chosen as delegated choice, and dummies for showing the
video and giving/taking to/from the charity/decision-maker. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
do not find statistical support for Hypothesis 2, which suggests a less pronounced aversion
to incentivinzing the information acquisition process in the Paid Information treatment
compared to Incentives and Informed Incentives.
Result 3: Judges are less willing to intervene by Incentives, Informed Incentives, and
Paid Information than by Information.
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 2.5 additionally report results regarding the intervention
behavior of judges not willing to donate themselves, as depicted in Figure 2.A.3 in the
Appendix. Compared to the Information treatment, judges unwilling to donate inter-
vene significantly more often by Incentives and Informed Incentives. Hence, I find the
opposite pattern than for judges who donate themselves. This differential effect can be
decomposed in columns 7 and 8 of Table 2.5 when looking at interaction effects between
judges’ own donation behavior and the treatment dummies. Judges, who value the dona-
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tion and donate themselves, generally intervene more often since they want to foster the
prosocial outcome. This amounts to a 30.5 percentage points increase in interventions
with and without control variables. Relative to this generally higher willingness of donors
to intervene, there is a strong differential effect for donors in Incentives and Informed
Incentives treatments compared to those in Information. In the former two treatments,
donors strongly shy away from intervening by money, which amounts to a drop in inter-
ventions of 30.3 to 47.1 percentage points. Thus, the aversion to intervene by monetary
incentives counteracts their general willingness to intervene. In total, this results in a
drop in donors’ willingness to intervene in Incentives and Informed Incentives treatments.
Contrarily, since non-donors do not want to foster the donation, but prefer money, they
are willing to transfer their favorism for money on decision-makers and implement the
payoff increase in Incentives and Informed Incentives treatments. As a result, the over-
all intervention rate in the Incentives treatment, for example, appears to be similar for
donors and non-donors with 87.7% and 87.5%, respectively, but is driven by very different
motives.
Note that the differential effect regrading donors and non-donors intervention behavior
is much less pronounced in the Paid Information treatment. This means that incentivizing
the information acquisition process seems not to create similarly strong opposite responses
between those who like or dislike the outcome as Incentives and Informed Incentives
do. Therefore, while incentivinzing the information acquisition process cannot solve the
aversion to incentives per se in this experiment, it may be able to at least resolve very
strong opposing opinions regarding the monetary, interventional tool.
2.4 Conclusion
In this paper, I investigate the aversion to monetary incentives for changing behavior.
In an experiment, in which one group of participants can attempt to change the dona-
tion behavior of others, I find that participants’ willingness to intervene is lower if the
intervention consists of money instead of information. This finding is surprising at first
glance given that people believe that money is more effective than information to change
people’s behavior. A comprehensive set of elicited beliefs allows me to track this aversion
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back to money’s inability to change more than just actions, i.e., one’s reason to act. In-
centivinzing the information acquisition process instead of the outcome does not resolve
the aversion to incentives.
The paper’s investigation of incentives’ inability to change the reason to act can help
to understand why monetary incentives sometimes do not work as intended (Ashraf et al.
2014; Bowles and Polania-Reyes 2012; Gneezy and Rustichini 2000a,b; Gneezy et al. 2011;
Kamenica 2012) or prevail to be ineffective in the long-run (Charness and Gneezy 2009;
Kesternich et al. 2016; Meier 2007). Similarly, it provides an explanation for why people
shy away from monetarily incentivizing others when the incentivized action conflicts with
rather than corresponds to an individual’s autonomous choice (Ackfeld and Ockenfels
2019). My results also help to better evaluate which interventional tools may be feasible
to be implemented by policy makers in the field. While Ambuehl and Ockenfels’s (2017)
vignette study finds support for the use of incentives in ethically loaded contexts as long
as participants are cognitively aware of the consequences of the incentivized action, this
project’s results show that incentives may still not be a feasible tool if people have already
made a decision for themselves. Moreover, results do not confirm that avoiding to directly
incentivize outcomes as in Elias et al. (2019) significantly resolves concerns with monetary
incentives.
My results may apply to so-called repugnant contexts like organ or blood donation
(Roth 2007), but also more generally. In many domains in life like eating less meat,
studying for long-run goals, or flying less, acting based on what one is convinced to do
instead of what one is incentivized to do may be preferred by uninvolved parties. While
similar results have been found in the economic literature on motivation crowding (Bowles
and Polania-Reyes 2012; Frey and Jegen 2001; Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997; Titmuss
1970), this paper documents an aversion to monetary incentives also in a context in
which motivation crowding-out does not apply. This establishes the aversion to monetary
incentives for changing behavior as a more fundamental principle than previously assumed.
Money’s inability to convince may explain why one often finds information campaigns
rather than monetary incentives in the real world. For example, instead of increasing
fines, policy makers often use safety campaigns on highways to foster considerate driving.
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Instead of pricing roads or plastics, they appeal to climate friendly behavior via awareness
campaigns. How to change people’s behavior is a main political issue. Money’s inability
to convince people may explain why the use of monetary incentives in real life is limited
and why it constitutes a steady topic of discourse between political parties.
Further research is needed to distinguish in detail under which conditions the aversion
to monetary incentives applies and how it is affected by different institutional settings.
Moreover, since this paper exclusively focuses on beliefs and behavior of the unaffected,
intervening party, the responses of the parties affected by the intervention additionally
have to be taken into account. Feedback about these responses may affect the intervening
party’s beliefs and intervention behavior, and may reshape how the trade-off between
money’s ability to change actions but its inability to change the underlying reason to act
is perceived.
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2.A Appendix: Additional results
Table 2.A.1: OLS regression results regarding judges’ pre-intervention beliefs with controls
Donations Feeling informed Feeling convinced
Donors Non-Donors Donors Non-Donors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Video before 1st decision 6.768** 8.660*** 4.843* 1.712 2.855
(2.940) (2.443) (2.845) (1.889) (2.930)
Constant 15.636 43.998** 9.950 54.345* 15.016
(21.575) (18.654) (24.841) (31.760) (21.111)
N 380 380 380 380 380
R2 0.22 0.12 0.10 0.14 0.07
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. “Video before 1st decision” corresponds to first
stage of Informed Incentives treatment. All other treatments serve as baseline. “Donors” cor-
responds to decision-makers choosing the donation, “Non-Donors” to decision-makers choosing
the egoistic option. Controls include age, gender, social preferences, survey controls, whether the
donation is chosen as delegated choice and by the judge herself, and dummies for showing the
video and giving/taking to/from the charity/decision-maker. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table 2.A.2: Regression results regarding judges’ pre- and post-intervention beliefs - Only
donors
Donations Informed Informed Convinced Convinced Increase Increase Increase
before before D before ND before D before ND donations informed convinced
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Video before 1st decision 8.770** 8.973*** 8.772*** 3.252 4.634
(3.564) (2.388) (3.044) (1.984) (3.387)
Incentives 14.667*** -18.188*** -6.374
(4.921) (3.806) (4.905)
Informed Incentives 11.647** -22.806*** -12.871***
(4.632) (3.659) (4.389)
Paid Info 2.722 2.905 0.780
(4.984) (4.319) (4.664)
Intercept 46.892*** 71.753*** 42.922*** 85.054*** 43.108*** 45.982*** 32.855*** 35.145***
(2.027) (1.500) (1.772) (1.468) (1.756) (3.579) (2.755) (3.167)
N 228 228 228 228 228 228 228 228
R2 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.23 0.05
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. “Video before 1st decision” corresponds to first
stage of Informed Incentives treatment. All other treatments serve as baseline in columns 1
- 5. Information treatment used as baseline category in columns 6 - 8. “D” corresponds to
decision-makers choosing the donation, “ND” to decision-makers choosing no donation. Only
restricted sample of judges donating themselves considered. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Figure 2.A.1: Bar plots of judges’ beliefs of feeling convinced (absolute) and increase in
feeling informed after intervention by treatment
(A) Absolute belief of feeling convinced
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(B) Increase in feeling informed
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Notes: Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Panel (A) displays absolute values of
judges’ beliefs regarding how convinced initial non-donors feel after switching to the donation.
Panel (B) displays judges’ beliefs regarding how much more informed initial non-donors feel
after the intervention.
Intervention behavior by perceived power of intervention to convince
If the ability to convince matters for the willingness to use an intervention, judges
may intervene more often when considering an intervention as more convincing. On the
individual level, this effect should hold independent of the treatment. For example, a
judge in the Informed Incentives treatment, who holds a higher belief than another judge
in the same treatment that an intervention by money is convincing, should more likely
intervene by money than the other judge even if the ability of monetary incentives to
convince is generally perceived to be lower than that of, e.g., Information. As Figure
2.A.2 displays, this pattern holds in all treatments except the Incentives treatment. In
those treatments, the judge’s belief that the intervention is convincing is higher if she
decides to intervene than if she decides not to intervene. Thus, the ability to convince
appears to guide intervention behavior.
From a statistical perspective, note that the 95% confidence intervals in Figure 2.A.2
are rather large when looking at judges who do not intervene. This is due to the small
number of observations in this subsample, which results in limited statistical power to
detect a difference between intervening and non-intervening judges. Yet, an independent
samples t-test confirms that judges who intervene expect the intervention to convince
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decision-makers significantly more (p = 0.051). This supports the idea that intervention
behavior is driven by the intervention’s ability to convince.
Figure 2.A.2: Bar plots of judges’ beliefs regarding increase in feeling convinced by treat-
ment and intervention decision
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Notes: Increase in how convinced new donors feel after their post-intervention donation
compared to their individual pre-intervention, non-donor level of conviction. Vertical lines
represent 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 2.A.3: Bar plots of intervention behavior of non-donors by treatment
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Notes: Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. “Non-Donors” corresponds to re-
stricted sample of judges who would not donate themselves
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Table 2.A.3: Marginal effects from probit and logit models of likelihood to intervene by
treatment
Full sample Donors
Logit Probit Logit Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Incentives 0.013 0.013 -0.181** -0.171**
(0.058) (0.057) (0.077) (0.075)
Informed Incentives -0.054 -0.055 -0.247*** -0.246***
(0.053) (0.053) (0.066) (0.068)
Paid Info -0.056 -0.056 -0.201*** -0.192***
(0.054) (0.054) (0.074) (0.073)
N 380 380 228 228
Pseudo R2 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.08
Notes: Marginal effects at mean of logit and probit models, respec-
tively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Information treatment
used as baseline category. “Donors” corresponds to restricted sample
of judges who would donate themselves. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01.
79
2.B Appendix: Experimental material
2.B.1 Screenshots of treatment differences
Figure 2.B.1: Decision screen judge: Incentives and Informed Incentives treatments
Figure 2.B.2: Decision screen judge: Information treatment
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Figure 2.B.3: Decision screen judge: Paid Information treatment
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Instructions online experiment 
 
Information regarding participation 
Study titel: CvsB Online 
Supervisor: Viola Ackfeld 
 
Description: You participate in a scientific decision-making experiment. You will be asked to 
read instructions, answer questions, and make several choices which can determine the 
amount you and other participants are going to be paid. On top of that, this experiment contains 
video sequences. You will receive your payment in cash in the week from May 27 to May 31 
at the “Studierenden Service Center (SSC)“ of the University of Cologne. 
 
Participant rights: Your participation in this experiment is voluntary. In order to use your data 
for research, you need to complete the entire experiment. You may withdraw from participation 
at any time during the experiment without giving any reasons. 
Data protection: All statements in this experiment are made anonymously and do not allow to 
draw conclusions regarding individual participants. There is no relationship between your 
anonymous statements in the experiment and the personal data, which are stored in the 
participant portal of the Cologne Laboratory for Economics Research (CLER) for the sake of 
invitation to experiments. Data will be used for scientific purposes only and will be saved only 
for scientific data analysis. In order to guarantee scientific transparency and within scientific 
cooperation projects, the collected data may be made available for subsequent use by third 
parties. 
 
I understand that I may contact the supervisor of this experiment if I require further information 
about the research, and that I may contact the supervisor of this experiment or the Ethics 
Commission in charge if I wish to make a complaint related to my involvement in the research. 
 
I agree to these conditions.            Yes, participate / No, do not participate 
 
Contact information 
Supervisor: Viola Ackfeld, ackfeld@wiso.uni-koeln.de 
Ethics Commission: Michael Otten, otten@wiso.uni-koeln.de
2.B.2 Instructions
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 Information regarding the experiment 
Welcome to this experiment and thank you for your participation. Since this experiment 
includes video sequences, please ensure that you can listen to them when you proceed with 
the experiment. If you do not load the experiment from a computer, please also make sure that 
you are connected to a WiFi network or have enough data at your disposal, respectively. 
This experiment consists of two parts. You were randomly chosen from the pool of registered 
participants* of the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research (CLER) to participate in the 
first part of the experiment, the online experiment. The second part of the experiment consists 
of a laboratory experiment, in which further randomly chosen participants will participate, who 
are registered for experiments at the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research (CLER) as 
you are. It is not possible to participate in both parts of the experiment. The second part of the 
experiment is going to be executed next week. 
Your task in this online experiment is to determine the rules of the subsequent laboratory 
experiment. Thus, the choice options and the payoff of a participant in the laboratory 
experiment depend on your decision. If you set a rule, then the corresponding rule is 
implemented in the laboratory experiment. Please take these consequences into account when 
making your decisions. If there will be more participants in the online experiment than in the 
laboratory experiment, we will choose randomly with equal chance among all participants of 
the online experiment whose decisions are going to be implemented. 
Today’s online experiment will take 15 to 20 minutes. Your payoff in case of full participation in 
this experiment is 5€. You receive your payment in cash in the week from May 27 to May 31 
at the “Studierenden Service Center (SSC)“. Additionally, you have the opportunity to earn a 
bonus. 
You can receive a bonus either by a decision at the end of this experiment or by a correct 
guess regarding participants‘ behavior in the laboratory experiment. During the course of the 
experiment, there will be several of these guesses. For each of these guesses, those five 
participants in this online experiment, whose single guesses are closest to the true average 
value in the laboratory experiment, receive a bonus of 2€ each. 
* If the word participants is mentioned in this experiment, it refers to male, female, and diverse participants. 
 
 
Payoff decision 
In the laboratory experiment participants can choose between two payoff alternatives. In case 
of choosing the one alternative, they earn a higher payoff for themselves; in case of choosing 
the other, they earn a smaller payoff for themselves, but donate money to the charity UNICEF 
for vaccinations against the disease tetanus in developing countries. In particular, participants 
can choose between the following payoff alternatives: 
A) Receive 5€ as your own payoff, do not donate money 
B) Receive 1€ as your own payoff, donate 6€ 
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 When we refer to „the donation“ in this experiment, alternative B is meant. After the experiment, 
we are going to upload the donation receipts on our website ockenfels.uni-koeln.de under the 
category „Aktuelles”. 
 
 
Info box: Tetanus vaccination 
 
With a donation to UNICEF within the framework of this experiment, 20 people in developing 
countries can be vaccinated against the disease tetanus. These 20 people receive three 
vaccinations each to be protected against tetanus for several years. In case of giving birth, 
the immunization is also temporarily transferred to the newborn child. 
Tetanus, also known as lockjaw, is a disease, in which bacteria get into the body via 
contaminated wounds. There, the poison of the bacteria initiates muscle strength, which can 
be fatal. Especially when giving birth, there is an increased risk that mother or child fall sick 
of tetanus. 
 
Sources: Federal Center for Health Education, World Health Organization 
 
At this point, we show you a video about tetanus vaccinations. Please watch the video. 
Afterwards, we will ask you some brief questions regarding the content of the video before you 
can proceed with the experiment. Participants in the laboratory experiment see the info box 
but not the video [informed incentives: both the info box and the video]. 
 
Video 
 [video] 
Control questions:  
1. For how long after birth is a child protected against tetanus if the mother is 
vaccinated against tetanus? [not at all, 2 month, 3 weeks, 1 year] 
2. How are the fridges operated, in which the tetanus vaccine is stored? [with solar 
energy, with electricity, with gasoline, there is no need to cool the vaccine] 
 
[proceed only if answered correctly, otherwise watch again] 
 
 
Video 
On a scale from 0 = „not at all informative“ to 100 = „fully informative“: How informative do you 
think is the video? 
On a scale from 0 = „not at all convincing“ to 100 = „fully convincing“:  How convincing do you 
think is the video? 
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Guesses I 
At this point, please guess which decisions and statements participants in the laboratory 
experiment will make. For each of these guesses, those five participants in this online 
experiment, whose single guesses are closest to the true average value in the laboratory 
experiment, receive a bonus of 2€ each. 
As already explained, participants in the laboratory experiment decide between the following 
payoff alternatives without having watched the video about tetanus vaccinations [informed 
incentives: after having watched the video about tetanus vaccinations]:  
A) Receive 5€ as your own payoff, do not donate money 
B) Receive 1€ as your own payoff, donate 6€ 
 
What do you think, which fraction of participants in the laboratory experiment will choose the 
donation (Alternative B)? 
____% 
On a scale from 0 = „not at all well informed“ to 100 = „fully informed“: What do you think, how 
well informed do participants in the laboratory experiment feel on average about tetanus 
vaccinations… 
… if they decide for the donation?   ____ 
… if they decide against the donation?   ____ 
 
On a scale from 0 = „not at all convinced“ to 100 = „fully convinced“: What do you think, how 
convinced do participants in the laboratory experiment feel on average that the donation is 
the payoff alternative one should choose in such a situation… 
… if they decide for the donation?   ____ 
… if they decide against the donation?   ____ 
 
 
Your task in this online experiment 
Your task in this experiment consists of defining the rules for a participant in the subsequent 
laboratory experiment. This participant will be randomly assigned to you. If this participant has 
chosen 5€ for himself and has thereby decided against the donation, you can decide whether 
he should subsequently receive additional information regarding tetanus vaccinations by video 
/ an additional payoff of 2€ for himself [for watching the video about tetanus vaccinations], so 
that he changes his decision and donates. Participants, who decide for the donation already 
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 at the beginning, always receive the additional information regarding tetanus vaccinations by 
video / an additional payoff of 2€ for themselves / the opportunity to inform themselves about 
tetanus vaccinations and receive a compensation of 2€ for this at the end of the experiment. 
[Information]: You can show the participant in the laboratory experiment the video about 
tetanus vaccinations, which you have watched yourself before. 
[Paid information]: You can offer the participant in the laboratory experiment an additional 
payoff of 2€, which he receives if he watches the video about tetanus vaccinations, which you 
have watched yourself before. 
[Incentives, informed incentives]: You can increase the private payoff of the participant in the 
laboratory experiment subsequently by 2€ if he chooses the donation. Instead of  
A) Receive 5€ as your own payoff, do not donate money 
B) Receive 1€ as your own payoff, donate 6€ 
he can then choose between 
A) Receive 5€ as your own payoff, do not donate money 
B) Receive 3€ as your own payoff, donate 6€ 
 
Do you want to show the participant matched to you the video / offer the participant matched 
to you a 2€ higher payoff [for watching the video] if he initially decided against the donation? 
Afterwards, the participant has the opportunity to choose between the two payoff alternatives 
again. Yes/No 
 
 
Guesses II       
At this point, please guess again which decisions and statements participants in the laboratory 
experiment will make. For each of these guesses, those five participants in this online 
experiment, whose single guesses are closest to the true average value in the laboratory 
experiment, receive a bonus of 2€ each. 
Values of your previous guesses  
Proportion of participants who donate in %        x 
Informedness of participants who decide against the donation        y 
Convincedness of participants who decide against the donation        z 
 
 
[paid information] What do you think, which fraction of participants in the laboratory experiment, 
who initially decided against the donation, will watch the video if they receive an additional 
payoff for this? 
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 ____% 
 
What do you think, which fraction of participants in the laboratory experiment, who initially 
decided against the donation, decide to donate after all, if they receive additional information 
by video / an additional payoff [for watching the video]? 
____% 
 
On a scale from 0 = „not at all well informed“ to 100 = „fully informed“: What do you think, how 
well informed do participants in the laboratory experiment, who initially decided against the 
donation and then receive additional information by video / an additional payoff [for watching 
the video], feel on average about tetanus vaccinations,… 
… if they subsequently decide for the donation instead?  ____ 
… if they continue to decide against the donation?    ____ 
 
On a scale from 0 = „not at all convinced“ to 100 = „fully convinced“: What do you think, how 
convinced do participants in the laboratory experiment, who initially decided against the 
donation and then receive additional information by video / an additional payoff [for watching 
the video], feel on average that the donation is the payoff alternative one should choose in 
such a situation,… 
… if they subsequently decide for the donation instead?  ____ 
… if they continue to decide against the donation?    ____  
 
 
Further decisions 
Besides your opportunity to receive a bonus for correct guesses, at this point you have a further 
opportunity to increase your fixed payoff of 5€. 
Below, you see the two payoff alternatives again. Which alternative would you choose for 
yourself? For five randomly drawn participants in the online experiment, we are going to 
execute this choice. Thus, you could receive the corresponding monetary amount as a bonus 
for yourself, and, if applicable, we would donate 6€ for tetanus vaccinations to UNICEF. There 
is no subsequent possibility to change your decision.  
A) Receive 5€ as your own payoff, do not donate money 
B) Receive 1€ as your own payoff, donate 6€ 
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 On a scale from 0 = „not at all well informed“ to 100 = „fully informed“: How well informed do 
you feel about tetanus vaccinations? 
____ 
On a scale from 0 = „not at all convinced“ to 100 = „fully convinced“: How convinced do you 
feel that the donation is the payoff alternative one should choose in such a situation? 
____ 
 
 
Further decisions 
Independent of your previous decisions, in 10% of the cases you can show another participant 
in the laboratory experiment a [informed incentives, information, paid information: another] 
video about tetanus vaccinations or initiate an increase or reduction of his payoff. Moreover, 
you can initiate an increase or reduction of the total amount donated to UNICEF for tetanus 
vaccinations. You make eleven decisions of this kind. One of these eleven decisions will then 
be randomly chosen with equal probability and implemented at the end of the laboratory 
experiment. 
Do you want to deduct 1€ from the donation to UNICEF? 
- Yes 
- No 
Do you want to add 1€ to the donation to UNICEF? 
- Yes 
- No 
Do you want to deduct 1€ from the payoff of another participant? [each time yes/no] 
- If he donates right at the beginning 
- If he donates if he has received additional information by video / an additional payoff 
[for watching the video] 
- If he never donates 
Do you want to add 1€ to the payoff of another participant? [each time yes/no] 
- If he donates right at the beginning 
- If he donates if he has received additional information by video / an additional payoff 
[for watching the video] 
- If he never donates 
Do you want to show another participant another video about tetanus vaccinations? If you 
want, you can watch the video beforehand. [show video] [each time yes/no] 
- If he donates right at the beginning 
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 - If he donates if he has received additional information by video / an additional payoff 
[for watching the video] 
- If he never donates 
 
 
Further decisions 
Besides your opportunity to receive a bonus for correct guesses, at this point you have a further 
opportunity to increase your fixed payoff of 5€. 
 If you can divide an amount of 6€ between yourself and another participant in the laboratory 
experiment, independent of your already made decisions, which distribution do you choose? 
For five randomly drawn participants in the online experiment, we are going to execute this 
choice. Thus, you and a participant in the laboratory experiment would both receive the 
corresponding amount of money. 
Self 
 
0€ 
Participant in the 
laboratory experiment 
6€ 
 
 
O 
1€ 5€ O 
2€ 4€ O 
3€ 3€ O 
4€ 2€ O  
5€ 1€ O 
6€ 0€ O 
 
 
[only in information, incentives] 
At this point, you can choose another measure to change the mind of the participant matched 
to you so that he changes his decision and donates if he initially decided against the donation. 
In 10% of the cases, we implement this measure instead of the previous measure. 
[information] Instead of showing the participant in the laboratory experiment the video about 
tetanus vaccinations, you can increase his payoff by 2€ if he chooses the donation. Instead of  
A) Receive 5€ as your own payoff, do not donate money 
B) Receive 1€ as your own payoff, donate 6€ 
he can then choose between 
A) Receive 5€ as your own payoff, do not donate money 
B) Receive 3€ as your own payoff, donate 6€ 
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  [incentives] Instead of offering the participant in the laboratory experiment an additional payoff 
of 2€ for himself, you can show him the video about tetanus vaccinations, which you have 
watched yourself before. 
In your previous decision, you have decided that the participant in the laboratory experiment 
matched to you should subsequently receive [no] additional informationen by video / [no] 
additional payoff for himself if he initially decided against the donation. 
[set previous intervention decision  (first button) as a default for radio button] 
O [not allowed] Do not intervene / [information + allowed] Show video / [incentives + 
allowed] Offer a 2€ higher payoff 
O [information] Offer a 2€ higher payoff / [incentives] Show video 
If you want to stick with [not allowed] not intervening / [information + allowed] showing the 
participant the video about tetanus vaccinations / [incentives + allowed] offering the participant 
a 2€ higher payoff for himself, click on „continue“. If you prefer to [information] offer the 
participant a 2€ higher payoff for himself / [incentives] show the participant the video about 
tetanus vaccinations, first click on this option and then on „continue“. 
 
 
Questionnaire 
Please answer the following questions. You can refine your answer on a 7-point-scale from 
1=”fully agree”, 7=”fully disagree”. 
1. Tetanus is a serious disease. 
2. Vaccination is useful. 
3. UNICEF is a reliable charity. 
4. In this experiment, it is morally reprehensible not to donate. 
5. I decided such that the participant benefits first and foremost. 
6. I wish that the participant in the laboratory experiment receives a fair payoff. 
 
 
 
Questionnaire 
Please answer the following questions. You can refine your answer on a 7-point-scale from 
1=”fully agree”, 7=”fully disagree”. 
 
 
7.  One should not try to dissuade somebody from a decision he made himself. 
8. It is better if people act by intrinsic motives (e.g., interest, conviction, …) than by 
extrinsic motives (e.g., duty, payment, …). 
9. Money can change convictions. 
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Questionnaire 
Please answer the following questions. You can refine your answer on a 7-point-scale from 
1=”fully agree”, 7=”fully disagree”. 
 
10. There should be more information campaigns regarding blood donation. 
11. There should be more information campaigns regarding organ donation. 
12. People should receive a payoff for donating blood. 
13. People should receive a payoff for donating an organ. 
 
 
 
Questionnaire 
Please answer the following questions. You can refine your answer on a 7-point-scale from 
1=”fully agree”, 7=”fully disagree”. 
 
14. I do the experimenter a favor if I state a high value regarding the question: “On a 
scale from 0 = „not at all well informed“ to 100 = „fully informed“: What do you think, 
how well informed do participants in the laboratory experiment feel on average about 
tetanus vaccinations?“ 
15. I do the experimenter a favor if I state a high value regarding the question: “On a 
scale from 0 = „not at all convinced“ to 100 = „fully convinced“: What do you think, how 
convinced do participants in the laboratory experiment feel on average that the 
donation is the payoff alternative one should choose in such a situation?” 
 
 
Personal details 
Please provide the following information about yourself: 
Age: ____ years 
Gender: male, female, diverse 
Semester: ___ 
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 Department: WiSo Fakultät, Rechtswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Medizinische Fakultät, 
Philosophische Fakultät, Mat-Nat Fakultät, Humanwissenschaftliche Fakultät, other, I’m not a 
student 
Major: ______________________ 
Nationality: _________________ 
How did you access the experiment? [Computer/Laptop, Mobile phone, Tablet, other device] 
Do you want to tell us something regarding this experiment? _________________________ 
 
 
Payoff 
The experiment is finished now. 
[if randomly selected for donation] You belong to the five randomly selected participant in the 
online experiment whose decision between the two payoff alternatives is implemented. You 
chose alternative [A/B] with/without donation. You receive a payoff of 1/5€, and 0/6€ are 
donated to UNICEF for tetanus vaccinations. 
[if randomly selected for social preferences] You belong to the five randomly selected 
participant in the online experiment whose distribution decision between you and a participant 
in the laboratory experiment is implemented. You chose a distribution of __€ for yourself and 
__€ for the participant in the laboratory experiment. 
You receive your payoff of 5[+y]€ in the week from May 27 to May 31 (not on the holiday on 
May 30) at the “Studierenden Service Center (SSC)” building, room 4.226, daily between 10am 
and 12pm and between 1pm and 4pm. You will learn whether you receive an additional bonus 
for your guesses when collecting your payoff since we can only calculate the bonus payments 
after the laboratory experiment has taken place next week. 
Below, you see a code. Please write down the code or take a picture of it, and show us the 
code when collecting your payoff. Without this code, we cannot match your payoff. Please also 
bring a photo ID to the payout. 
[Code] 
Thank you very much for your participation in this online experiment and your support of our 
research! Address questions regarding this experiment to ackfeld@wiso.uni-koeln.de, and 
complaints to ackfeld@wiso.uni-koeln.de or to otten@wiso.uni-koeln.de as the representative 
of the ethics commission in charge.  
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 Instructions laboratory experiment 
 
Information regarding participation 
Study titel: CvsB 
Supervisor: Viola Ackfeld 
 
Description: You participate in a scientific decision-making experiment. You will be asked to 
read instructions, answer questions, and make several choices which can determine the 
amount you and other participants are going to be paid. On top of that, this experiment can 
contain video sequences. 
 
Participant rights: Your participation in this experiment is voluntary. In order to use your data 
for research, you need to complete the entire experiment. You may withdraw from participation 
at any time during the experiment without giving any reasons. If you choose to withdraw from 
the experiment, you will be paid the 4 Euro show-up fee but not the additional amount that you 
would have earned during the experiment. 
Data protection: All statements in this experiment are made anonymously and do not allow to 
draw conclusions regarding individual participants. There is no relationship between your 
anonymous statements in the experiment and the personal data, which are stored in the 
participant portal of the Cologne Laboratory for Economics Research (CLER) for the sake of 
invitation to experiments. Data will be used for scientific purposes only and will be saved only 
for scientific data analysis. In order to guarantee scientific transparency and within scientific 
cooperation projects, the collected data may be made available for subsequent use by third 
parties. 
 
I understand that I may contact the supervisor of this experiment if I require further information 
about the research, and that I may contact the supervisor of this experiment or the Ethics 
Commission in charge if I wish to make a complaint related to my involvement in the research. 
 
I agree to these conditions.            Yes, participate / No, do not participate 
 
Contact information 
Supervisor: Viola Ackfeld, ackfeld@wiso.uni-koeln.de 
Ethics Commission: Michael Otten, otten@wiso.uni-koeln.de  
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 Information regarding the experiment 
Welcome to this experiment and thank you for your participation. If you have questions during 
the experiment, you can always raise your hand. One of the experiments will come to you to 
answer your questions. From now on, please do no longer ask questions loudly and do not 
communicate with other participants*. Since this experiment can contain video sequences, 
please put on the headphones provided. Independent of your decisions, you are guaranteed 
to receive a show-up fee of 4 €. 
In this experiment, you can choose between two payoff alternatives. In case of choosing the 
one alternative, you earn a higher payoff for yourself; in case of choosing the other, you earn 
a smaller payoff for yourself, but donate money to the charity UNICEF for vaccinations against 
the disease tetanus in developing countries. In particular, you can choose between the 
following payoff alternatives: 
A) Receive 5€ as your own payoff, do not donate money 
B) Receive 1€ as your own payoff, donate 6€ 
When we refer to „the donation“ in this experiment, alternative B is meant. After the experiment, 
we are going to upload the donation receipts on our website ockenfels.uni-koeln.de under the 
category „Aktuelles”. 
 
 
Info box: Tetanus vaccination 
 
With a donation to UNICEF within the framework of this experiment, 20 people in developing 
countries can be vaccinated against the disease tetanus. These 20 people receive three 
vaccinations each to be protected against tetanus for several years.  In case of giving birth, 
the immunization is also temporarily transferred to the newborn child. 
Tetanus, also known as lockjaw, is a disease, in which bacteria get into the body via 
contaminated wounds. There, the poison of the bacteria initiates muscle strength, which can 
be fatal. Especially when giving birth, there is an increased risk that mother or child fall sick 
of tetanus. 
 
Sources: Federal Center for Health Education, World Health Organization 
 
* If the word participants is mentioned in this experiment, male, female and diverse participants are meant. 
 
 
[if informed incentives] 
Video 
At this point, we show you a video about tetanus vaccinations. Please watch the video. 
Afterwards, we will ask you some brief questions regarding the content of the video before you 
can proceed with the experiment. 
. 
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 [video] 
Control questions:  
1. For how long after birth is a child protected against tetanus if the mother is 
vaccinated against tetanus? [not at all, 2 month, 3 weeks, 1 year] 
2.  How are the fridges operated, in which the tetanus vaccine is stored? [with solar 
 energy, with electricity, with gasoline, there is no need to cool the vaccine] 
 
[proceed only if answered correctly, otherwise watch again] 
 
 
[if 10% delegation]  
Delegate 
We offer 10% of the participants in this experiment the opportunity to delegate the choice 
between the two alternatives. This means that the decision of another participant from a 
previous experiment is executed, whom we explained the rules of today’s experiment, and who 
made a corresponding decision for you. 
You belong to the 10% of participants who can delegate their choice between the two payoff 
alternatives. What do you want to do? 
Delegate decision / Choose yourself   [jump to payoff if delegate chosen] 
 
 
 [if participant chose “delegate decision”] 
Delegate 
The participant matched to you chose Alternative [A/B]. You receive a payment of 5/1€ and 
0/6€ are donated to UNICEF for tetanus vaccinations. 
 
 
Payoff choice 
You can now choose one out of the two payoff alternatives:  
A) Receive 5€ as your own payoff, do not donate money 
B) Receive 1€ as your own payoff, donate 6€ 
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Payoff choice 
You have chosen Alternative A/B. You receive a payoff of 5/1€ and 0/6€ are donated to UNICEF 
for tetanus vaccinations. 
 
On a scale from 0 = „not at all well informed“ to 100 = „fully informed“: How well informed do 
you feel about tetanus vaccinations? 
____ 
On a scale from 0 = „not at all convinced“ to 100 = „fully convinced“: How convinced do you 
feel that the donation is the payoff alternative one should choose in such a situation? 
____ 
 
 
[If A + incentives/informed incentives + allowed] 
 Payoff choice 
You chose alternative A without donation. 
We offer you to increase your own payoff in case of donation by 2€. This means that 
you can now choose between 
A) Receive 5€ as your own payoff, do not donate money 
 
B) Receive 3€ as your own payoff, donate 6€ 
If you want to stick with alternative A, click on „Continue“. If you want to switch to 
alternative B, first click on alternative B and then on „Continue“. 
Note: There will be no further possibility to subsequently change your decision. 
 
[If A + information + allowed] 
 Video 
You chose alternative A without donation. 
At this point, we show you a video about tetanus vaccinations. Please watch the video. 
Afterwards, we will ask you some brief questions regarding the content of the video 
before you can proceed with the experiment. 
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 [video] 
Control questions:  
1. For how long after birth is a child protected against tetanus if the mother is 
vaccinated against tetanus? [not at all, 2 month, 3 weeks, 1 year] 
2. How are the fridges operated, in which the tetanus vaccine is stored? [with 
solar energy, with electricity, with gasoline, there is no need to cool the 
vaccine] 
[proceed only if answered correctly, otherwise watch again] 
 ____________________________________________________________________ 
  
Payoff choice 
Here, you see the two payoff alternatives again. If you want to stick with alternative A, 
click on „Continue“. If you want to switch to alternative B, first click on alternative B and 
then on „Continue“. 
A) Receive 5€ as your own payoff, do not donate money 
 
B) Receive 1€ as your own payoff, donate 6€ 
Note: There will be no further possibility to subsequently change your decision. 
 
[If A + paid information + allowed] 
You chose alternative A without donation. 
We offer you to increase your payoff in this experiment by 2€ if you watch a video, 
which informs you about tetanus vaccinations. If you watch the video, we will ask you 
some brief questions regarding the content of the video afterwards before you can 
proceed with the experiment. 
Do you want to watch the video? You receive 2€ in exchange.  Yes/No 
____________________________________________________________________ 
[if yes:] 
Video 
 [video] 
Control questions:  
1. For how long after birth is a child protected against tetanus if the mother is 
vaccinated against tetanus? [not at all, 2 month, 3 weeks, 1 year] 
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 2. How are the fridges operated, in which the tetanus vaccine is stored? [with 
solar energy, with electricity, with gasoline, there is no need to cool the 
vaccine] 
[proceed only if answered correctly, otherwise watch again] 
 ____________________________________________________________________ 
  
Payoff choice 
Here, you see the two payoff alternatives again. If you want to stick with alternative A, 
click on „Continue“. If you want to switch to alternative B, first click on alternative B and 
then on „Continue“. 
A) Receive 5€ as your own payoff, do not donate money 
 
B) Receive 1€ as your own payoff, donate 6€ 
Note: There will be no further possibility to subsequently change your decision. 
 
 
[If A + allowed (in paid information: + watched video)] 
Payoff choice 
You chose alternative [A/B]. You receive a payoff of 1/3/5€, and 0/6€ are donated to UNICEF 
for tetanus vaccinations. 
 
On a scale from 0 = „not at all well informed“ to 100 = „fully informed“: How well informed do 
you feel about tetanus vaccinations? 
____ 
On a scale from 0 = „not at all convinced“ to 100 = „fully convinced“: How convinced do you 
feel that the donation is the payoff alternative one should choose in such a situation? 
____ 
 
 
Questionnaire 
Please answer the following questions. You can refine your answer on a 7-point-scale from 
1=”fully agree”, 7=”fully disagree”. 
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 1. Tetanus is a serious disease. 
2. Vaccination is useful. 
3. UNICEF is a reliable charity. 
4. In this experiment, it is immorally reprehensible not to donate. 
 
 
Questionnaire 
Please answer the following questions. You can refine your answer on a 7-point-scale from 
1=”fully agree”, 7=”fully disagree”. 
 
5. One should not try to dissuade somebody from a decision he made himself. 
6. It is better if people act by intrinsic motives (e.g., interest, conviction, …) than by 
extrinsic motives (e.g., duty, payment, …). 
7. Money can change convictions.  
 
 
Questionnaire 
Please answer the following questions. You can refine your answer on a 7-point-scale from 
1=”fully agree”, 7=”fully disagree”. 
 
8. There should be more information campaigns regarding blood donation. 
9. There should be more information campaigns regarding organ donation. 
10. People should receive a payoff for donating blood. 
11. People should receive a payoff for donating an organ. 
 
 
Questionnaire 
Please answer the following questions. You can refine your answer on a 7-point-scale from 
1=”fully agree”, 7=”fully disagree”. 
 
12. I do the experimenter a favor if I state a high value regarding the question: “On a 
scale from 0 = „not at all well informed“ to 100 = „fully informed“: How well informed 
do you feel about tetanus vaccinations?” 
13. I do the experimenter a favor if I state a high value regarding the question: “On a 
 scale from 0 = „not at all convinced“ to 100 = „fully convinced“: How convinced do 
 you feel that the donation is the payoff alternative one should choose in such a 
 situation?” 
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Personal details 
Please provide the following information about yourself. [if B directly chosen in incentives, 
informed incentives: You receive 2€ for filling in the questionnaire.] 
 
Age: ____ years 
Gender: male, female, divers 
Semester: ___ 
Department: WiSo Fakultät, Rechtswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Medizinische Fakultät, 
Philosophische Fakultät, Mat-Nat Fakultät, Humanwissenschaftliche Fakultät, other, I’m not a 
student 
Major: ______________________ 
Nationality: _________________ 
 
 
[if B directly chosen in information] 
 
Video 
 
At this point, we show you a video about tetanus vaccinations. Please watch the 
video. Afterwards, we will ask you some brief questions regarding the content of 
the video before you can proceed with the experiment. 
 [video] 
 Control questions: 
                  1.  For how long after birth is a child protected against tetanus if the mother is  
             vaccinated against tetanus? [not at all, 2 month, 3 weeks, 1 year] 
                  2.  How are the fridges operated, in which the tetanus vaccine is stored? [with solar 
                       energy, with electricity, with gasoline, there is no need to cool the vaccine] 
 
  [proceed only if answered correctly, otherwise watch again] 
 
 
[if B directly chosen in paid information] 
100
  We offer you to increase your payoff in this experiment by 2€ if you watch a video, 
 which informs you about tetanus vaccinations. If you watch the video, we will ask  
you some brief questions regarding the content of the video afterwards before you 
can proceed with the experiment. 
 
 Do you want to watch the video. You receive 2€ in exchange.  Yes / No 
 ________________________________________________________________ 
 
 [if yes] 
 Video 
 [video] 
   Control questions: 
                    1.  For how long after birth is a child protected against tetanus if the mother is  
              vaccinated against tetanus? [not at all, 2 month, 3 weeks, 1 year] 
                    2.  How are the fridges operated, in which the tetanus vaccine is stored? [with 
                         solar energy, with electricity, with gasoline, there is no need to cool the vaccine] 
 
     [proceed only if answered correctly, otherwise watch again] 
 
 
Your decision will be implemented. 
If you are not forwarded automatically, click “Continue”. 
 
 
[if additional video allowed]  
Video 
Here, you see a [if already watched a video: another] video about tetanus vaccinations. Please 
watch the video. 
[video] 
 
 
Payoff 
The experiment is finished now. 
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 [if drawn for bonus/deduction] Recently, we explained participants in another experiment the 
course of this experiment, and let them inter alia decide whether money should be added to / 
subtracted from your payoff as lump-sum. The participant matched to you decided that a lump-
sum of 1€ should be added/subtracted to/from your payoff. 
[if drawn for social preferences] Recently, we explained participants in another experiment the 
course of this experiment, and let them inter alia decide how to distribute an amount of 6€ 
between himself and you. The participant matched to you allocated [z]€ to you. 
Including your show-up fee of 4€ [if bonus/deduction: , the bonus/deduction of 1€, ] [if social 
preferences: , the share allocated to you in the distribution decision] [if B directly chosen in 
incentives, informed incentives: , the 2€ for filling in the questionnaire] [if paid information + 
watched video: , the 2€ for watching the video] and your payoff of [1/3/5€] from the donation 
decision, you receive a final payoff of [x]€. 
Please fill in this amount in the receipt provided, and wait until the experimenter calls you for 
payout. 
The donation receipts with the total amount donated in this experiment will soon be published 
on the website ockenfels.uni-koeln.de under the category „Aktuelles“. 
Thank you very much for your participation in this experiment and your support of our research! 
Address questions regarding this experiment to ackfeld@wiso.uni-koeln.de, and complaints to 
ackfeld@wiso.uni-koeln.de or to otten@wiso.uni-koeln.de as the representative of the ethics 
commission in charge. 
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2.B.3 Translated video texts
Video 1
I traveled to Madagascar with UNICEF because we want to defeat tetanus amongst
new-borns here. And we had a look at how exactly this works.
This is the national storage for these vaccines in Madagascar. You can already feel
it’s a little cooler here. They must be kept between four and eight degrees. These are the
tetanus vaccines – you can see them here. They are brought from the storage up to the
smallest village in Madagascar.
A dose of vaccine takes quite a long journey to arrive where we need it. What matters
is that it is cooled during the entire time, and this is easy to figure out because there
is a small dot on every vial containing the vaccine. If this dot changes color, you can
see immediately: This dose of vaccine is no longer durable. Those fridges, which they
have there, are very special and are not connected to the power supply because there is
no electricity. The doctor also told us that they unfortunately can’t give births at night
because they don’t have light. But, the refrigerator works because it runs on petrol.
Great!
Tetanus is a bacterium. That’s important to know. It is transmitted naturally in
extremely unhygienic conditions, at birth. Once you have it, you can’t heal it anymore.
That means one has to take preventive action. It’s just a small shot – if you think about
it – containing 0.5 milliliters you have to inject and you know you’ll be safe afterwards.
The great thing is: Mothers only need three doses of vaccine to be protected - five years
for themselves and they pass the immunization on to the child for two months after birth,
and this is of course a great thing. Then, both are safe in any case.
The dream of every family is to have a child that is healthy. That is the most important
thing. We’re not satisfied until tetanus is completely defeated. Every support counts! We
have already achieved a lot, but we need your contribution. Therefore, please donate so
that we can continue working in the fight against tetanus in new-borns.
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Video 2
Hello and welcome to UNICEF TV. I traveled to the Central African Republic, one
of the poorest countries in the world, to learn about tetanus vaccinations. The Central
African Republic is located right in the middle of Africa. 4.5 million people live here under
most challenging conditions. Only every 4th person has access to clean drinking water,
and only every 4th woman can give birth to her child in a health station or a hospital, often
only after walking for kilometers. UNICEF trains midwives because hygienic conditions
at birth and skilled care significantly reduce the risk of infection. Tetanus is fatal, but so
easy to defeat. You just have to know how!
104
Chapter 3
Personal Information Disclosure under
Competition for Benefits: Is Sharing
Caring?∗
joint with Werner Güth
Abstract
Personal information is shared extensively every day, partly in exchange for benefits
or as a reaction to other people’s information sharing. In this paper, we experimen-
tally investigate these two motives by analyzing the interaction of peer comparison
and incentives to disclose potentially privacy-sensitive information. We find that
information sharing is higher under incentives, and further increases under peer
comparison. This effect is driven by those initially disclosing less, who additionally
report feeling more compelled to reveal information. Our results provide an ex-
planation for the current information-sharing trend while pointing to a potentially
neglected side effect.
∗We thank the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Bonn for financing data
collection. Ackfeld acknowledges additional funding by the European Research Council (ERC) under
the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement No 741409-
EEC). Further support of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) is gratefully acknowledged. We
thank Jordi Brandts, Matthias Heinz, Lukas Kiessling, Erin Krupka, Axel Ockenfels, and audiences at
the Spring School in Behavioral Economics San Diego, ESA World Berlin, and VfS Freiburg for helpful
comments, and Kirsten Marx for her support in programming. All views are the authors’ own.
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“Most hiring requires a LinkedIn profile now, so although we use this narrative
of choice [. . . ] they substantively don’t really have a choice because in the modern
workforce you have to use social media, and you have to use the internet. [. . . ]
When people have to use these platforms [. . . ] to get a job, they will still use
it, and so we are sort of coercing and compelling people to hand over a lot of
information [. . . ].”
– Christopher Wylie, Cambridge Analytica - May 16, 2018
3.1 Introduction
Extensive sharing of personal information has become a stylized fact and one of the major
societal changes of the 21st century. Getting access to many new services or exchange
platforms nowadays often implicitly requires sharing one’s personal information. Hence,
in many situations in life, extensive personal information sharing may be driven by motives
which go beyond a direct preference for information sharing.
First, there may be strategic competition in personal information disclosure if people
compete for monetary rewards or the beneficial attention of others. For example, people
compete via extensive personal information disclosure for the attention of overnight guests
or recruiters on Airbnb and LinkedIn, respectively, or for that of followers on Instagram or
Youtube. The mircrofinance platform Kickstarter even recommends borrowers to include
soft, personal information in their requests. Second, one may react to the information
disclosure behavior of one’s peers, i.e., the more others share, the more likely one adapts
to their behavior (Acquisti et al. 2012; Böhme and Pötzsch 2011; Chang et al. 2016).
This effect might be especially pronounced in competitive settings. Abstaining for the
information-sharing economy may become more and more impossible the more competing
peers engage in disclosure. This may lead to situations in which some people, who have
higher privacy valuations than others, feel pressured to reveal information about them-
selves, but incur high privacy costs. Hence, under information disclosure competition
against peers, they may be worse off compared to a world without such information-
sharing dynamics.
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This paper analyzes different motives for extensive personal information sharing and
sheds light on the potentially hidden costs thereof. First, we study the interaction of
competition for benefits and observing peers’ sharing as a channel explaining extensive
personal information disclosure. In particular, we investigate whether incentives to reveal
personal information lead to more information sharing, and how one adapts one’s initial
choice in reaction to peer comparison. Second, we explore whether and how the interplay
of these two factors contributes to subjectively perceived pressure to reveal more, or
more unpleasant, information. Thereby, we point to a potential side effect of extensive
information disclosure competition, which has not gained attention so far.
We investigate these questions in a laboratory experiment, which enables us to provide
causal evidence on competition via personal information disclosure, and to disentangle via
a two-by-two design how peer comparison and disclosure competition interact. Two par-
ticipants compete for distribution power in an allocation game. In the main treatments,
a third participant selects who determines the allocation. In order to be selected, candi-
dates striving for distribution power can endogenously reveal answers from a potentially
privacy-sensitive questionnaire, thus making information sharing strategic. In the con-
trol treatments, distribution power is randomly assigned, so information sharing has no
strategic aspect. As a second dimension, we inform participants in half of the treatments
(without prior announcement) about their competitor’s disclosure choice, and give them
the opportunity to adapt their own. Thereby, we can test for the effect of peer comparison
on disclosure behavior with and without competition involved. Afterwards, we measure
participants’ perceived pressure to disclose information, as well as game-related outcomes.
We find that information disclosure doubles under strategic incentives compared to the
control condition with random assignment of allocation power. Moreover, subsequent peer
comparison boosts information disclosure in the strategic, but not in the random setting.
This effect is driven by subjects who are initially relatively unwilling to disclose much, but
reveal more information when learning to lag behind. In line with the idea of reluctant
adaptations of the less disclosure-willing candidates, these participants report feeling more
compelled to disclose information afterwards. We do not find such an effect for strategic
incentives in general. Additional results on distributor choice and distribution outcomes
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show a positive effect of revealing more information on being selected, but ambiguous
results regarding generosity in payoff distribution.
Investigating motives and hidden costs of personal information sharing, the contri-
butions of our paper are threefold. Firstly, we allow for endogenous sharing of personal
information, and thereby show how such information can be strategically employed to
compete. Experimental research regarding the value of personal information has mainly
been based on exogenous provision of personal information so far (Bohnet and Frey 1999;
Brandts et al. 2006; Charness and Gneezy 2008; Eckel and Petrie 2011), and therefore does
not take into account how such information can be strategically used to attract attention.1
While Benndorf et al. (2015) motivate their study with strategic privacy-sensitive infor-
mation disclosure, they only use exogenously assigned, impersonal information without an
intrinsic privacy value for participants. Our study goes one step further in understanding
privacy concerns by using information with an intrinsic private value for participants.2
Secondly, we shed light on motives driving the personal information-sharing trend. In
particular, we provide novel evidence on the dynamics created by the interaction of strate-
gic incentives and peer comparison. Acquisti et al. (2012), Böhme and Pötzsch (2011),
and Chang et al. (2016) show that peer comparison spurs one’s personal information-
disclosure behavior. We provide causal evidence that such peer effects may be especially
pronounced under competition for benefits and also affect those who are initially unwilling
to disclose information. The combination of these two motives may explain the recent
boom in extensive personal information sharing, a stylized fact of the digital age, whose
underlying dynamics have mainly been neglected so far. In this way, we may detect a
new form of competition in society.
Thirdly, we uncover that extensive information sharing might not necessarily generate
improvements for all involved parties. Lee (2014) and Wang et al. (2011) find correla-
1See Hermstrüwer and Dickert (2017) and Holm and Samahita (2018) for experimental research
on how the presence of personal information affects prosocial behavior in light of maintaining a social
image, and Gaudeul and Giannetti (2017) on group formation and contribution behavior based on the
endogenous provision of personal information. See Bartoš et al. (2016) for research on how limited
attention can influence the selection of candidates.
2Several papers try to measure the economic value of privacy, but find ambiguous results (Benndorf
and Normann 2018; Beresford et al. 2012; Jentzsch et al. 2012; Tsai et al. 2011). See Farrell (2012) for a
discussion regarding the economic properties of privacy and Acquisti et al. (2016) and Tucker (2015) for
comprehensive surveys on this topic.
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tional evidence for hidden costs of information sharing. To the best of our knowledge,
our paper is the first to provide causal, empirical evidence for side effects of personal
information sharing. If disclosure-unwilling individuals feel pressured to disclose more, or
more unpleasant, and costly information than they intrinsically would like to, they may
be worse off compared to a world without such information-sharing dynamics. While pre-
vious economic research has investigated side effects of social pressure (DellaVigna et al.
2012, 2017; Reyniers and Bhalla 2013) and competition (Brandts et al. 2009) in isolation,
we investigate potential side effects based on a combination of these motives in the highly
relevant context of personal information sharing.3
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 3.2, we review related
literature. We present our experimental design and corresponding hypotheses in Section
3.3. Section 3.4 reports and Section 3.5 discusses the results. The last section concludes.
3.2 Literature
Our paper primarily builds on two strands of literature: the value of personal information
provision and the impact of peer comparison.4 We contribute to the first literature by
endogenizing the information-sharing decision, and to the second by providing evidence
on the existence and consequences of peer comparison in the new and highly relevant con-
text of personal information sharing with heterogeneous privacy types (Plesch and Wolff
2018). We combine both literatures by investigating the interaction of peer comparison
and strategic incentives for information sharing, and discover potentially hidden costs.
Examining the interplay of these two motives and its consequences in the context of per-
sonal data sharing, our paper dynamically adds to research on the economics of privacy
3Note that this paper focuses on potentially overseen cost at the disclosing market side, but refrains
from a welfare analysis. Since non-anonymous personal information in real-world markets may be more
predictive for behavior than the anonymous data used in this experiment, we would otherwise risk under-
estimating welfare gains. Rather, our approach attempts to reveal a subjective and usually unobservable
type of information-disclosure costs. Finding such hidden costs already in a setting with anonymous
information likely implies more pronounced effects in the field with identifiable data. Hence, the effects
we find may constitute a lower bound for costs, independently of gains.
4We also touch on several other strands of literature. Our experimental design consists of elements
from the partner selection and proposer competition literature. Regarding partner selection, a couple of
studies show that partner selection can help to overcome coordination failures (Coricelli et al. 2004; Page
et al. 2005; Riedl et al. 2016; Wang et al. 2012). Proposer competition prevails to affect the distribution
of money in favor of the responder (Roth et al. 1991).
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(Acquisti et al. 2016; Benndorf and Normann 2018; Beresford et al. 2012; Jentzsch et al.
2012; Tucker 2015). By endogenizing the sharing of personal information, our experiment
substantially extends a design by Brandts et al. (2006).5
Several studies show a positive value of personal information sharing in line with our
results. For example, subjects in distribution games give more if personal information
like name, major, hobbies, and home city of the recipient are revealed (Bohnet and Frey
1999; Charness and Gneezy 2008)6. Hermstrüwer and Dickert (2017) report higher contri-
butions when participants previously consented to reveal their name together with their
contribution afterwards.7 Remarkably, participants even seem willing to pay for seeing the
partner’s photo in trust games (Eckel and Petrie 2011). With regard to the endogenous
provision of personal information, Gaudeul and Giannetti (2017) find higher contributions
in public good games when group formation is based on endogenously provided names.
Observational data from online microfinance platforms mostly support the idea that per-
sonal information sharing is valuable. Michels (2012) reports lower interest rates for loan
requests containing a photo, and inversely, Pope and Sydnor (2011) show that chances to
get a loan decrease without one. The latter’s analysis reveals that even given observable
financial indicators, the provision of a picture matters for receiving funding. Böhme and
Pötzsch (2010) find evidence for such a relationship for commercial, but not for private
borrowers.
Theoretically, the positive value of information sharing is predicted by unraveling
theory (Milgrom 1981). Under market competition, good types share their private infor-
mation, while non-sharing correctly evokes suspicion about quality. However, laboratory
tests confirm unraveling only partially (Benndorf 2018; Jin et al. 2017), especially when
adding a more privacy-sensitive framing (Benndorf et al. 2015). We go one step further
by using not only exogenously assigned information, but real personal information. This
renders full unraveling even less likely in our experiment.
5Brandts et al. (2006) use a personality questionnaire to determine allocation power in a distribution
task, either randomly or based on this questionnaire. Since information is exogenously provided in
Brandts et al. (2006), their focus lies on how being actively selected affects distributional behavior, while
we are interested in the amount of information endogenously provided.
6However, Charness and Gneezy (2008) cannot confirm this result in the ultimatum game.
7In the opposite setting in Holm and Samahita (2018), participants are more likely to hide their
picture subsequently if they behaved less generously, but Hermstrüwer and Dickert (2017) do not find
such an effect for names.
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Evidence for how well voluntarily provided personal information can predict types is
mixed. Duarte et al. (2012) observe a positive relationship between the appearance of
trustworthiness in pictures and actual trustworthiness in microfinance. Ge et al. (2017)
show that connected social media information can serve as a deterrence mechanism for
credit default. While creditors in Pope and Sydnor’s (2011) study seem to make use of vol-
untarily provided personal information, they fail to infer all relevant hints on creditworthi-
ness. Relatedly, Iyer et al. (2016) only find a significant effect of insightful inference from
voluntarily provided personal information for low-credit categories. Our results suggest
that information sharing under competition for benefits can indeed enhance the voluntary
provided amount of relevant information, but inference on quality may be obfuscated by
sharing too much non-insightful information if competition is present.
As a second dimension, our project is related to several aspects of the literature on peer
effects, predominantly peer pressure driven by conformity seeking (Asch 1951; Bernheim
1994) and social comparison (Clark and Oswald 1998; Festinger 1954; Frey and Meier
2004). A variety of empirical papers documents that peers have a strong impact on how
we behave.8 Given the diverse range of settings in which peer effects seem to be at work,
peer comparison likely also affects personal information disclosure. However, evidence
analyzing peer effects regarding endogenous information revelation is rare. First related
results point in the direction that the amount of information others reveal influences
one’s own disclosure behavior. Findings by Acquisti et al. (2012) and Chang et al. (2016)
indicate that people are more willing to answer sensitive questions or disclose sensitive
pictures, respectively, when knowing that others have done so. On online microfinance
platforms, Böhme and Pötzsch (2011) find that borrowers adapt their loan request to
the most recent requests listed on the top of the starting page regarding how much to
write, whether to add a photo, what personal information to disclose, and how identifiable
to present oneself. Results regarding adaptations within the same loan category further
suggest positive peer effects, but are less conclusive. We provide experimental evidence
8For example, people show more effort in the workplace (Falk and Ichino 2006; Mas and Moretti
2009), vote in elections (Bond et al. 2012; DellaVigna et al. 2017; Funk 2010), adapt their investment
behavior (Bursztyn et al. 2014), or donate more (Alpizar et al. 2008; DellaVigna et al. 2012; Frey and
Meier 2004; Meer 2011) due to peers. See Bursztyn and Jensen (2017) for a review.
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on the effect of peer comparison in the domain of personal data sharing and its interaction
with strategic incentives to disclose information.
Both the influence of peers and the competitive aspect in personal information sharing
may, however, cause unintended and non-negligible side effects. Research by DellaVigna
et al. (2012, 2017) shows that actions meant to increase welfare can even have negative
welfare effects if social pressure is accounted for.9 Moreover, there is evidence that peer
comparison harms happiness (Reyniers and Bhalla 2013), and that peer pressure in form
of competition decreases well-being without creating any gains (Brandts et al. 2009).
Exploratory studies surveying or interviewing Facebook users confirm peer pressure in
the online world. Wang et al. (2011) report that the desire to appear favorable to one’s
peers induces people to post something they regret afterwards. With regard to social
comparison, Lee (2014) finds a positive correlation between comparison-seeking frequency
on Facebook and negative feelings from comparison. We contribute to this literature by
providing causal evidence regarding the hidden costs of personal information sharing
competition.10
3.3 Experimental design
Our experimental design, depicted in Figure 3.1, consists of the following parts: First
of all, information is generated. Second, participants endogenously decide which pieces
of information to reveal. Third, they can revise their decision after peer comparison.
Fourth, information is taken into account for role selection. Fifth, the allocation and
the resulting payoffs are determined. Steps one, four, and five are adapted from Brandts
et al. (2006). In order to guarantee understanding, participants have to answer several
comprehension questions correctly before being allowed to make decisions regarding our
9Similarly, Funk (2010) observes a policy intervention aimed at increasing voter turnout which has
the opposite consequence to the expected one, due to the role of social pressure not being taken into
account.
10Recent theoretical models in economics try to combine peer effects with information disclosure
and privacy. Daughety and Reinganum (2010) build a model with different privacy scenarios in which
marginal types in a regime in which it is possible to waive privacy are, in equilibrium, pressured to reveal
their type because they care about how they are perceived by others. Ali and Bénabou’s (Forthcoming)
model emphasizes that in fast-changing societies with variability in norms, extensive personal information
sharing based on image concerns hinders the correct aggregation of information by a policy maker to infer
society’s true aggregated preferences.
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outcomes of interest. In what follows, the different parts, procedures, and treatments are
described in detail. We first focus on the personal information we elicit, continue with the
game, the endogenous information revelation process, and additional measures we use,
and finish by describing the treatments and as well as corresponding hypotheses. The
experimental instructions can be found in Appendix 3.B.
Figure 3.1: Structure of the experiment
Personality questionnaire
Instructions: Game & information disclosure; role assignment
Information disclosure decision (A and B)
Incentivized belief regarding other’s decision
(No) Comparison with other’s disclosure; disclosure adaptation
Elicitation of pressure to disclose
Examination of answers disclosed (C)
Allocator selected by C
in strategic / randomly
Allocation (A and B)
strategy method
Acceptance threshold
strategy method
Execution & post-experimental questionnaire
Notes: Overview of the experimental steps. A unit of observation in the experiment consists
of three participants A, B, and C. Treatment differences are marked in bold letters.
Personal information
While a first-best approach to study personal information disclosure might be to access
real-world data, for example from social media, such data come with shortcomings. First,
they are complex and what information people have already accessed or what they infer
from it is out of experimental control, which is likely to impair causal inference. Secondly,
studying the dynamic interaction of strategic incentives and peer comparison, our channel
of interest, and at the same time eliciting measures for potential side effects seems hardly
possible with field data on a experimentally sound level. Instead, we follow a second-best
approach and generate relevant and potentially sensitive, but anonymous and controllable
personal information similar to Frik and Gaudeul (2016).
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Table 3.1: Questionnaire
Question 1 Do you make decision mainly in such a way that you benefit yourself?
Question 2 Do you consider inequality in society, which is based on different
performances, as something negative?
Question 3 Are there reasons which justify reading emails or messages of friends?
Question 4 Would you accept a well-paid job if you knew it hurts others?
Question 5 Do you only participate in laboratory experiments because of money?
Question 6 Is it acceptable to lie in some situations?
Question 7 Should people who voluntarily donate an organ receive payment for it?
Question 8 Is winning important to you?
Question 9 Is it okay to read one’s text messages on the cellphone while driving?
Question 10 Does it affect you a lot if you fail an exam, or failed one in the future?
Question 11 Is it okay to drive a car after drinking one glass of beer (0.5 liters) or
one glass of wine (0.2 liters)?
Question 12 Is it important to you what others think about you?
Notes: Scale: 1 = not at all, 7 = definitely. Order randomized.
We use a 12-item questionnaire to elicit opinions and personality traits measured
on a 7-point scale, shown in Table 3.1. Some questions refer to characteristics likely
related to experimental game behavior, while others ask for rather unrelated, subjective
opinions or attitudes regarding controversial or sensitive issues. For example, we elicit
how participants perceive inequality, whether money is their only reason to participate in
experiments, how they assess payment for organ donation, or whether they feel impairment
when failing an exam.11 Participants receive 3 Euro for answering the questionnaire, being
aware that all information they provide can affect their payments in the experiment, but
without knowing yet what will follow in the second part.12 We let participants explicitly
11The information we elicit is mainly subjective statements and can, by the nature of this kind of
information, hardly be verified. Although some authors argue that the use of information which cannot be
verified might be problematic in contexts related to pricing privacy (Benndorf and Normann 2018; Schudy
and Utikal 2017), alternatives like pictures or names used in previous studies (Benndorf and Normann
2018; Bohnet and Frey 1999; Charness and Gneezy 2008; Eckel and Petrie 2011; Gaudeul and Giannetti
2017; Hermstrüwer and Dickert 2017; Holm and Samahita 2018) create problems of identifiability instead.
Using information which cannot be verified, but contains no inherent right or wrong can overcome this
issue (Frik and Gaudeul 2016) and is adapted in this work. We are interested in endogenous information
revelation as a reaction to different treatment manipulations, and there is no reason to assume that
answering the questionnaire initially varies between our treatments.
12Eliciting information in the first part for the second part, in which it might be payoff-relevant,
without prior knowledge of this connection might be considered as problematic since we only inform
participants gradually about the course of the experiment. However, such an approach becomes necessary
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consent to this non-standard approach by stating that “additional payment depends on
the statements [. . . ] you and your interaction partners make” before the information
revelation stage. Moreover, we emphasize voluntariness of participation and the right to
leave the experiment at any time.
The questions are designed such that there is no general right or wrong. Consequently,
the relevance of a question must be subjectively assessed, which leaves room for interpre-
tation. We use this kind of questions for three reasons. Firstly, in everyday life, one often
has to decide which information to disclose to others without knowing how that infor-
mation will be perceived and interpreted. Secondly, such questions preserve anonymity,
thereby guaranteeing high experimental standards. If we find side effects of information
disclosure even in case of our comparably less privacy-sensitive information, perceived
pressure in the field with identifiable information is likely even stronger. Thirdly, having
no clear right or wrong renders lying unreasonable. We randomize the order of questions
to avoid any order effects.13
Distribution game
After answering the questionnaire, participants receive the second part of the instructions
explaining the experimental game and the preceding possibility to reveal information.
The game is the impunity game (Bolton and Zwick 1995), played one-shot in randomly
assigned groups of three players. One player, the proposer, distributes a pie of 17 Euro
between herself and the other two group members. The other two players are responders
who can only accept or reject their own share. They only learn their own proposed shares
and decide independently of each other. Unlike in the ultimatum game, a rejection in
in experimental economics if more elaborate research questions require more flexible designs. See, for
example, Brandts et al. (2006) and Khalmetski et al. (2015) for other research which requires non-standard
techniques. Since the purpose of our experiment is to investigate how economic and social pressure affect
the willingness to disclose potentially sensitive information, telling participants in advance what will
follow would distort their initial reports. In fact, asking participants for their acceptance of subsequently
using their answers does not indicate any resentment. On a scale from 1 to 7, with 7 being the full
approval of subsequent information usage, the lowest treatment average is 5.47. Some participants even
commented positively on the fact that personal information could influence the distribution phase.
13In particular, we display the questions on two separate screens with six questions each, and randomize
the screens order, as well as the position of questions within the screens, to avoid order effects. Acquisti
et al. (2012) find order effects in the willingness to answer intrusive questions. We use ten different
random orderings of questions, and control for these orderings in the regression analyses.
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the impunity game does not imply that all players earn zero. Instead, only the rejecting
player receives zero, while the proposer’s payoff remains unaffected, as does that of the
other responder. However, the proposer is informed about the responder’s rejection as a
form of voice.14
We utilize the strategy method when eliciting proposer and responder choices, i.e.,
participants make decisions for all situations they could face. This allows us to compare
the allocation behavior of those who become proposer and those who do not. For the role
of the responder, we elicit acceptance thresholds which are then implemented conditionally
on the first stage offer. A special feature of our game is that not all three group members
can become the proposer. In particular, at the beginning of the experiment, we randomly
match three players into a group and assign them to one of the three roles A, B, and
C,15 which remain constant during the whole interaction. Participants in role A and B
compete to become the proposer of the impunity game. We refer to this role as the
allocator from now on. The participant in role C cannot become allocator and always
takes the role of a responder, but may select the allocator. Before doing so, she can access
the information revealed by players A and B. The next section explains this endogenous
disclosure procedure.
Endogenous information disclosure
After reading the instructions of the second part of the experiment, participants are aware
of the allocation task and the opportunity to reveal information in this setting. Partici-
pants in role A and B can decide which answers from the questionnaire they want to reveal
to player C. For each information revealed, subjects have to pay a small fee of 10 Cents
which is subtracted from their lump-sum payoff of 3 Euro from the first part.16 Keeping
information secret is possible at no cost. The small fee mimics transaction costs of per-
sonal information disclosure. For example, extending one’s online profile requires a small
14In order to render voice meaningful, the proposer has to offer at least 1 Euro to every participant
including herself. As a consequence, a rejection inevitably causes a loss for the rejecting responder.
We refrain from payoff-relevant punishment to avoid that varying beliefs regarding responder behavior
between the different treatments drive proposers’ choices.
15In order to avoid ordinal ordering inherent in the letters A, B, and C, we use the colors red, blue,
and green during the experiment.
16Revelation costs are adopted from Benndorf et al. (2015).
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amount of time and effort, which increases the more features you fill in. Methodologi-
cally, it limits experimenter demand concerns of asking for information provision in such
a setting. Finding different information revelation patterns under disclosure costs would
therefore strengthen our results. The information disclosure decision is our main variable
of interest in this paper. In particular, we focus on the total number of disclosures, stating
corresponding hypotheses at the end of this section.
Additional measures
Due to our interest in potential side effects of information disclosure, we elicit the partic-
ipants’ perceived pressure to disclose information right after they have made their final
disclosure choice. Particularly, we ask them “Did you feel compelled to reveal more
information than you initially wanted to?”, measured on a 7-point scale.17 Moreover,
considerable heterogeneity in disclosure behavior may exist in such a setting and may
impact game behavior. This heterogeneity is likely to stem from differences in privacy
concerns, which we measure post-experimentally based on Westin’s privacy index, as in
Harris Interactive (2001),18 and based on social media activity measures, the latter taken
from Frik and Gaudeul (2016).
Since the decision to disclose might also hinge on the perceived relevance of a question
to predict behavior in the subsequent allocation task and the associated discomfort, we
elicit these factors for each question on a 7-point scale in the post-experimental ques-
tionnaire. We consider an information as relevant or unpleasant, respectively, if the
participant selects at least a value of 4 on the 7-point scale. The sum of answers, whose
17While such survey measures rely on self-reported perceptions that may be different from behavioral
decision data, psychologists suggest that self-reports are the best way to measure subjective emotions
(Robinson and Clore 2002). This approach has also been adopted by economists. See, for example,
Alesina et al. (2004), Blanchflower and Oswald (2004), Brandts et al. (2009), Charness and Grosskopf
(2001), and Reyniers and Bhalla (2013).
18In line with the 7-point scales we use for all other ordinal ratings, we also use a 7-point instead of a
4-point scale for the three questions determining the Westin privacy index. These questions stem from the
2001 version of Westin’s privacy classification, as published in Harris Interactive (2001). See Kumaraguru
and Cranor (2005) for a review of Westin’s privacy indexes. We classify scores from 1 to 3 as “disagree” and
5 to 7 as “agree”, and follow Westin’s definition of the three privacy types Unconcerned, Fundamentalist,
and Pragmatists based on those definitions: Fundamentalists agree that consumers have lost control
over personal information, do not believe that companies handle their data in an appropriate way, and
question existing privacy laws. The Unconcerned make the opposite statements, while Pragmatists hold
mixed opinions.
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disclosure is perceived as unpleasant, serves as a second indicator of potential side effects
of information disclose. Moreover, since our experiment involves peer comparison, we use
a 7-item version of the INCOM social comparison index (Schneider and Schupp 2011) in
order to control for heterogeneity in the habit of comparing oneself with others. On top of
that, we elicit beliefs regarding the competitor’s answer score and disclosure decisions in
an incentive-compatible way. In particular, subjects receive a bonus of 3.50€ and 0.50€ ,
respectively, at the end of the experiment if they correctly guessed the other candidate’s
answer and disclosure decision.19
Treatments
Table 3.2: Treatments: Two-by-two factorial de-
sign
Allocator choice
random strategic (by C)
Peer
comparison
No RA SA
Yes RAC SAC
The experimental design consists of four treatments based on a two-by-two factorial
design, which vary in how information is revealed and how the allocator is selected. The
first dimension distinguishes how the allocator is determined and is adapted from Brandts
et al. (2006). In random treatments, one of the subjects in role A or B is randomly chosen
with equal probability to become allocator. In strategic treatments, C decides whether
A or B becomes allocator. Obviously, the two conditions differ in their incentives to
provide information to C. In random, there should be no reason to disclose any information
beyond one’s genuine preference for information sharing. In contrast, information sharing
can serve a strategic purpose in strategic because it may raise one’s chance to become
the payoff-determining allocator, creating a situation of proposer competition (Roth et
al. 1991).20 Consequently, varying the selection procedure allows us to distinguish non-
19Given the different chances of a correct answer guess on a 7-point scale and a correct disclosure
guess on a 2-point scale, i.e., disclose or non-disclose, we determine bonuses to be equal in expectation,
setting them to 3.50 Euro for a correct answer guess and 1 Euro for a correct disclosure guess. One guess
is randomly chosen and evaluated for payoff at the end.
20If there is an intrinsic value of decision rights, as in Bartling et al. (2014), this effect may also be
captured in the strategic term.
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strategic information disclosure, i.e., one’s baseline sharing preference, from strategic
information sharing which is triggered by the monetary incentive.
The second dimension of our two-by-two factorial design varies whether there is a social
comparison stage or not before information is revealed to C. This allows us to investigate
how peer pressure affects the willingness to disclose information. In the comparison stage,
participants learn which answers the other player competing for allocator power disclosed,
but not the exact score of the answers. Players A and B can adjust their revelation choice,
or simply reconfirm their previous one. The previous choice is preselected as the default
on the screen, so that for maintaining the previous choice participants just have to click on
“proceed”.21 If a subject wants to adjust her previous choice, she can do so by changing
the preselected disclosure decisions from “no” to “yes” or vice versa. As in the initial
disclosure stage, the change in revelation can be made for each question separately and
costs 10 Cents per disclosure.22
We denote the four treatments resulting from our two-by-two design by random (RA),
random-comparison (RAC), strategic (SA), and strategic-comparison (SAC). In what fol-
lows, we discuss how the different levels of strategic and social impact inherent in these
treatments may affect information disclosure and perceived pressure to disclose. We refer
to the initial disclosure choice before the peer comparison stage as “ex ante” disclosure
and to the subsequent one as “ex post” disclosure, respectively.
Data collection
Data were collected in the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research in November and
December 2017 using zTree (Fischbacher 2007) for programming and ORSEE (Greiner
2015) for participant recruitment. The experiment lasted approximately 50 minutes and
participants earned on average 13€, including a show-up fee of 4€. In total, 294 people
21In order to ensure comparability between treatments, participants in the treatments without com-
parison also see another screen, but with only their own choices displayed. Here, they just have to click on
“proceed” to continue. In principle, they can also adjust their choices, but there should be no straightfor-
ward reason to do so, except that the belief elicitation tasks in between resulted in some deeper thoughts
about how much to disclose.
22Note that the 10-Cent transaction costs are not reimbursed if a subject decides to hide an answer
she disclosed before.
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participated in 10 experimental sessions. We oversampled the strategic treatments due to
our interest in active allocator selection by C-participants.
Hypotheses
Allocator selection by C in the strategic treatments SA and SAC likely incentivizes indi-
viduals to disclose ex ante more information than in the random treatments RA and RAC.
While random selection of the allocator elicits one’s intrinsic preference for information
revelation without additional incentives, the prospect of gaining allocator power might
seem worth to sacrifice some privacy. This corresponds to incurring a cost, likely in form
of privacy costs, worth to be paid in exchange for the strategically beneficial position.
Hypothesis 1 (Strategic disclosure): The amount of information revealed ex ante is higher
in strategic treatments than in random treatments.
Subsequent peer comparison likely initiates adaptation to the disclosure behavior of
the competitor. Changes in RAC can be fully attributed to a classical peer effect, while
changes in SAC are further triggered by competition in gaining the attention of player
C via revealing more. Therefore, we expect more disclosure changes in SAC, and in
particular more upward changes due to its strategic aspect.23
Hypothesis 2 (Social comparison): Peer comparison leads to more ex post disclosure
changes under strategic incentives than without.
Reactions to peer comparison under strategic incentives are likely driven by one’s own
ex ante disclosure choices relative to that of the competitor, and may thus be heteroge-
neous. In particular, we expect that those who learn that they revealed fewer answers
than their competitor under strategic benefits adapt their initial disclosure choice and
disclose more. Reyniers and Bhalla (2013) find such an effect in the context of charitable
donations, i.e., under peer comparison those who initially attempted to donate less revise
their choice upwards. Such a reaction is even more likely to occur in our setting since
23The fact that comparison in SAC inherently provides information regarding how much disclosure may
be necessary to capture distributional benefits may even emphasize this reaction. Although downward
corrections are also possible, e.g., after initially overestimating the other’s disclosure, we do not expect
that peer comparison initiates much hiding of information in SAC.
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the incentive to adapt is not only driven by soft factors like image concerns, but also by
expected monetary benefits in SAC.
Hypothesis 3 (Heterogeneous effects): Those who disclose less ex ante in SAC react to
peer comparison and adapt their disclosure decision.
So far, we have focused on the effect of strategic incentives and social comparison on
information disclosure. If subjects change their initial level of disclosure in SAC after
peer comparison, this can be driven both by an updated belief about the right amount
of information to disclose or by social pressure.24 In order to investigate the aspect of
social pressure, we asked participants: “Did you feel compelled to reveal more information
than you initially wanted to?” right after they made their ex post revelation decision.
Perceived pressure should play a role in strategic treatments due to their competitive
nature (Brandts et al. 2009), and should be especially strong when paired with peer
comparison in SAC (DellaVigna et al. 2012, 2017). Regarding heterogeneity, we expect
the increase in pressure in SAC to be driven by the initially disclosure-unwilling, who
learn that they lag behind in revelation competition.
Hypothesis 4 (Pressure to disclose): Perceived pressure to disclose information increases
a) in strategic compared to random treatments, b) even more so in combination with
social comparison in SAC, and in this case c) driven by those learning to be the one
disclosing less.
Besides this potential cost, personal information disclosure might also create benefits.
Previous research both in experimental settings (Bohnet and Frey 1999; Brandts et al.
2006; Charness and Gneezy 2008; Eckel and Petrie 2011; Gaudeul and Giannetti 2017;
Hermstrüwer and Dickert 2017; Holm and Samahita 2018), as well as on microfinance
platforms (Böhme and Pötzsch 2010; Ge et al. 2017; Michels 2012; Pope and Sydnor
2011), provides evidence that adding soft, personal information can beneficially influence
outcomes. If information overbidding is a way to compete for attention, the extent of
personal information sharing likely affects allocator selection in the strategic treatments
24See Section 3.5 for a discussion.
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of our experiment. Particularly, those individuals who disclose more information should
be more likely selected as allocators.
Hypothesis 5 (Beneficial information overbidding): Participants who reveal more infor-
mation in strategic treatments are more likely selected as allocators.
We refrain from stating explicit hypotheses regarding the influence of sharing on caring,
i.e., from information disclosure on generosity in impunity play since field evidence for
such a relationship is mixed (Duarte et al. 2012; Iyer et al. 2016; Pope and Sydnor 2011),
and it is not the focus of our project.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 3.3 shows descriptive statistics of our sample. Participants are 55.8% female and on
average 24.3 years old. With reference to Westin’s privacy index, our sample is roughly
split into two halves, privacy “pragmatists” and “fundamentalists”. Hardly anyone is
classified as “unconcerned”.25 Except for age, statistical tests do not reveal any differences
between treatment groups in terms of demographics, privacy preferences, and social media
behavior. Descriptive statistics regarding outcome variables for the restricted sample of
allocator candidates (role A and B) are summarized in Table 3.A.1 in the Appendix.
3.4.2 Answers ex ante disclosed
First, we analyze the aggregated amount of information disclosed ex ante, i.e., before
social comparison. Hypothesis 1 predicts more disclosure in strategic treatments. Indeed,
participants react to the strategic setting with more information revelation. Compared
to random, information revelation doubles from 1.9 to 3.8 answers on average in the
strategic context. Figure 3.2 depicts the distribution of the number of answers disclosed.
In random, more than half of the participants disclose nothing, while only 12.9% do so in
strategic. Instead, the majority of 46.6% of observations in the latter treatment falls in the
25Therefore, we pool pragmatists and unconcerned subjects in the subsequent analyses and only use
a dummy for fundamentalists.
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Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics: Sample characteristics
Total RA RAC SA SAC p-value
Female 55.8% 48.3% 65.0% 51.7% 58.6% 0.232
Age 24.3 25.9 23.5 24.3 23.8 0.045
Westin Fundamentalist 51.0% 43.3% 53.3% 54.0% 51.7% 0.606
Westin Pragmatist 47.6% 56.7% 45.0% 43.7% 47.1% 0.456
Westin Unconcerned 1.4% 0.0% 1.7% 2.3% 1.1% 0.911
Profile public 15.0% 15.0% 16.7% 16.1% 12.6% 0.905
Profile identifiable 69.4% 61.7% 73.3% 67.8% 73.6% 0.415
Ability compare 4.4 4.3 4.5 4.5 4.3 0.394
Opinion compare 4.8 4.6 5.0 5.0 4.7 0.209
N 294 60 60 87 87
Notes: p-values in last column show accuracy of randomization into treatments
based on individual characteristics, and stem from Kruskal-Wallis-tests for age, abil-
ity compare, and opinion compare, and from Fisher’s exact tests otherwise.
range between two and four revelations. A Wilcoxon ranksum-test confirms that the two
distributions are statistically different form each other (p < 0.001). While the answers
that participants give are themselves obviously meaningful for disclosure, the focus of our
analysis is not which particular information participants are willing to disclose, but how
incentives and social comparison affect information disclosure in general. Therefore, the
analysis on the answer level is left to the interested reader in the Appendix.26
As a general empirical strategy in this paper, we estimate the effect of our treatment
dimension, strategic incentives, social comparison, and their interaction, on different out-
comes yi, i.e.,
yi = β0 + β1strategici + β2comparisoni + β3strategici ∗ comparisoni + β ′Xi + i (1)
in which Xi is a vector of individual characteristics of individual i, and i denotes an error
term clustered at group level. We are interested in β1, β1, and β3 capturing the effect of
strategic incentives, social comparison, and the differential effect of social comparison in
strategic settings, respectively.
26In the Appendix, we provide histograms of the content of answers in Figure 3.A.1, and Table 3.A.2
reports probit regression results on factors affecting disclosure on question level.
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Figure 3.2: Histograms of answers ex ante disclosed
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Notes: Vertical lines represent means.
Table 3.4 reports corresponding OLS regression results with reference to the number of
answers ex ante disclosed by allocator candidates. The effect of the strategic incentive to
reveal more information is statistically significant at the 1% level, as already suggested by
the descriptive analysis. Participants in strategic disclose on average 1.9 answers more.
At this stage, peer comparison has not yet taken place, so insignificant effects of the
comparison coefficient and its interaction with strategic in column (2) confirm that there
are no initial differences between groups with and without subsequent feedback.
As controls, age and gender, as well as nine dummy variables for the ten random
orders of questions, are added in column (3). In general, women disclose significantly
less than men, quantitatively about one answer less on average. Moreover, to capture
attitudes that are relevant for our setting, column (4) adds control variables for privacy
concerns via a dummy for Westin’s privacy fundamentalists, the two dimensions ability
and opinion compare of the INCOM social comparison index, and two dummy variables
capturing identifiability of the participant’s social media profile and strangers’ access to
it. All specifications confirm that strategic incentives enhance information disclosure and
thus Hypothesis 1. In the Appendix, we show that controlling for the many zero disclo-
sures, which occur particularly in random treatments, by a tobit model even strengthens
our results. Moreover, results are robust to a 90% winsorization on treatment level.
Result 1: More information is revealed ex ante in strategic than in random treatments.
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Table 3.4: Effect of strategic incentives on ex ante disclosure
Answers ex ante disclosed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
strategic 1.913∗∗∗ 1.927∗∗∗ 1.974∗∗∗ 2.106∗∗∗
(0.432) (0.663) (0.652) (0.670)
comparison 0.475 0.669 0.700
(0.633) (0.672) (0.669)
strategic # comparison -0.027 -0.203 -0.244
(0.864) (0.843) (0.858)
constant 1.862∗∗∗ 1.625∗∗∗ 2.071 0.971
(0.317) (0.501) (1.457) (1.740)
basic controls No No Yes Yes
preference controls No No No Yes
N 196 196 196 196
R2 0.091 0.096 0.171 0.185
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Table reports OLS regres-
sion coefficients with standard errors in parentheses clustered at group
level. Basic controls include gender, age, and dummies for the ten dif-
ferent randomizations of questions used. Preference controls include
dummies for “Westin fundamentalist”, publicly accessible and identi-
fiable social media profiles, respectively, and the ability and opinion
comparison seeking indexes from INCOM.
3.4.3 Ex post disclosure changes
We now investigate how social comparison affects disclosure behavior. After the initial
disclosure stage and a belief elicitation task, subjects can revise their disclosure choice.
Without prior announcement, participants in comparison treatments learn the disclosure
choice of the other allocator candidate. Particularly, they learn which answers their com-
petitor disclosed, but not the content of answers, and can revise their choices. In order
to maintain comparability between treatments with and without comparison, subjects
can also revise their disclosure choice when not receiving feedback on their competitor’s
behavior. As the dependent variable, we focus on the absolute amount of disclosure
changes independent of their direction.27 A disclosure change is measured as a different
disclosure choice ex post than ex ante, i.e., xex ante 6= xex post. We sum up these sin-
27One would miss important changes when only measuring the amount of information disclosed ex
ante and ex post: It would overlook inverse changes like “subsequently disclose answer x, but hide answer
y”, which would be reported as zero, but might indicate adaptation to the other’s disclosure.
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gle disclosure changes for all twelve answers to derive our outcome variable of interest,∑12
n=1 |xex anten − xex postn |i, which can range from 0 to 12. Hypothesis 2 predicts that social
comparison has a stronger effect under strategic incentives in SAC than in RAC without.
Figure 3.3: Coefficient plots of ex post disclosure changes by treatment
(A) Disclosure changes overall
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(B) Disclosure changes by ex ante disclosure
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Notes: Vertical lines represent standard errors clustered at group level. Horizontal lines divide
ex post disclosure changes into upward and downward changes depicted above and below the
line, respectively.
Panel A of Figure 3.3 depicts ex post disclosure changes by treatment as a coefficient
plot based on OLS regression. The horizontal line separating the bars in an upper and
a lower part distinguishes the direction of the changes. The fractions below the line are
disclosure reductions, while extensions are depicted above. We observe a small number of
ex post disclosure changes in treatments without peer comparisons, probably as a reaction
to intermediate belief elicitation. Compared to the baseline level of changes in RA, there
are not more ex post changes in RAC after social comparison. However, substantial
changes occur when combining social comparison with strategic incentives to disclose.
Table 3.5 reports the corresponding regression results, as specified in Equation (1),
with ex post disclosure changes as the dependent variable. The strategic-comparison in-
teraction effect in column (1) is statistically significantly positive at the 5% level. This
means that participants who face strategic benefits react to peer comparison. The inter-
action effect of strategic-comparison equals at least 0.72 disclosure changes, and remains
significant independent of the control variables included in columns (2)-(4). By adding
up the three coefficients of interest, a stable effect size of 0.65 disclosure changes emerges
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Table 3.5: Ex post disclosure changes by treatment
Ex post disclosure changes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
high low
strategic -0.093 -0.105 -0.132 -0.284 -0.351 0.143
(0.236) (0.219) (0.220) (0.278) (0.294) (0.361)
comparison 0.025 0.019 -0.045 -0.086 -0.089 -0.004
(0.250) (0.230) (0.237) (0.247) (0.340) (0.414)
strategic # comparison 0.716∗∗ 0.718∗∗ 0.824∗∗ 0.824∗∗ 0.610 1.258∗
(0.350) (0.344) (0.362) (0.358) (0.431) (0.728)
own ex ante disclosure 0.082
(0.062)
own - other’s ex ante disclosure -0.061
(0.047)
constant 0.300 0.676 -0.106 -0.332 -0.348 -0.526
(0.225) (0.530) (0.477) (0.475) (0.573) (0.938)
basic controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
preference controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 196 196 196 196 116 80
R2 0.058 0.081 0.131 0.150 0.205 0.262
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Table reports OLS regression coefficients with standard
errors in parentheses clustered at group level. Basic controls include gender, age, and dummies
for the ten different randomizations of questions used. Preference controls include dummies for
“Westin fundamentalist”, publicly accessible and identifiable social media profiles, respectively,
and the ability and opinion comparison seeking indexes from INCOM. The lower candidate is the
one who disclosed strictly fewer answers ex ante than her competitor.
for treatment SAC in addition to the 0.3 baseline level of changes in RA. In total, this
equals nearly one absolute disclosure change in SAC on average. In contrast, the compar-
ison variable is weak and insignificant, and implies that social comparison per se does not
overcome one’s intrinsic preference for privacy, including a potential reluctance to disclose
personal details.
Controlling for privacy- and social comparison-related factors in column (3) increases
the size of the strategic-comparison interaction effect. Interestingly, participants who score
higher on the ability dimension of the INCOM social comparison index, i.e., those who
often compare their own ability with others, make significantly more disclosure changes
(p = 0.028). In column (4), we additionally control for one’s own ex ante disclosure,
i.e., the absolute disclosure level, and for the disclosure difference to the competitor, i.e.,
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the relative disclosure. Both factors do not significantly affect adaptation behavior, and
leave our results unchanged. The same holds when performing a 90% winsorization on
treatment level as a robustness check, which can be found in Table 3.A.4 of the Appendix.
Consequently, the interplay between incentives and social comparison seems crucial for
adapting one’s personal information disclosure. This confirms Hypothesis 2.
Result 2: Peer comparison induces significantly more ex post disclosure changes under
strategic incentives than without.
In order to better understand ex post disclosure changes, we also investigate the rel-
evance and direction of ex post disclosure changes. First, is the information used in our
experiment relevant, i.e., perceived as meaningful for allocator selection and allocation
behavior? In columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.A.5 in the Appendix, we only consider ex
post disclosure changes of answers which player C considers as relevant indicators for
game behavior. Results with and without additional controls reveal a similar picture as
in the main analysis. The strategic-comparison interaction term is significant, suggesting
that peer comparison indeed fosters the disclosure of more relevant answers.
Second, we examine the direction of disclosure changes, which can be inferred from
Figure 3.3 by looking at the horizontal division lines of the bars. Moreover, we ana-
lyze whether a change mimics the disclosure decision of the competitor. The strategic-
comparison interaction effect is significant for disclosure extensions and for adaptations to
the disclosure choice of the other. In SAC in particular, 89.1% of all changes are upward
changes, and 85.5% are adaptations. For a detailed analysis and corresponding regression
results, see Table 3.A.6 in the Appendix. Two important aspects prevail: First, we fol-
low peers in what we disclose, which can be regarded as an intensive margin and fits to
conformity seeking (Asch 1951; Bernheim 1994). One wants to avoid deviating from the
disclosure choice of the other and therefore adapts to her revelation behavior. Second,
the primary direction of change with both peer comparison and strategic incentives is
upwards, which resembles an extensive margin.
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Regarding heterogeneity in ex post disclosure changes, Hypothesis 3 predicts that the
observed changes in SAC are driven by those learning to lag behind. This turns out to
be true when splitting our sample into two subgroups based on the criterion whether
an individual is the one who discloses more or strictly less information ex ante than the
other.28 Looking at the corresponding coefficient plots for these subsamples depicted in
Panel B of Figure 3.3 shows that the bar for the lower candidate in the SAC treatment
is by far the highest. In this condition, subjects make on average 1.4 ex post disclosure
changes, of which 97.4% are extensions and 84.2% adaptation mimicking the disclosure
behavior of the competitor. In columns (5) and (6) of Table 3.5, we run the previous dis-
closure change regressions separately for the two subgroups.29 The strategic-comparison
interaction effect turns out to be significant for lower candidates. Those who learn that
they disclose more information ex ante do not see the need to react to peer comparison,
while those who realize that they lag behind revise their ex ante disclosure choice. This
supports the idea that, with peer comparison and competition in information disclosure,
those generally unwilling to disclose adapt their behavior to their environment. However,
by splitting the sample, one loses statistical power in the regression analysis, resulting in
significance only at the 10% level to substantiate Hypothesis 3.
Result 3: Subjects who disclose less ex ante under strategic incentives and peer com-
parison alter their disclosure choice.
One interesting additional observation when looking at Panel B in Figure 3.3 is that
there are some changes going on under peer comparison even without strategic incentives
to disclose. These changes are bi-directional. Some subjects in RAC, who learn that they
disclosed more, reveal less information, which can be inferred from most ex post disclosure
changes of higher candidates lying below the horizontal line in Panel B in Figure 3.3. In
contrast, lower candidates expand their disclosure, so both groups converge to each other.
28Since we call a group member the “lower” candidate only if she reveals strictly less information ex
ante, and therefore assign a value of zero to the dummy if both candidates in a pair disclose the same
amount of information ex ante, we have more “high” than “low” candidates.
29Since our two-by-two design already requires an interaction regression when analyzing the full sample,
a further interaction for heterogeneous groups would result in triple interaction. In order to maintain
interpretability of results, we use sample splits instead.
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On the contrary, in SAC, even if one is already ahead, one more likely reacts by disclosing
more rather than less. This supports the idea that incentives for personal information
sharing push the extensive margin of disclosure up.
3.4.4 Hidden cost of information disclosure
Are there potential side effects of extensive personal information disclosure, in particular
pressure to disclose? In SAC, particularly those who reveal less ex ante widen their
disclosure due to peer comparison. Therefore, we explore whether peer comparison results
from peer pressure by analyzing answers to the question “Did you feel compelled to reveal
more information than you initially wanted to?”, elicited right after participants’ ex post
disclosure choice. Panel A in Figure 3.4 shows the coefficient plot of the level of perceived
pressure measured in standard deviations for the four treatments. In random treatments,
the level of pressure with and without comparison is similarly low and lies between -
0.32 and -0.25 standard deviations. The corresponding comparison regression coefficient,
distinguishing the pure effect of social comparison, is insignificant and small in magnitude
in all regression specifications displayed in columns (1)-(3) of Table 3.6. Thus, social
comparison per se does not seem to trigger pressure to share information.
Figure 3.4: Coefficient plot of perceived pressure to disclose by treatment
(A) Perceived pressure overall
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(B) Perceived pressure by ex ante disclosure
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Notes: Vertical lines represent standard errors clustered at group level.
However, the combination of peer comparison and incentives seems to render infor-
mation sharing compelling. We find that the interaction of strategic incentives and peer
comparison increases perceived pressure by 0.42 to 0.48 standard deviations, depending
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on the specification. Although it is statistically significant only if controlling for other
factors, it is large in magnitude. If we winsorize the data by 90% on treatment level,
shown in Table 3.A.14 of the Appendix, this finding is robust and becomes significant
at the 10% level already without any controls. This provides directional evidence in line
with Hypothesis 4b. However, we do not observe a statistically significant increase in
pressure from strategic incentives alone. The level of pressure in the SA treatment equals
the average level in our sample, and is not significantly higher than in the RA treatment
on conventional levels (p = 0.131). Unlike Brandts et al. (2009), we cannot confirm that
competition per se has detrimental effects, and cannot confirm Hypothesis 4a.
Table 3.6: Perceived pressure to disclose information by treatment
Perceived pressure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
high low
strategic 0.274 0.250 0.254 0.379∗∗ -0.142
(0.180) (0.183) (0.175) (0.191) (0.345)
comparison -0.062 -0.078 -0.089 -0.066 -0.201
(0.165) (0.171) (0.169) (0.205) (0.342)
strategic # comparison 0.416 0.433∗ 0.475∗ 0.132 1.117∗∗
(0.252) (0.252) (0.246) (0.292) (0.468)
constant -0.254∗∗ 0.105 -0.373 -0.696 0.355
(0.112) (0.330) (0.472) (0.714) (0.797)
basic controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
preference controls No No Yes Yes Yes
N 196 196 196 116 80
R2 0.076 0.081 0.113 0.202 0.202
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Table reports OLS regression co-
efficients with standard errors in parentheses clustered at group level. Ba-
sic controls include gender and age. Preference controls include dummies for
“Westin fundamentalist”, publicly accessible and identifiable social media pro-
files, respectively, and the ability and opinion comparison seeking indexes from
INCOM. The lower candidate is the one who disclosed strictly fewer answers
ex ante than her competitor.
We further look at heterogeneity in perceived pressure when being the one disclosing
less ex ante. Hypothesis 4c postulates that perceived pressure is comparably high for
those individuals. Panel B in Figure 3.4 shows the corresponding coefficient plot split by
who in the pair discloses less ex ante. In random treatments, those who disclose more
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and do so without incentives feel the least compelled. Their information disclosure de-
cision seems to be intrinsically motivated and free from pressure. Similarly to the effect
for ex post disclosure changes in Panel B of Figure 3.3, participants realizing in SAC
to have disclosed less ex ante feel most pressured. The effect size is with 0.81 standard
deviations large in magnitude compared to the standardized average of zero. Running
separate regressions for candidates with ex ante higher or lower disclosure in a pair, the
strategic-comparison interaction effect in the low candidate subsample in column (5) of
Table 3.6 is significant at the 5% level. Therefore, we infer from our results that observing
to lag behind in personal information revelation under competition is perceived as more
compelling. This supports Hypothesis 4c.30
Result 4: Perceived pressure to disclose information increases under peer comparison
in combination with strategic incentives, especially when learning to have disclosed less
ex ante, but not under strategic incentives in general.
As a second indicator for hidden cost of information disclosure, we additionally focus
on the disclosure of information, whose revelation participants consider as unpleasant.
Their correlation with all ex post disclosure changes, as well as with relevant disclosure
changes, is quite high, at 0.663 and 0.560, respectively. In accordance, regression results
in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.A.5 in the Appendix uncover that the combination
of strategic incentives and peer comparison causes unpleasant disclosure changes. The
strategic-comparison interaction effect is significant at the 10% and 5% level when not in-
cluding or including controls, respectively. This means that peer comparison and strategic
incentives come along with another side effect: They trigger the revelation of information
which participants do not like to disclose. Hence, while disclosure changes may have a
beneficial effect on outcomes via making more relevant information available, they also
come along at the cost of causing discomfort.
30Note that the strategic coefficient turns significant in the restricted sample of candidates being ahead
in column (4), indicating that pressure may also be caused by strategic incentives per se. However, we did
not have any hypothesis regarding heterogeneous reactions for initially more disclosure-willing subjects,
and we therefore refrain from further interpreting this result.
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3.4.5 Effects of information disclosure on outcomes
Allocator selection based on information disclosure
In this section, we briefly analyze how personal information disclosure affects the prob-
ability to become the allocator. Allocator candidates seem to assume that C takes personal
information into account for allocator selection since they disclose more information in
strategic treatments. Indeed, participants in role C look at the information provided. On
average, they investigate 10.5 out of 12 answers disclosed ex post, and in 79.6% of the
cases all answers.31
Figure 3.5: Probability of becoming allocator by difference in information disclosure
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Notes: Cumulative probability functions of becoming allocator.
Panel B of Figure 3.5 illustrates that disclosing more information than the other can-
didate indeed increases the likelihood to become allocator in strategic treatments.32 The
curves present the cumulative probability distribution of being selected, conditional on
the ex post difference in answers disclosed relative to one’s competitor. In Panel B, the
line for non-selected candidates is shifted to the left, meaning that their probability of
not being selected is higher the more they lag behind. Over a large range of the ab-
scissa, there is first-order stochastic dominance between the two lines. While 25.5% of
allocators stem from the group of participants disclosing less, suggesting that what has
31In a ranksum-test, the number of answers inspected by C is with 9.9 clicks insignificantly smaller in
random than in strategic treatments with 10.8 clicks (p = 0.274).
32Since C is not informed about the comparison stage, we can ignore the comparison dimension and
pool observations.
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been disclosed also matters for selection, disclosing more seems highly decisive to be-
come allocator. In fact, a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects the hypothesis
that the difference in ex post disclosures between selected and non-selected allocators is
the same (p = 0.004). There is no such difference in treatments with random allocator
selection displayed in Panel A of Figure 3.5 (p = 0.988). In sum, this suggests that the
pure amount of personal information sharing can impact how much attention one receives
from others, so engaging in competition via information overbidding seems to pay off
for disclosure-willing individuals. When restricting our analysis to information which C
considers as relevant indicators for allocation behavior, the effect that more sharing raises
the likelihood of being selected increases.33 The corresponding probit regression analy-
sis in Table 3.A.9 of the Appendix confirms these findings and substantiates Hypothesis 5.
Result 5: Disclosing more information significantly increases the probability of being
selected as allocator in strategic treatments.
As a corollary to this finding, it is worth pointing out that participants who disclose
less ex ante also most often disclose less ex post and are therefore less likely to become
allocator in SAC. In spite of the opportunity to catch up, they fail to become allocator
in 74.1% of the cases, which is statistically different from a 50% chance in a two-sided
binomial test (p = 0.019) and indistinguishable from the corresponding chance without
comparison in SA in a ranksum-test (p = 0.698). Thus, for this group, ex post disclosure
changes do not pay off.
Allocation behavior
While revealing more information is beneficial for becoming the allocator, is this role
also beneficial in terms of payoff? OLS regressions in Table 3.A.10 in the Appendix
confirm that this is true. When dividing the 17€ pie themselves, subjects earn almost
three times as much as they would receive from their matched competitor. Instead of the
33This additionally confirms that the anonymous information in our experiment is indeed perceived
as relevant personal information in this context.
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average payoff of 3.40€ from their competitor, they keep 9.73€ for themselves. Hence,
becoming an allocator is highly beneficial in terms of payoff.
Is allocator selection based on information disclosure competition also beneficial for
the other market side, i.e., players C selecting the allocator? In order to explore this,
we look at allocation behavior conditional on personal information sharing. We measure
prosocial behavior by the amount one gives to C. We summarize the main effects here
and refer to Table 3.A.11 in the Appendix for a more detailed analysis.
Figure 3.6: Coefficient plot of money allocated to C by information disclosure and selection
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First of all, and in line with Brandts et al. (2006),34 participants in strategic treat-
ments give significantly more to C and thereby reciprocate the favor of being selected.
This represents the level effect in the coefficient plot in Figure 3.6. Second, there seems
to be a positive relationship between intrinsic disclosure-willingness and generosity in
random treatments.35 This can be inferred from the slope in Figure 3.6. However, this
34Brandts et al. (2006) call the effect that selected participants give more to the selecting party than
randomly chosen participants the “I-want-you” effect. We confirm its existence in a modified setting.
35However, we do not want to emphasize this result too much since the number of observations with
many disclosures in random treatments is limited.
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positive relationship is distorted by revelation competition in strategic treatments. Sub-
jects disclosing more personal information in strategic treatments do not offer more to
player C. Hence, there is no direct effect of disclosure behavior on prosocial behavior in
treatments with allocator selection. In the corresponding OLS regression specification
in Table 3.A.11 in the Appendix, this means that the significant effects of the amount
disclosed ex post and its interaction with the strategic coefficient cancel out. Third, there
is no indirect effect on prosocial behavior from being chosen as an allocator as a result of
one’s disclosure. Those who become allocators in strategic treatments do not offer signif-
icantly more to player C than non-selected candidates. Thus, participants in role C do
not suffice in picking the more generous candidates based on endogenously disclosed per-
sonal information. Statistical support based on OLS regression results for all the findings
discussed above can be found in Table 3.A.11 in the Appendix.
While there is no positive effect of the total amount of information disclosed ex post,
the sum of disclosures becomes meaningful if we focus only on those answers which C rates
as relevant for allocation behavior. Regressions in Table 3.A.12 in the Appendix repeat
the previous analysis only with the disclosure of relevant answers. Here, more disclosure
indeed implies generosity, i.e., allocators disclosing more relevant answers distribute more
money to player C and less money to themselves. Taking together the findings on overall
and relevant ex post disclosure, there appears to be a positive relationship between dis-
closing more and being more generous, but sharing irrelevant information under strategic
incentives obfuscates this relationship. Thus, competition for benefits might lead to more
information sharing, and hence to more meaningful information diffusion, but also to less
straightforward signaling due to information abundance.
The Appendix also reports acceptance thresholds from the impunity game as a form
of “choice and voice”. While social comparison might decrease acceptance, we do not find
robust treatment effects regarding acceptance thresholds. However, acceptance thresholds
are significantly higher than predicted by game theory, so subjects are willing to forgo
some money in our experiment when being offered too little. Even though altruistic
sanctioning in monetary terms is excluded, respondents often engage in non-monetary
altruistic accusation via choosing a positive acceptance threshold.
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3.5 Discussion: Robustness of results based on beliefs
Our analysis of disclosure behavior highlights that the combination of benefits for in-
formation sharing and observing peers’ information sharing increases disclosure. In this
section, we try to explore more deeply why this is the case in the SAC treatment. One ex-
planation already discussed and supported by our results is peer pressure stemming from
peer comparison. Another conflicting explanation is the effect of information provision
per se. Providing important information about the other candidate’s information-sharing
behavior in SAC could trigger changes in disclosure behavior due to less uncertainty about
how much and which information one has to reveal to increase one’s chances of becoming
the allocator. However, we argue in the following why a pure information-provision ar-
gument cannot fully explain our results.36 Moreover, we provide evidence that there are
no systematic differences with respect to content of the given answers between those who
disclose more or less information, respectively.
Ex post disclosure changes could be driven by wrong beliefs about the competitor’s
disclosure and by social pressure. Subjects, likely updating their incorrect beliefs about
how much more information disclosure is needed for becoming allocator, seem to account
for 22.2% of those candidates in our SAC sample, who lag behind ex ante. In these cases,
subjects fully catch up or even overbid their competitor in terms of ex post information
disclosure after peer comparison. Such behavior may resemble imitation learning (Huck et
al. 1999; Vega-Redondo 1997). In contrast, 29.6% adapt partly by one to three disclosure
extensions, but still disclose less ex post. This group seems to trade off privacy concerns
by reducing the distance to the competitor, likely due to conformity seeking (Asch 1951;
Bernheim 1994). 44.4% of participants do not react at all when learning about the
disclosure choice of their peer. This type likely does not want to trade off privacy against
potential benefits of disclosing more.
Since our detailed dataset contains beliefs about how much a subject expects her
competitor to disclose, we can examine the information provision explanation in more
36While we cannot completely rule out that the high perceived pressure in SAC stems from receiving
information in a competitive setting per se and is not related to the privacy component of our data,
significant pressure seems to exist under such conditions, at least if personal information is at work. If
anything, general applicability of our results to competitive settings with peer comparison would increase
the relevance of our results even further.
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Figure 3.7: Disclosure behavior and beliefs by treatment and ex ante disclosure
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Notes: The lower candidate is the one who disclosed strictly fewer answers ex ante than her
competitor.
detail. If the belief about the competitor’s amount of disclosure was systematically too
low, the additional information provided in comparison treatments should initiate more
disclosures in order to outbid one’s competitor. However, the beliefs of those disclosing
less, depicted in Figure 3.7, are correct: They expect their competitor to disclose more
information than they do themselves, as the first bars of “SA low” and “SAC low” show.
If participants had expected to disclose less, they should have behaved according to their
correct belief by already disclosing more ex ante. Recall here that participants are unaware
that they will be able to revise their choice when making their ex ante disclosure decision,
and should consequently act as if it is the final choice. Thus, wrong beliefs about how much
disclosure is necessary to become allocator seem an unlikely explanation for discrepancies
in disclosure. Rather, privacy costs may hinder those who lag behind from catching
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up with those having lower privacy costs. In effect, additional information under social
comparison rather confirms that one lags behind, rather than providing new insights.
Moreover, if wrong beliefs were decisive for disclosing less, one should see a strong
reaction when learning how much more revelation is needed to outbid the competitor.
Rather than observing this, there is only a minor increase in disclosures after the com-
parison stage in SAC (compare the third bar in category “SAC low” of Figure 3.7 to the
second bar). Thus, the majority of disclosure changes are unlikely to occur in order to
outbid the competitor. The candidate lagging behind reveals somewhat more, but more
often than not refrains from jumping ahead in disclosure. This highlights peer pressure
in information disclosure competition as a more likely driver of the personal information
disclosure dynamics we observe.
Overall, our results indicate that there seem to be substantial restrictions that make
subjects refuse to share their personal information despite being aware of lagging behind
in information disclosure competition. On the one hand, for some subjects, this might be
the content of the information. Subjects not only need to consider the number of questions
that they reveal, but also their answers to these questions. If they expect their personal
data to send a bad signal, they may prefer to refrain from disclosing their information. On
the other hand, some subjects may experience a general unwillingness to share their data,
independently of how good or bad their information is, as a form of privacy cost. In order
to distinguish these two explanations, we check for systematic differences between the
content of answers given by those allocator candidates who disclose ex ante more or less
information, respectively. Table 3.A.7 in the Appendix reports results from corresponding
OLS regressions at question level. Neither for the full sample nor for the restricted sample
of subjects in strategic treatments are there any significant differences in answer content
between subjects who disclose more or less ex ante, except for question 7.37 Hence, for 11
out of 12 answers, there are no systematic differences in terms of content of the answers
37Question 7 reads “Should people who voluntarily donate an organ receive payment for it?” and has
no right or wrong answer. While this answer has a marginally significant impact on whether a subject
becomes the allocator in the regression with both disclosure and answer content included in Table 3.A.15
in the Appendix, it is not significant without controlling for disclosure and is not predictive for allocating
more money to player C in the distribution stage.
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one could reveal. We infer from these results that different content and thus different
signals are not driving disclosure behavior.
On top of finding no systematic differences in actual content between those disclosing
more or less, there are no differences either with regard to beliefs regarding content. For
each answer, we compare a subject’s own answer with her guess regarding which answer
her opponent has given. Regressing each of these differences again on an indicator for
being the one disclosing fewer answers in Table 3.A.8 returns no statistically significant
effects. Hence, subjects who disclose fewer answers do not belief that the answers they
have given are systematically different from the answers of their competitor. This conclu-
sion always holds, regardless of whether we look at the full sample or only at subjects in
strategic treatments. Consequently, differences in beliefs regarding content cannot drive
our results. Rather, some people seem to feel a general reluctance to share personal
details, independently of whether the content is good or bad.
In summary, we conclude that wrong beliefs about the benefits of information sharing,
as well as different content of the information to share, cannot explain our findings. On the
contrary, heterogeneous privacy costs in a world with information disclosure competition
and conformity seeking can explain the observed patterns in disclosure behavior. In
combination with the perceived pressure that disclosure-unwilling individuals report, our
results therefore highlight important new patterns in personal information sharing, which
have so far been overseen.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate personal information sharing under competition for benefits.
Particularly, we examine the interaction of strategic incentives and peer comparison to
disclose personal information as a channel leading to more and more information sharing
as observed in the field. Moreover, we provide evidence on a potentially neglected side
effect in such a context, i.e., an increase in perceived pressure to disclose for those who
are intrinsically less willing to share information about themselves. Our setting best fits
modern markets, for example social media platforms like Instagram and Youtube, Airbnb,
LinkedIn, or microfinance or crowdfunding platforms like Kickstarter, in which one market
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side strives for another’s beneficial attention by providing personal information. It also
applies to offline markets, for example the housing market in which prospective tenants
try to stand out from the crowd of applicants by bringing a well-designed folder with
abundant documents, but is exacerbated by online markets.
In our lab experiment, participants can endogenously reveal potentially sensitive an-
swers from a personality and opinion questionnaire in order to be selected to determine the
allocation decision in an impunity game. We vary in how far information sharing can serve
a strategic purpose, and analyze how it is influenced by peer comparison. Results show
that strategic incentives double disclosure, and that this effect is fostered by subsequent
peer comparison. This dynamic response is primarily driven by those participants who
learn from social comparison that they revealed less, a priori, than their competitors. It
goes along with an increase in perceived pressure to have to disclose information and with
the disclosure of more unpleasant information. We find that more disclosure-willing indi-
viduals are more frequently picked, but that the abundance of information shared under
incentives obfuscates the positive relationship between sharing more relevant information
and desirable behavior.
Which implications can be drawn from our results? First, it is unlikely that all infor-
mation sharing we observe online nowadays is based on a pure preference for revelation.
Rather, modern markets of the 21st century trade personal information as a medium of
exchange for benefits, and people respond to this incentive by revealing more. Second,
peer pressure exists in personal information disclosure. Observing others who freely share
personal information for benefits triggers intrinsically reluctant individuals to adapt their
behavior. This adaptation process, driven by the interplay of benefits and observing peers
sharing, sheds light on the channel underlying the present, seemingly unstoppable trend of
more and more voluntary information disclosure. Third, the high level of pressure, which
participants in our experiment report after being influenced by a more disclosure-willing
peer, and the sharing of more information, which is perceived as unpleasant, provide in-
dicative evidence of a potential and so far neglected side effect of markets with information
revelation competition. Those who freely share information in exchange for benefits and
incur low privacy costs exert social pressure on the more disclosure-unwilling to adapt.
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The more others share, the harder it becomes to abstain. In effect, disclosure-unwilling
individuals may partly adapt, incurring high privacy cost without meaningfully affecting
outcomes. They would have been better off in a state with less overall disclosure driven
by strategic incentives and peer comparison.
Our results are in line with evidence by Brandts et al. (2009), DellaVigna et al. (2012,
2017), and Reyniers and Bhalla (2013), illustrating that competition or social pressure
can reduce well-being or welfare. However, we refrain from a welfare analysis since the
personal data we use may be less predictive for real-world behavior than personal data
exchanged in the field. Thus, we would underestimate potential welfare gains for the
selecting market side. Rather, we focus on understanding the disclosure side, emphasize
the power of peer dynamics in markets with gains from personal information sharing, and
point out that a reluctant group might be hurt. The effects we find in our setup with
anonymous personal information are likely even stronger in the field with non-anonymous
and more privacy-sensitive personal data.
Moreover, our finding that competition via extensive personal information sharing is
beneficial for the disclosure-willing market side, but provides only limited insights for the
selecting one, is in line with evidence from the field (Iyer et al. 2016; Michels 2012; Pope
and Sydnor 2011). In our setting, incentives to share more personal information obfus-
cate the positive relationship between the number of relevant disclosures and generosity
towards others. Since a lot of personal information sharing occurs in settings which in-
centivize people to reveal personal details, for example on Airbnb to attract guests, on
LinkedIn to attract recruiters, or on microfinance and crowdfunding platforms to attract
investors, competition via personal information revelation might lead to extensive infor-
mation sharing in order to catch attention, rather than highlighting the qualitatively most
suitable options. The recent introduction of “superhosts”38 on Airbnb might be a result
of such information overbidding and questions the usefulness of extensive endogenous
disclosure. As a consequence, personal information sharing may not be caring.
Although our study provides helpful insights into the channels underlying recent exten-
sive (online) information sharing, it also has shortcomings. It relies on rather subjective
38“Superhost” is a rating of excellence on Airbnb which might have become necessary because with the
mass of information already provided by hosts, screening based on this information is no longer useful.
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opinions and attitudes as a source of personal information in a laboratory environment
which might be less sensitive than identifiable information like names or photos in the
real world. Further research might narrow the gap to field settings to show how peer com-
parison and strategic benefits, in part jointly and partly in isolation, affect endogenous
personal information disclosure, but under less experimental control. A more detailed
analysis of adaptation patterns of initially disclosure-unwilling individuals and their per-
ceived pressure seems to be another promising perspective for further research.
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3.A Appendix: Additional results
3.A.1 Descriptive statistics of answers and outcomes
Table 3.A.1: Descriptive statistics: Outcome variables
random random strategic strategic
comparison comparison
Answers ex ante disclosed 1.63 2.10 3.55 4.00
(3.078) (2.610) (2.957) (3.217)
Ex post disclosure changes 0.30 0.33 0.21 0.95
(1.454) (0.730) (0.585) (1.820)
Relevant ex post disclosure changes 0.20 0.05 0.12 0.53
(0.853) (0.221) (0.422) (1.168)
Unpleasant ex post disclosure changes 0.10 0.30 0.26 0.52
(0.632) (0.158) (0.256) (0.522)
Perceived pressure (standardized) -0.25 -0.32 0.02 0.37
(0.786) (0.748) (1.024) (1.144)
Own payoff (€) 10.70 9.95 9.64 8.98
(3.818) (3.493) (3.764) (3.706)
C’s payoff (€) 3.15 3.63 4.03 4.40
(1.902) (1.835) (2.060) (2.094)
Acceptance threshold 1.98 2.45 1.83 2.50
(1.510) (1.853) (1.488) (1.719)
N 40 40 58 58
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Only role A and B considered.
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Figure 3.A.1: Histograms of answers
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Notes: Answers on 7-point scale (1 worst, 7 best).
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3.A.2 Additional results: Ex post and ex ante disclosure behavior
Table 3.A.2: Probit regressions - Disclosure-affecting factors at question level
Answer (x) disclosed ex ante
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
unpleasant -0.039∗∗∗ -0.012 -0.023 -0.022∗ -0.040∗∗∗ -0.015
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.013)
relevant 0.034∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.015 0.032∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.004
(0.016) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
answer -0.121∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗ -0.025
(0.019) (0.014) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017)
strategic 0.207∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ 0.091 0.228∗∗∗ 0.062 0.032
(0.058) (0.057) (0.056) (0.048) (0.057) (0.054)
baseline probability 0.348 0.251 0.199 0.381 0.215 0.169
N 196 196 196 196 196 196
Pseudo R2 0.255 0.219 0.098 0.344 0.139 0.081
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
unpleasant -0.000 -0.025 0.017 -0.035∗ -0.025 0.008
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.019) (0.018) (0.016)
relevant -0.009 0.015 0.049∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗ 0.023
(0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017)
answer 0.033∗∗ -0.028 -0.113∗∗∗ 0.015 -0.068∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗
(0.013) (0.021) (0.030) (0.016) (0.015) (0.023)
strategic 0.201∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗ 0.092 0.135∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.052) (0.053) (0.057) (0.055) (0.052)
baseline probability 0.220 0.214 0.302 0.204 0.252 0.267
N 196 196 196 180 196 196
Pseudo R2 0.146 0.077 0.172 0.109 0.190 0.184
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Marginal effects displayed, representing changes
in the probability to disclose a certain answer, with disclosure decision of answer(x) as
0-1 (no/yes) outcome variable. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at group level.
Control dummies for the ten different randomizations of questions used included.
Factors affecting disclosure at answer level
As reported in probit regressions in Table 3.A.2, several factors seem to affect the
probability to reveal a particular answer from the questionnaire. Of course, the answer
one gave significantly affects disclosure for most questions. Moreover, the perceived rele-
vance for predicting subsequent allocation behavior increases the probability of disclosing
146
the answer. In contrast, a feeling of discomfort to reveal a particular answer decreases
it. The strategic coefficient reports by disclosing which particular answers participants
respond to the disclosure incentive. All answers are disclosed significantly more often in
strategic treatments, except answers three, five, six, and ten.
Table 3.A.3: Tobit regressions - Effect of strategic incentives on ex
ante disclosure
Answers ex ante disclosed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
strategic 3.264∗∗∗ 3.581∗∗∗ 3.509∗∗∗ 3.666∗∗∗
(0.658) (1.024) (0.989) (1.000)
comparison 1.240 1.429 1.466
(1.093) (1.097) (1.086)
strategic # comparison -0.592 -0.748 -0.826
(1.289) (1.231) (1.239)
constant 0.236 -0.407 0.765 -0.087
(0.544) (0.856) (1.929) (2.309)
sigma 3.898∗∗∗ 3.883∗∗∗ 3.714∗∗∗ 3.686∗∗∗
(0.314) (0.320) (0.300) (0.285)
basic controls No No Yes Yes
preference controls No No No Yes
N 196 196 196 196
Pseudo R2 0.032 0.035 0.051 0.053
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in paren-
theses clustered at group level. Basic controls include gender, age, and
dummies for the ten different randomizations of questions used. Pref-
erence controls include dummies for “Westin fundamentalist”, publicly
accessible and identifiable social media profiles, respectively, and the
ability and opinion comparison seeking indexes from INCOM.
Relevance and discomfort of ex post disclosure changes
Table 3.A.5 reports OLS regression results regarding the perceived relevance and dis-
comfort of ex post disclosure changes. Patterns are similar to the main results. The
strategic-comparison interaction effect is significant in all specifications with and without
controls both with respect to relevant and unpleasant disclosure changes. Hence, while
subsequent peer comparison under strategic incentives leads to the disclosure of more
relevant information, it also makes participants reveal information that they perceive as
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Table 3.A.4: Robustness to winsorization - Ex ante disclosures and ex post disclosure
changes
Answers ex ante disclosed Ex post disclosure changes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
strategic 2.026∗∗∗ 2.002∗∗∗ 2.015∗∗∗ 2.160∗∗∗ 0.090 0.060 0.016
(0.409) (0.633) (0.620) (0.638) (0.083) (0.096) (0.115)
comparison 0.400 0.573 0.614 0.200∗ 0.185 0.120
(0.567) (0.595) (0.593) (0.112) (0.119) (0.125)
strategic # comparison 0.048 -0.122 -0.175 0.507∗∗ 0.514∗∗ 0.620∗∗
(0.817) (0.790) (0.805) (0.250) (0.252) (0.271)
constant 1.750∗∗∗ 1.550∗∗∗ 2.250 1.305 0.100∗ 0.469 -0.270
(0.284) (0.461) (1.370) (1.572) (0.055) (0.426) (0.423)
basic controls No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
preference controls No No No Yes No No Yes
N 196 196 196 196 196 196 196
R2 0.109 0.114 0.192 0.207 0.099 0.119 0.170
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Table reports OLS regression coefficients with
standard errors in parentheses clustered at group level. Basic controls include gender, age,
and dummies for the ten different randomizations of questions used. Preference controls
include dummies for “Westin fundamentalist”, publicly accessible and identifiable social
media profiles, respectively, and the ability and opinion comparison seeking indexes from
INCOM. Results winsorized by 10% on treatment level.
particularly unpleasant and costly.
Directions of ex post disclosure changes and adaptation behavior
We look at three other outcome variables of ex post disclosure behavior, namely the di-
rection of changes, i.e., the number of ex post upward and downward changes, respectively,
and whether the change mimics the competitors’ revelation. The direction of changes can
be inferred from Figure 3.3 in the main analysis, and Table 3.A.6 shows the corresponding
regression results. The strategic-comparison interaction effect is significant for the number
of adaptations to the other’s ex ante disclosure and for the number of upward changes,
i.e., ex post disclosure of answers not disclosed ex ante. None of our explanatory variables
prevails significant for downward changes, i.e., answers disclosed ex ante, but hidden ex
post.
Two main messages follow from this analysis. First, looking at columns (1) and (2) of
Table 3.A.6, ex post disclosure changes are adaptations to disclosures of one’s competitor.
This alludes to conformity seeking (Asch 1951; Bernheim 1994). In fact, the correlation
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Table 3.A.5: Relevance and discomfort of ex post disclosure changes
by treatment
Relevant Changes Unpleasant Changes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
strategic -0.079 -0.067 -0.031 -0.075
(0.142) (0.136) (0.104) (0.093)
comparison -0.150 -0.171 -0.075 -0.109
(0.135) (0.136) (0.102) (0.096)
strategic # comparison 0.564∗∗∗ 0.601∗∗∗ 0.213∗ 0.261∗∗
(0.211) (0.224) (0.126) (0.131)
constant 0.200 -0.098 0.100 0.004
(0.131) (0.341) (0.099) (0.186)
controls No Yes No Yes
N 196 196 196 196
R2 0.059 0.133 0.025 0.103
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Table reports OLS regression
coefficients with standard errors in parentheses clustered at group level.
Controls include gender and age, as well as dummies for “Westin funda-
mentalist”, publicly accessible and identifiable social media profiles, re-
spectively, and the ability and opinion comparison seeking indexes from
INCOM.
between the number of adaptations and the number of ex post disclosure changes is very
high at 0.84, and the interaction effect in column (1) of Table 3.A.6 for adaptations is
similar in magnitude to that in column (1) of Table 3.5 for ex post disclosure changes.
Testing for similarity of the interaction effects across the two regressions with adaptations
and ex post disclosure changes as outcome variables yields a p-value of 0.924, so there is
no indication to reject similarity of the two coefficients. When competing with peers, one
seems to disclose that kind of information that peers also disclose, which can be regarded
as an intensive margin.
Secondly, reported in columns (3)-(6) of Table 3.A.6, the combination of social and
economic incentives to disclose captured by the strategic-comparison interaction effect
explains disclosure extensions, but not disclosure reductions. This alludes to an extensive
margin because one reveals more information if others do so, given that one can benefit
from revelation. The finding that the ex ante disclosure changes of interest are mainly
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Table 3.A.6: Adaptations to competitor and directions of ex post disclosure changes
Adaptations Upward changes Downward changes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
strategic -0.122 -0.151 0.115 0.041 0.208 0.173
(0.227) (0.209) (0.086) (0.112) (0.223) (0.178)
comparison -0.000 -0.050 0.075 0.011 0.050 0.056
(0.240) (0.221) (0.090) (0.111) (0.242) (0.207)
strategic # comparison 0.707∗∗ 0.773∗∗ 0.580∗∗ 0.681∗∗ -0.136 -0.143
(0.321) (0.332) (0.255) (0.275) (0.248) (0.234)
constant 0.225 0.170 0.075 0.006 -0.225 0.112
(0.222) (0.415) (0.054) (0.384) (0.222) (0.247)
controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 196 196 196 196 196 196
R2 0.061 0.122 0.091 0.146 0.011 0.111
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Table reports OLS regression coefficients with
standard errors in parentheses clustered at group level. Basic controls include gender, age,
and dummies for the ten different randomizations of questions used. Preference controls
include dummies for “Westin fundamentalist”, publicly accessible and identifiable social
media profiles, respectively, and the ability and opinion comparison seeking indexes from
INCOM.
disclosure extensions shows that peer comparison in a world with benefits seems to affect
disclosure behavior in only one direction, namely to reveal more.
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Table 3.A.7: Answer scores by more / less initial disclosure on question level
Answer to question (x)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lower candidate 0.180 -0.112 0.167 0.087 -0.339 0.003
(0.196) (0.245) (0.282) (0.236) (0.233) (0.222)
constant 4.618∗∗∗ 4.056∗∗∗ 3.541∗∗∗ 2.956∗∗∗ 4.878∗∗∗ 5.207∗∗∗
(0.296) (0.273) (0.417) (0.340) (0.390) (0.313)
N 196 196 196 196 196 196
R2 0.057 0.053 0.083 0.080 0.055 0.045
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
lower candidate -0.869∗∗∗ -0.040 0.151 0.057 0.082 0.111
(0.293) (0.212) (0.156) (0.254) (0.307) (0.202)
constant 4.268∗∗∗ 5.145∗∗∗ 1.966∗∗∗ 5.097∗∗∗ 3.459∗∗∗ 4.986∗∗∗
(0.469) (0.282) (0.261) (0.311) (0.475) (0.285)
N 196 196 196 196 196 196
R2 0.080 0.036 0.036 0.028 0.030 0.019
Answer to question (x) - Strategic treatments only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lower candidate 0.302 0.079 0.366 0.111 -0.078 0.076
(0.254) (0.332) (0.378) (0.319) (0.315) (0.282)
constant 4.661∗∗∗ 4.023∗∗∗ 3.380∗∗∗ 2.632∗∗∗ 4.289∗∗∗ 4.900∗∗∗
(0.359) (0.302) (0.544) (0.260) (0.426) (0.433)
N 116 116 116 116 116 116
R2 0.077 0.077 0.086 0.051 0.124 0.102
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
lower candidate -1.116∗∗∗ 0.103 0.263 -0.064 0.400 -0.140
(0.386) (0.267) (0.192) (0.345) (0.406) (0.270)
constant 4.183∗∗∗ 4.949∗∗∗ 1.869∗∗∗ 5.157∗∗∗ 3.112∗∗∗ 5.132∗∗∗
(0.588) (0.330) (0.313) (0.443) (0.682) (0.336)
N 116 116 116 116 116 116
R2 0.168 0.047 0.087 0.054 0.077 0.026
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Content of answer(x) on 7-point scale
as outcome variable. The lower candidate is the one who disclosed strictly fewer
answers ex ante than her competitor, with the latter serving as a baseline. Standard
errors in parentheses clustered at group level. Control dummies for the ten different
randomizations of questions used included.
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Table 3.A.8: Perceived answer score differences by more / less initial dis-
closure on question level
Difference in answer (x)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lower candidate 0.023 -0.030 0.134 0.077 0.003 0.113
(0.201) (0.222) (0.211) (0.269) (0.231) (0.292)
constant 0.447∗ 0.265 -0.025 0.170 0.623∗ -0.348
(0.227) (0.351) (0.269) (0.400) (0.355) (0.211)
N 196 196 196 196 196 196
R2 0.067 0.116 0.138 0.026 0.141 0.065
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
lower candidate 0.344 -0.350 -0.107 -0.069 0.347 -0.048
(0.285) (0.298) (0.265) (0.261) (0.242) (0.322)
constant 0.203 0.550∗ 0.512 0.243 -0.424 -0.018
(0.485) (0.291) (0.366) (0.274) (0.466) (0.313)
N 196 196 196 196 196 196
R2 0.079 0.099 0.045 0.066 0.105 0.050
Difference in answer (x) - Strategic treatments only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lower candidate 0.202 0.074 0.089 0.122 -0.354 0.282
(0.288) (0.291) (0.312) (0.350) (0.255) (0.380)
constant 0.274 0.026 -0.545∗∗ 0.252 0.927∗∗ -0.516∗
(0.290) (0.503) (0.228) (0.569) (0.428) (0.291)
N 116 116 116 116 116 116
R2 0.066 0.094 0.170 0.046 0.172 0.105
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
lower candidate 0.459 -0.513 -0.258 -0.018 0.142 0.175
(0.382) (0.408) (0.368) (0.328) (0.314) (0.428)
constant 0.395 0.694∗ 0.379 0.071 -0.446 -0.275
(0.604) (0.383) (0.460) (0.389) (0.679) (0.421)
N 116 116 116 116 116 116
R2 0.101 0.161 0.079 0.069 0.103 0.063
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Difference between guess of the other’s
answer and one’s own answer as outcome variable for answer(x). The lower
candidate is the one who disclosed strictly fewer answers ex ante than her com-
petitor, with the latter serving as a baseline. Standard errors in parentheses
clustered at group level. Control dummies for the ten different randomizations
of questions used included.
152
3.A.3 Additional results: Allocator selection and distribution outcomes
Allocator selection
Table 3.A.9: Effect of difference in information disclosure on probability to become
allocator
Allocator
(1) (2) (3) (4)
own - other’s ex post disclosures 0.042∗∗∗ 0.030∗
(0.016) (0.018)
own - other’s relevant ex post disclosures 0.077∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗
(0.026) (0.030)
blue displayed first -0.060 -0.101
(0.111) (0.104)
red 0.033 0.012
(0.139) (0.125)
baseline probability 0.534 0.537 0.534 0.539
randomization controls No Yes No Yes
N 58 58 58 58
Pseudo R2 0.077 0.202 0.091 0.249
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Table reports marginal effects from probit re-
gressions with robust standard errors in parentheses. One allocator candidate is randomly
chosen per group to calculate disclosure difference. Relevant disclosures only take disclo-
sures into account which player C marks as relevant predictor of game behavior. “Red”
and “blue displayed first” are dummies if the candidate’s color is red and whether player
blue is displayed above red on the screen for allocator selection. “Red” corresponds to
role A and “blue” to role B in instructions. Randomization controls include dummies for
the ten different randomizations of questions used. Only strategic treatments considered.
Table 3.A.9 shows the results of probit regressions with the probability of being se-
lected as the allocator as the dependent variable. Since active allocator selection only takes
place in strategic treatments, we only consider this subsample in our analysis. Moreover,
we randomly draw one of the two allocator candidates in each group since otherwise each
difference would be counted twice in the analysis. Columns (1) and (2) investigate how
the difference in answers disclosed ex post affects the probability of being selected. Each
additionally disclosed answer increases the chance to become allocator by 4.2 percentage
points in column (1). Since we assigned participants the colors red (A) and blue (B) in
our experiment for better identification, we add dummies equal to one if the color as-
signed is red, and if the blue player is randomly chosen to be displayed first on the choice
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screen of player C, respectively. Moreover, we add dummies for the order in which the
questions are displayed. Doing so decreases effect size and significance in column (2), but
still confirms the relevance of disclosing relatively more than the competitor, i.e., a 3.0
percentage points higher probability to be selected for each additional answer disclosed.39
The same analysis is repeated in columns (3) and (4) for a slightly modified outcome
variable, which only considers those answers for the calculation of the disclosure differ-
ence which player C marks as relevant indicators for impunity game behavior. Results
reveal a qualitatively similar pattern, but a bigger effect size, namely a 7.4% to 7.7%
higher probability of being selected for each relevant answer one discloses more than the
competitor. Consequently, disclosing more answers is indeed beneficial for being selected
according to our experimental data, supporting Hypothesis 5, especially if the question is
considered as relevant.
Allocation behavior
In order to check whether becoming allocator is beneficial in terms of payoff, Table
3.A.10 compares payoffs if subjects become allocator or not. Since we elicit payoff alloca-
tions before revealing who becomes allocator via the strategy method, for each subject,
we can calculate a payoff for the case of becoming allocator, and one if not. The latter is
the payoff allocated to her by her matched competitor if the competitor becomes allocator
instead. We compare these two possible payoffs based on whether a subject decides herself
about the payoff distribution. Column (1) shows a large and highly significant effect from
determining the allocation oneself. Compared to a 3.40€ payoff from the competitor,
subjects receive 6.33€ more if they determine the allocation themselves. This result is
robust if controls are included in column (2). If we additionally include a dummy variable
for strategic treatments and interact it with whether the payoff is self-determined or not
in columns (3) and (4), the self-determination effect even increases in magnitude. This
means that becoming allocator is highly beneficial in terms of payoff.
Table 3.A.11 presents results on how information disclosure in different treatments
carries over to prosocial behavior, measured by the amount one keeps for oneself as the
39We limit the set of control variables to features visible to C when choosing the allocator since she
does not know other characteristics about the participant.
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Table 3.A.10: Payoff if determined by oneself or allocated by competi-
tor
Own payoff
(1) (2) (3 (4)
self-determined 6.327∗∗∗ 6.327∗∗∗ 7.038∗∗∗ 7.038∗∗∗
(0.407) (0.411) (0.642) (0.648)
strategic 0.187 0.217
(0.278) (0.284)
self-determined # strategic -1.201 -1.201
(0.825) (0.833)
constant 3.398∗∗∗ 3.190∗∗∗ 3.288∗∗∗ 3.157∗∗∗
(0.136) (0.839) (0.215) (0.846)
controls No Yes No Yes
N 392 392 392 392
R2 0.537 0.548 0.544 0.554
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Table reports OLS regression co-
efficients with standard errors in parentheses clustered at group level. Each
subject is included once as if determining the allocation decision herself
and once as if receiving the payoff from her matched competitor. Controls
include gender, age, dummies for “Westin fundamentalist”, publicly acces-
sible and identifiable social media profiles, respectively, and the ability and
opinion comparison seeking indexes from INCOM.
allocator in Panel A, and by the amount one gives to C in Panel B.40 A lower coefficient in
Panel A represents less egoistic behavior, while a higher coefficient in Panel B represents
more generosity.
Pooling the data with and without peer comparison in column (1) confirms the “I-want-
you” effect (Brandts et al. 2006): Selected allocators give more to the selector compared
to a situation with random allocator assignment, i.e., allocators reciprocate the favor of
their selection by offering more to C. When investigating all four treatments separately in
column (2), the point estimate of the strategic coefficient does not change much, staying
in the range of 80 to 90 cents which C earns more on average. This means that previous
social comparison does not affect subsequent distribution behavior, and seems not to be
detrimental for prosociality in our setting. Therefore, we stick with data pooled over
comparison when investigating allocation behavior in more detail.
40Since the pie of 17€ is fixed, it is redundant also to report the amount given to the competitor.
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Table 3.A.11: Payoff allocations by treatment and disclosure behavior
Own payoff
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
strategic -1.015∗ -1.062 -0.329 -1.967∗∗ -1.718∗∗
(0.551) (0.823) (0.772) (0.756) (0.817)
comparison -0.750
(0.851)
strategic # comparison 0.095
(1.098)
allocator -0.250
(0.784)
strategic # allocator -1.371
(1.027)
answers ex post disclosed -0.379∗∗∗ -0.398∗∗∗
(0.118) (0.129)
strategic # answers ex post disclosed 0.445∗∗∗ 0.421∗∗
(0.164) (0.173)
constant 10.325∗∗∗ 10.700∗∗∗ 10.450∗∗∗ 10.997∗∗∗ 11.332∗∗∗
(0.427) (0.676) (0.562) (0.467) (1.799)
controls No No No No Yes
N 196 196 196 196 196
R2 0.018 0.027 0.047 0.048 0.078
C’s payoff
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
strategic 0.828∗∗∗ 0.884∗∗ 0.460 1.205∗∗∗ 1.058∗∗
(0.288) (0.413) (0.421) (0.394) (0.430)
comparison 0.475
(0.430)
strategic # comparison -0.113
(0.573)
allocator 0.075
(0.406)
strategic # allocator 0.735
(0.556)
answers ex post disclosed 0.197∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.063)
strategic # answers ex post disclosed -0.203∗∗ -0.192∗∗
(0.086) (0.091)
constant 3.387∗∗∗ 3.150∗∗∗ 3.350∗∗∗ 3.039∗∗∗ 2.766∗∗∗
(0.217) (0.336) (0.292) (0.240) (0.946)
controls No No No No Yes
N 196 196 196 196 196
R2 0.040 0.051 0.064 0.066 0.095
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Table reports OLS regression coefficients
with standard errors in parentheses clustered at group level. Controls include gender,
age, dummies for “Westin fundamentalist”, publicly accessible and identifiable social
media profiles, respectively, and the ability and opinion comparison seeking indexes
from INCOM.
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Are players selected as allocators actually those who act more generously? We can
answer this question with our strategy data. Since participants who reveal more infor-
mation are more likely selected as allocators, we investigate whether C benefits from this
selection strategy. Although the interaction effect of the strategic and the allocator vari-
able in columns (3) of Table 3.A.11 point in the direction of more prosociality, it is not
significant (p = 0.189), i.e., selected allocators do not systematically behave more gener-
ously. In Table 3.A.15, we report further results on question level regarding which answers
predict allocation behavior, and to which extent these answers are taken into account for
allocator selection.
Column (4) of Table 3.A.11 shows the direct effect of information disclosure on allo-
cation behavior. There is a significant positive effect of the strategic coefficient on the
amount allocated to C, as in the initial specifications, which can be attributed to 1.97€
of forgone own earnings of the allocator. Moreover, we observe highly significant effects
on prosociality in opposite directions with respect to the number of answer disclosed ex
post alone and with respect to its interaction with the strategic coefficient. The former
effect captures the influence of more information sharing on prosocial behavior in random
treatments. Interestingly, people intrinsically motivated to share personal information
seem to keep less for themselves and give more to others. Quantitatively, for each answer
they disclose, they give approximately 18 and 20 cents more to the other candidate and
player C, respectively.
The positive relationship between more personal information disclosure and generosity
vanishes with incentives. The ex post disclosure coefficient and its interaction with the
strategic coefficient almost entirely cancel out. This means that more information sharing
does not correspond to more prosociality in case of strategic incentives for information
disclosure. While the level effect of more prosociality in strategic treatments remains
strong in magnitude, revelation competition seems to destroy the predictive power of en-
dogenous information disclosure for prosocial behavior. Figure 3.6 in the main text shows
the corresponding coefficient plot. While without incentives to share information only
the intrinsically motivated types disclose information, with incentives the non-intrinsic,
opportunistic types also start to disclose, thereby diluting the original relationship. The
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Table 3.A.12: Payoff allocations by treatment and relevant disclosure behavior
Own payoff C’s payoff
(1) (2) (3) (4)
strategic -0.566 -0.338 0.466 0.325
(0.578) (0.622) (0.297) (0.319)
relevant answers ex post disclosed -0.294∗ -0.367∗∗ 0.197∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗
(0.165) (0.166) (0.084) (0.085)
strategic # relevant answers ex post disclosed -0.076 -0.074 0.239 0.243
(0.310) (0.305) (0.182) (0.193)
constant 10.601∗∗∗ 10.459∗∗∗ 3.203∗∗∗ 3.257∗∗∗
(0.454) (1.764) (0.231) (0.909)
controls No Yes No Yes
N 196 196 196 196
R2 0.038 0.077 0.083 0.120
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Table reports OLS regression coefficients with standard
errors in parentheses clustered at group level. Controls include gender, age, dummies for “Westin
fundamentalist”, publicly accessible and identifiable social media profiles, respectively, and the
ability and opinion comparison seeking indexes from INCOM.
positive relationship between intrinsic information sharing and generosity remains when
winsorizing ex post disclosures at the 90%-level in columns (3)-(6) of Table 3.A.14.
When instead looking at the relationship between generosity and those disclosed an-
swers, which C considers as relevant indicators of game behavior in Table 3.A.12, the
amount of disclosure becomes meaningful. As in the previous analysis, there is a sig-
nificantly positive (negative) effect on the amount the allocator gives to C (herself). In
contrast, there is no longer a significantly negative interaction between the amount of
disclosure and the strategic coefficient. This means that strategic incentives do not distort
the positive relationship between disclosing more and being more generous when it comes
to relevant information disclosure. Taken together, this implies that information has to
be screened more carefully regarding its relevance if incentives for disclosure are involved.
Acceptance thresholds
This section presents acceptance thresholds in the impunity game elicited for all three
players of a group by using the strategy method. Figure 3.A.2 plots the acceptance
thresholds in all four treatments of subjects in roles A and B in Panel B. We depict those
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Figure 3.A.2: Coefficient plot of acceptance thresholds by role and treatment
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Notes: Vertical lines represent standard errors clustered at group level. The line at level one
depicts the minimum payoff when not rejecting.
of C separately in Panel A because C is in another info set when stating her acceptance
threshold as she already knows who becomes allocator at that point in time. Moreover,
Panel A consists of only two bars since C is not informed about the different social
comparison levels. Since each player receives a payoff of 1€ for sure if she accepts the
allocator’s offer, setting an acceptance threshold higher than 1€ might cause a payoff loss,
and is weakly dominated for subjects interested only in their own payoff. Nonetheless, all
bars display significantly higher acceptance thresholds (all p < 0.001), ranging from 1.83€
to 2.50€. This means that subjects are willing to forgo some money in our experiment
when being offered too little.
We try to disentangle what drives the high acceptance thresholds in simple OLS re-
gressions displayed in Table 3.A.13, but find no significant differences between treatments
and roles except for comparison. The strategic coefficient is neither significant in column
(1) for role C nor in column (2) for roles A and B, and provides zero explanatory power
(R2 = 0.000). In contrast, social comparison turns out to push the acceptance threshold
upwards. While this effect turns out to be significant in columns (3) and (4) when in-
vestigated pooled over the strategic dimension, it is not if this dimension is additionally
taken into account. As a consequence, we refrain from conclusions regarding acceptance
behavior in the impunity game.
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Table 3.A.13: Acceptance thresholds by role and treatment
Acceptance threshold
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
C A and B A and B A and B A and B A and B
strategic 0.069 -0.049 -0.147 -0.136
(0.321) (0.231) (0.282) (0.300)
comparison 0.592∗∗ 0.600∗∗ 0.475 0.454
(0.227) (0.242) (0.321) (0.341)
strategic # comparison 0.197 0.246
(0.450) (0.473)
controls No No No Yes No Yes
N 98 196 196 196 196 196
R2 0.000 0.000 0.032 0.049 0.033 0.051
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Table reports OLS regression coefficients with standard
errors in parentheses, in columns (2)-(6) clustered at group level.
Table 3.A.14: Robustness to winsorization - Perceived pressure and allocation behavior
Pressure Own payoff C’s payoff
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
strategic 0.264 0.242 -2.153∗∗∗ -1.933∗∗ 1.293∗∗∗ 1.161∗∗∗
(0.178) (0.171) (0.770) (0.831) (0.402) (0.438)
comparison -0.062 -0.089
(0.165) (0.169)
strategic # comparison 0.416∗ 0.474∗
(0.249) (0.243)
answers ex post disclosed -0.540∗∗∗ -0.572∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗∗
(0.147) (0.149) (0.075) (0.076)
strategic # answers ex post disclosed 0.603∗∗∗ 0.594∗∗∗ -0.280∗∗∗ -0.277∗∗∗
(0.186) (0.190) (0.099) (0.101)
constant -0.254∗∗ -0.328 11.195∗∗∗ 11.775∗∗∗ 2.945∗∗∗ 2.546∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.454) (0.481) (1.788) (0.248) (0.943)
controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 196 196 196 196 196 196
R2 0.076 0.113 0.057 0.088 0.073 0.103
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Table reports OLS regression coefficients with standard
errors in parentheses clustered at group level. Controls include gender, age, dummies for “Westin
fundamentalist”, publicly accessible and identifiable social media profiles, respectively, and the
ability and opinion comparison seeking indexes from INCOM. Results winsorized by 10% at
treatment level. Pressure reported in standard deviations, payoffs in €.
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Selection and allocation outcomes by answers
Table 3.A.15 reports how answers translate into outcomes. Regarding allocation be-
havior in strategic treatments, answers 1, 9, 10, and indicatively also answer 2, turn out
to be predictive for the amount one allocates to player C, but these answers are only
insufficiently taken into account for allocator selection in column (2). A probit model
in columns (2) finds significant effects of answers 1 and 2 on the probability of being
selected as allocator only at the 10% level, and no effect for the other answers predictive
for behavior. Note that answers taken into account for allocator selection are limited
to answers which are actually disclosed since player C can only take these answers into
account for selection. When considering content of the disclosed answers and disclosure
per se separately in column (3), the pattern just described fades. With reference to ques-
tion 1, its pure disclosure seems to matter more than its content. In addition, at the 5%
significance level, disclosure of questions 5, 8, and 12 appears to be important for C’s
allocator selection decision, as well as the content of questions 3, 8, and 12.
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Table 3.A.15: Effects of answers and disclosures on selection and al-
location behavior
Allocation to C Allocator
(1) (2) (3)
Answer1 -0.360∗∗ 0.052∗ -0.062
Answer2 0.184∗ 0.030∗ 0.052
Answer3 0.002 -0.047 -0.074∗∗
Answer4 -0.121 0.000 -0.055
Answer5 0.002 -0.001 0.063∗
Answer6 -0.063 0.002 0.050
Answer7 -0.009 0.027 0.067∗
Answer8 -0.198 0.024 -0.242∗∗∗
Answer9 -0.394∗∗ -0.009 -0.030
Answer10 0.243∗∗ -0.003 -0.080
Answer11 -0.059 -0.049 0.043
Answer12 -0.061 0.013 0.167∗∗∗
Ex post disclosure question1 0.515∗∗∗
Ex post disclosure question2 -0.316
Ex post disclosure question3 0.168
Ex post disclosure question4 0.203
Ex post disclosure question5 -0.353∗∗
Ex post disclosure question6 0.001
Ex post disclosure question7 -0.002
Ex post disclosure question8 1.253∗∗∗
Ex post disclosure question9 0.005
Ex post disclosure question10 0.567
Ex post disclosure question11 -0.228∗
Ex post disclosure question12 -0.868∗∗∗
constant 6.736∗∗∗
baseline probability 0.498 0.504
randomization controls Yes Yes Yes
N 116 116 116
R2 / Pseudo R2 0.395 0.085 0.343
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Marginal effects of probit model
displayed in columns (2) and (3), representing changes in probability of
becoming allocator based on question-level disclosures and answers. An-
swers are on a 7-item scale (1 worst, 7 best). Answers in columns (2) and
(3) are restricted to those which are disclosed. Column (1) represents OLS
regression results with the monetary amount allocated to player C as the
outcome variable. Only strategic treatments considered. Standard errors
clustered at group level not displayed for the sake of readability. Random-
ization controls include dummies for the ten different randomizations of
questions used. R2 reported in column (1), Pseudo R2 in columns (2) and
(3).
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3.B Appendix: Instructions
Translated from German. Instructions taken from strategic treatments; variations in ran-
dom treatments displayed in [square brackets].
Instructions: Part 1
Welcome, and thank you very much for your participation in this experiment. Please
read the following instructions carefully. If you have any questions, feel free to raise your
hand at any time. One of the experimenters will approach you to answer your questions.
Please do not ask any more questions loudly, and do not communicate with other par-
ticipants in the experiment. If you break this rule, we will have to dismiss you from the
experiment and the associated payoff. No participant receives any information about the
identity and payoffs of other participants during or after the experiment.
The experiment consists of two parts. You receive the instructions for the second part
at the beginning of the second part.
Each participant receives 4 Euros for participating in this experiment. Moreover, your
additional payment depends on the statements and on the decisions you and your inter-
action partners make, i.e., your decisions impact your own payoff as well as that of the
other participants.
The first part of the experiment begins with a brief questionnaire. Please answer all
questions carefully. For filling in the questionnaire, you receive 3 Euros. The questionnaire
has to be filled in completely. If you do not agree to this practice, you have now or at
any time during the experiment the possibility to leave the experiment without further
consequences and without losing your guaranteed show-up fee of 4 Euros.
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Instructions: Part 2
In this experiment, you interact in a group with two other players. For better distinc-
tion, the colors Red, Blue, and Green are assigned to the three participants, and represent
their roles within the group. Groups and the roles Red, Blue, and Green are randomly
assigned during the experiment, and then remain fixed for the whole experiment. The
allocation decision, which will be explained in what follows, takes place exactly once.
Allocation decision
In this experiment, one participant should decide on the distribution of 17 Euro be-
tween all three group members. We call the player, who makes this decision, the allocator
in what follows. Only Red and Blue can take the role of the allocator. [With a probability
of 50% each, chance] Green decides whether Red or Blue can determine the allocation of
the 17 Euro in the role of the allocator. Green cannot be the allocator.
Before the allocator is determined [randomly] by Green and the allocation decision is
made, group members in the role Red and Blue can disclose information about themselves
to the green participant. Whether you provide information about yourself to Green, and
if yes, which, is completely optional for you. Particularly, you decide for each answer
to the questionnaire whether the green participant is allowed to learn this information.
For each answer disclosed, we subtract 10 Cents from your budget of 3 Euros from the
first part of the experiment. Green can look at the disclosed information about the other
two group members from the questionnaire before [chance] Green decides whether Red or
Blue takes the role of the allocator.
The allocator can distribute the 17 Euro as integer, positive amounts between himself
and the other two group members. The amount has to be distributed in full, and each
member has to receive at least 1 Euro. Hence, the allocator can give each group member
including himself 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, or 15 Euro, but the total
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amount must not exceed 17 Euro.
Each of the other two group members can decide which minimal amount of money he
requires to receive from the allocator to accept his offer, or reject it otherwise. In case the
allocator’s offer is smaller than the minimum acceptable amount, one rejects his offer and
receives 0 Euro. In case the offered amount is higher, one accepts the offer and receives
the offered amount, i.e., at least 1 Euro. The two participants make this decision inde-
pendently of each other. This means that your decision whether to accept or reject the
offer affects only your own payoff, but does not affect the payoffs of the other two group
members. In particular, the payoff of the allocator remains unaffected, independently of
whether the other two group members accept or reject his offer, and always equals the
amount the allocator kept for himself. However, the allocator learns whether his chosen
monetary amounts are accepted or not.
In role Red or Blue, you will be asked to make one decision in case you become allo-
cator and one in case you do not become allocator. Afterwards, [chance] Green decides
who becomes allocator. At the end of the experiment, all group members will be informed
about the decisions relevant for them, and their resulting payoffs.
Guesses of answers and information disclosed
During the experiment, we will ask you to guess how the other candidate for the role
of the allocator (Red or Blue) answered the questionnaire, i.e., which answer (with seven
response options) he chose for each of the questions. In addition, for each answer you will
be asked to guess the other candidate’s decision to disclose his response (yes or no). More
precisely, this means that Red guesses the answers and corresponding disclosure decisions
of Blue, and Blue guesses the answers and corresponding disclosure decisions of Red.
Whether Green guesses the answers and disclosure decision of Red or Blue is determined
by chance. At the end of the experiment, one of your guesses will be randomly selected
for bonus payment. In case an answer guess is selected, you receive a bonus of 3.50 Euro
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if your guess is correct. In case a disclosure guess is selected, you receive a bonus of 1
Euro if your guess is correct. If your guess is not correct, you do not receive a bonus.
Please note that only one of your guesses will be paid, i.e., either an answer guess or a
disclosure guess, but not both. For this payoff mechanism, you fare best if you always
state the value which equals your true guess.
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Chapter 4
Increasing Personal Data Contributions:
Field Experimental Evidence from an Online
Education Platform∗
joint with Tobias Rohloff and Sylvi Rzepka
Abstract
We study personal data sharing as a contribution to a public good. In a field
experiment on an online platform, in which users are prompted to complete their
profiles, we investigate whether the salience of public benefits and reduced privacy
costs increases personal data contributions. Compared to a control message, we
find that emphasis on public benefits increases the number of contributed profile
information. Further reference to privacy protection enhances this effect. However,
we do not find clear evidence that such treatments can also motivate users, who
initially do not share any personal data, to start contributing. Our results highlight
that even in a fast-paced online environment, reference to the social benefit can
increase people’s willingness to contribute, but mainly for those who are somewhat
willing to share personal data.
∗We thank the Hasso Plattner Institute, especially Jan Renz and Christian Willems, for their coop-
eration. Ackfeld acknowledges funding by the Joachim Herz Foundation via an Add-On Fellowship for
Interdisciplinary Economics and by the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s
Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement No 741409- EEC). This project was
preregistered at the AEA RCT registry, reference number AEARCTR-0004604, and received ethics ap-
proval by the WiSo Ethics Review Board at the University of Cologne, reference number 19023VA. Data
for this project is proprietary and cannot be shared. We thank Lisa Bruttel, Marco Caliendo, Matthias
Heinz, Lukas Kiessling, Christoph Meinel, Axel Ockenfels, and Christoph Schottmüller for helpful com-
ments. All views are the authors’ own.
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4.1 Introduction
Personal data may be the new currency of the 21st century and can create large benefits
for society, for example, by allowing to route traffic efficiently (Cramton et al. 2019; Lv
et al. 2014) or to predict diseases or their outbreak (Ginsberg et al. 2009; Obermeyer and
Emanuel 2016). In such contexts, sharing personal information equals contributing to
a public good since the benefits of data-driven services are to a large extent non-rivalry
and their consumption non-excludable.1 As a consequence, contributions to these new
services in form of personal data are likely underprovided. In attempts to overcome this
underprovision, Mozilla, for example, solicits users to “donate” their voice to their open-
source voice database to help machines learn to speak naturally.2 Similarly, the online
platform openhumans.org explicitly asks for donations in form of personal data to conduct
research.
Contributions to public goods in form of personal data differ from well-studied contri-
butions in form of money or effort (Chaudhuri 2011) because they are individual-specific
and potentially privacy-sensitive. A 10-Euro contribution is the same independent of
whether it is entirely provided by one person or partly by several people. This is not
the case for personal data because one extensive contribution from only one person leads
to a less diverse database than an equal amount of contributions from many different
people. Hence, public good provision, which is meant to fit the needs of various people
based on the aggregation of personal data, requires a wide, diverse, and representative
contribution base.3 Otherwise, the most comprehensive public good cannot be provided.
While other individual-specific contributions to public goods have already been studied,
for example, knowledge (Chen et al. 2019; Zhang and Zhu 2011) and feedback (Bolton
et al. Forthcoming; Bolton et al. 2004; Cabral and Li 2015; Chen et al. 2010; Ling et al.
2005), personal data as contributions have so far been neglected. However, personal data
contributions may work differently than other individual-specific contributions to public
1Note the difference to services for which users “pay with their data”, for example, if discounts for
products or the use of an app require the opening of a user profile with mandatory entries, which renders
usage excludable. Our focus lies on contexts in which people share personal data on a voluntary basis.
2See https://voice.mozilla.org/en.
3As aggregation technology, think of a benevolent social planer who produces the best possible public
goods or services for society based on the personal data contributions she receives.
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goods since they are additionally privacy-sensitive.4 Compared to the cost of providing
feedback or knowledge, this adds further costs - privacy costs - to contributing personal
data and may therefore aggravate underprovision.
In this paper, we study personal data as contributions to a public good in light of the
benefits and costs of sharing such information. More precisely, we randomize users of a
non-profit online education platform into treatments with or without salient reference to
the public benefit of sharing personal data on the platform, and with or without additional
reference to privacy protection. By investigating whether salience of public benefits and
reduced perceived privacy costs can mitigate underprovision of personal data, we address
the individual-specific as well as privacy-sensitive nature of this new contribution type.
Studying such personal data contributions is important since with scarce information on
users, the public good that fits society’s needs best cannot be provided.
We test the importance of emphasizing public benefits of personal data sharing and
privacy protection in a natural field experiment (Harrison and List 2004) on one of Ger-
many’s largest massive open online course (MOOC) platforms. Our intervention aims at
increasing the stock of personal data available to the non-profit platform, our public good
provider, such that the platform can target the particular needs of its users with the best
fitting services to facilitate learning on the platform, for example, via planning prompts
(Andor et al. 2018).5 At baseline, only 48% of users have any entry in their profile with the
mean user having 2.6 out of 11 profile categories filled. To increase personal data sharing,
we implement pop-up messages in four courses on the platform. Besides a control pop-up
message (Control), in one treatment, we increase the salience of the public benefit for the
whole user community when contributing personal data (Benefit). In a further treatment,
we additionally highlight data protection standards, thereby reducing potentially overes-
timated privacy costs (Benefit + Cost). Our experimental design allows us to investigate
whether the privacy-sensitivity of personal data attenuates the effectiveness of attempts
to increase personal data contributions.
4See Acquisti et al. (2016) and Tucker (2015) for comprehensive reviews on the economics of privacy.
5Planning prompts prove effective only for a subgroup of learners in Andor et al. (2018), and the
platform can only target this subgroup adequately when having sufficient information to identify this
user subgroup.
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Overall, our treatments of interest increase both the quantity, i.e, the amount, and
the quality, i.e, the diversity in disclosed content, of contributed personal data. Salient
public benefits significantly boost profile completeness by 5.3% compared to the control
group.6 If combined with emphasis on limited privacy costs, this effect increases to 6.4%.
Both effects are sizeable given that more users in the control group react to the pop-up
by following the link to their profile compared with users that receive the longer messages
highlighting the public benefit of data contribution and privacy protection. While we
find no clear evidence for treatment effects on the extensive margin, i.e., whether users
have any filled profile entry, on average, we do observe an increase in having filled any
profile entry which is rated as privacy sensitive. These results imply that internalizing
public benefits matters for personal data contributions and that neglecting the privacy-
sensitivity nature of personal data may attenuate the effectiveness of attempts to mitigate
underprovision. Furthermore, the type of users who contribute their personal data changes
significantly, especially in Benefit + Cost, the combined treatment. For instance, more
senior employees but also younger users and more females disclose personal data, which
makes the contribution basis more diverse and may thus allow to target educational
services more precisely.
Our paper relates and contributes to the literature on mitigating underprovision of
public goods in two ways. First, we gauge whether using insights on how to enhance
individual-specific contributions to public goods carries over to personal data as contri-
butions. Previous research studies feedback giving and knowledge sharing as forms of
individual-specific contributions to a public good, for example, on online platforms such
as eBay or MovieLens, a movie recommendation platform. Results by Cabral and Li
(2015) suggest that the underprovision of feedback on eBay cannot successfully be tack-
led with monetary incentives. In contrast, behaviorally motivated interventions appear
more successful in mitigating underprovision. For instance, reputation systems in Bolton
et al. (2004) enhance feedback provision but do not internalize all external effects in full.7
6Whenever we refer to an effect size (in %) in this paper, we mean the additional treatment effect
relative to the average (post-intervention) level in Control. This means that we divide the size of the
treatment dummies by the size of the regression constant.
7With larger social distance, which may be particularly relevant on online platforms, underprovision
of feedback worsens (Bolton et al. Forthcoming).
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Moreover, social comparisons such as knowing that others provide feedback prevail ef-
fective in increasing feedback contributions (Chen et al. 2010). In contrast, according to
Ling et al. (2005), only emphasizing the uniqueness of one’s individual-specific feedback
increases contributions, while highlighting public and personal benefits has the opposite
effect. With respect to knowledge as an individual-specific contribution to a public good
as on Wikipedia, results show that a combination of private and public benefits (Chen
et al. 2019) as well as a large number of beneficiaries (Zhang and Zhu 2011) are drivers
for contributions to the public information good.8 Building on these insights, we imple-
ment behaviorally-informed interventions in a field experiment, which aim at increasing
a new form of individual-specific contribution to a public good, namely personal data. In
particular, we increase the salience (Bordalo et al. 2013; Chetty et al. 2009) of the public
benefit when contributing personal information to a public education good.
Second, we contribute to research in the domain of privacy by investigating the effect
that privacy sensitivity of personal data has on data provision. Research in this domain
has so far focused on pricing or sharing personal data under varying data protection stan-
dards in other than public-benefit-enhancing settings.9 While we study the role of privacy
in a setting in which personal data are not sold for profit but serve the common good,
the literature on privacy provides important indications for how people react to privacy
salience. For one thing, it suggests that contextual cues affect the sharing of personal
information (John et al. 2011; Tsai et al. 2011). For another, it shows that salience of
privacy standards rather than the actual comprehensiveness of privacy protection appears
important when individuals decide about sharing personal information (Marreiros et al.
2017; Tucker 2014).10 Since not taking privacy concerns into account may result in over-
8With respect to laboratory evidence on the relationship between group size and public good provision,
early results, as reviewed by Ledyard (1995), finds ambiguous results. In contrast, Andreoni (2007) reports
that doubling the number of beneficiaries increases contributions but not by the same amount. Diederich
et al. (2016) find a positive effect of group size in a linear public good game with a large, heterogeneous
subject pool. Goeree et al. (2002) also estimate a positive relationship. Wang and Zudenkova (2016)
claim that there is a discontinuous relationship between contributions to public goods and group size
with the relationship being positive for small groups.
9Regrading pricing privacy, Benndorf and Normann (2018), Beresford et al. (2012), Jentzsch et al.
(2012), and Tsai et al. (2011) try to elicit a monetary value of privacy. Feri et al. (2016) show that some
subjects react to the risk of privacy breaches.
10When confronted with information about online companies’ privacy policies, subjects in Marreiros et
al. (2017) are less willing to share personal information independent of whether the information regarding
companies’ privacy protection standards are positive or negative. With respect to privacy in advertising,
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seeing side effects of data sharing (Ackfeld and Güth 2019), our experiment targets the
salience of data protection and hence privacy costs, which may otherwise attenuate the
effect of our public benefit salience intervention. Our results highlight that additionally
taking privacy into account when trying to increase contributions to a public good in form
of privacy-sensitive personal data may increase the efficacy of such attempts.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 describes the data
and the experimental design. Our empirical strategy is outlined in Section 4.3. Section
4.4 presents the experimental results and Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Experimental set-up
4.2.1 Online platform environment
We conduct our field experiment on one of the biggest German massive open online
course (MOOC) platforms with more than 200,000 users, openHPI, which offers free on-
line courses on computer science as well as information and communication technology
for beginners and experts either in English or German. Particularly, we implement our
experiment in four courses offered between September 2019 and February 2020, namely
“Network virtualization - from simple to cloud”, “Introduction to successful remote team-
work”, “The technology that has changed the world - 50 years of internet”, and “Data
engineering and data science”.11 While slightly different in structure, all courses con-
sist of video lectures and individual or group assignments. Moreover, all courses use the
same interface and have the same requirements to earn certificates for validating one’s
participation.12
Tucker (2014) shows that shifting the perception of but not the actual control over personal profile
information on Facebook raises the willingness to click on personalized ads. While the data Tucker
(2014) uses stem from an awareness campaign of a non-profit organization, the intervention is still used
to generate higher revenues for an external party.
11We pre-registered to conduct our experiment also in the course “Human-Centered Design: Building
and Testing Prototypes”. However, since another experiment took place in this course, we refrained from
additionally implementing our experiment there.
12In most courses, participants can earn a “Confirmation of Participation” if accessing 50% of the
material. When achieving 50% of points in the assignments and the final exam, participants receive a
“Record of Achievement”. While the course material can also be accessed after the scheduled course
dates, graded exercises and tests are no longer available afterwards.
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A user profile is automatically created when a new user registers on the platform.
Registration is necessary for enrolling in courses. It requires the real name13 of the user
to be printed on course certificates and an email address for verification and to receive
course alerts. Besides these required fields, users can voluntarily provide the following
information in their profiles: date of birth, company affiliation, career status, highest
educational degree, professional experience, professional position, city, gender, and coun-
try.14 Shortly prior to our intervention, two more profile categories were introduced,
namely main motivation for taking courses on the platform and regular computer usage,
which replaced one old category.15 We use these new profile categories on the one hand
to rationalize the appearance of our interventional pop-up message in courses, and on the
other hand to provide a reason for a profile review also for those users who have already
filled their profile completely before the intervention. The new categories were published
eight days before the start of the first treated course. Hence, it is unlikely that partici-
pants have encountered the new categories before being directed to their user profiles via
our interventions.16
4.2.2 Experimental design
We implement simple pop-up messages in courses, which enrolled users see once when
accessing the material of the second or a later course week.17 By implementing our
interventions in courses, we can make sure that users likely access the online education
platform during our intervention period and receive the intervention at a similar point
of time in terms of platform activity. Two workdays before the intervention (days 5-
13While users could in principle use fake names, they would thereby eliminate their prospect to receive
a personalized certificate, which they can use, for example, in job applications. This makes the use a fake
names a minor concern.
14Additionally, users can define a display name as a pseudonym in their profile, which is used in the
course forum. However, this does not contain any relevant, real-world information about users and is
therefore disregarded in our analysis.
15The replaced category was also related to computer usage but contained less distinguishable inputs
in terms of content.
16Only 5.8% of users in our sample updated their profiles independently before seeing the intervention
pop-up. These updates are captured by the pre-intervention profile entries. The different time spans
between the publishing date and a course’s starting date are captured by course dummies in regressions.
17New course material is published every week. In principle, in the third week of the course, users
could directly open the material of the third week without having accessed the second week’s material.
Nonetheless, they would see the pop-up.
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6 of the course), we record user profile information of all enrolled course participants.
More precisely, we measure which user filled which profile entries, and if entries are filled,
by which content. This serves as our baseline, pre-intervention profile filling level. We
compare this level with the grade of profile filling 21-22 days after course start, i.e., 14-
15 days after our intervention. Hence, course participants have two weeks to edit their
profiles in response to the intervention. Figure 4.1 graphical represents the timeline of
the experiment. Since participants do not necessarily have to access the course material
in a specific week and may start the courses one week later and catch up until the course
ends, collecting post-intervention data after two weeks allows us to also have those users
in our sample, who lack slightly but not too far behind in course progress.18
Figure 4.1: Timeline of the experiment
Week 1 Week 2 Week 3
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Randomization
& Treatment
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profile information
By design, we exclude users who do not make it to the material of the second course
week.19 First, this is because the first week’s material is already full of information which
would either risk our intervention to be overseen or risk to cause the overseeing of impor-
tant course-related information.20 Second, when aiming at improving the public good of
online education in line with the needs of its users based on extended user information,
excluding only marginally interested users is reasonable since the information and wants
of rather uninterested users do not necessarily need to be represented in the improved
services of the platform. Platform improvement based on extended information avail-
ability is meant to benefit those users with a genuine interest in courses but difficulties
1811.0% of users in our treated sample access the course the first time later than seven days after
course start.
19Approximately one third of enrolled course participants reaches the required material.
20For example, in one of the courses, there is a planing prompt pop-up when participants access the
course material the first time, which would stand in conflict with our treatment pop-up.
174
with course completion, for example, due to time-inconsistency or a lack of course-related
knowledge.
We randomly assign users, active in the second course week, into three treatment
groups. Randomization takes place via platform-wide user IDs. Due to technical reasons,
we have to exclude users who access the course material exclusively via the mobile app.21
If a user is enrolled in more than one course, she also receives the intervention more than
once, but we count her only in the chronologically first course.
Table 4.1: Wording of treatments
Control Benefit Benefit + Cost
Dear Learner, Dear Learner, Dear Learner,
We have updated our pro-
file categories. Please
take a moment to com-
plete your profile.
We have updated our pro-
file categories. Please
take a moment to com-
plete your profile.
We have updated our pro-
file categories. Please
take a moment to com-
plete your profile.
By providing your in-
formation, you support
openHPI in improving its
free online education ser-
vices and the learning ex-
perience for the whole
openHPI community.
By providing your in-
formation, you support
openHPI in improving its
free online education ser-
vices and the learning ex-
perience for the whole
openHPI community.
Your profile will only be
visible to you and the
openHPI team but not
to other openHPI users.
Your data will only be
used for research and plat-
form improvement in ac-
cordance with our data
protection standards.
Notes: The words “data protection” in Benefit + Cost contain a link to the privacy protection
guidelines of the platform. All treatments include a link to the user profile at the end.
Our treatments are implemented on the online learning platform as simple pop-up
messages. Table 4.1 shows the different treatment texts and Figure 4.A.1 in the Ap-
pendix displays a screenshot of the most comprehensive pop-up. Pop-up messages in all
21By excluding users, who access the material exclusively via the mobile app, we lose 509 potential
observations compared to 6155 treated users in the final sample.
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treatments, including a Control treatment, contain the following text together with a
link to the individual user profile: “Dear Learner, We have updated our profile categories.
Please take a moment to complete your profile.” The Control group ensures that we can
distinguish a pure reminder effect of the pop-up message from effects due to salience of
public benefits and overestimated privacy costs. In the Benefit treatment, the standard
text is extended by a hint to the public benefit that providing personal information can
have for the whole user community. It reads: “By providing your information, you support
openHPI in improving its free online education services and the learning experience for
the whole openHPI community.” In the Benefit + Cost treatment, a remark is added to
this statement emphasizing privacy protection standards, particularly who has access to
the shared information: “Your profile will only be visible to you and the openHPI team
but not to other openHPI users. Your data will only be used for research and platform
improvement in accordance with our data protection standards.” The reference to data
protection includes a link to the data protection webpage.22
By extending the Control text rather than using a similarly long but irrelevant text,
we give the Control condition an overproportionally high chance that users read its text
until the end and click on the link to their profile. In light of convex effort cost of text
reading time (Augenblick et al. 2015), fewer users may finish reading the longer treatment
texts in Benefit and especially Benefit + Cost. Hence, our design speaks against finding
corresponding treatment effects and therefore even strengthens any findings.
4.2.3 Hypotheses
Following results by Andreoni (2007) and Zhang and Zhu (2011) in the domains of mon-
etary and knowledge contributions to public goods, we hypothesize that highlighting the
public benefit of personal data contributions in the Benefit treatment increases personal
data contributions since the perception of the number of beneficiaries of the contribution
rises. In the Control treatment, such public benefits may not be known or may not be
sufficiently salient (Bordalo et al. 2013; Chetty et al. 2009) so they are not taken into
22The link opens a new browser tab with the data protection guidelines. Opening another tab implies
that we distract users in the Benefit + Cost treatment from editing their entries on the profile page. This
diminishes the chance to find a treatment effect in Benefit + Cost and thus strengthens any findings.
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account by users when deciding about sharing personal data with the platform.
Hypothesis 1: Emphasizing the public Benefit of contribution increases personal data
contributions relative to Control.
Since we study a potentially privacy-sensitive contribution to a public good, the pos-
itive effect of highlighting the number of beneficiaries on information contribution may
be attenuated by privacy concerns. If this is true, we expect personal data contributions
to rise more strongly if the public benefit is paired with a statement clarifying how data
is used in the Benefit + Cost treatment, thereby reducing potential misperceptions of
data sharing standards and increasing the salience thereof. Note that the wording of the
privacy protection statement is the same as in the platform’s data protection guidelines,
to which users have to consent during registration. Hence, the Benefit + Cost treatment
only adds information which should at least implicitly be known by users.
Hypothesis 2: Additionally emphasizing data protection standards in the Benefit +
Cost treatment further increases personal data contributions relative to the Benefit treat-
ment.
4.3 Empirical strategy
We estimate effects of our treatment dummies on post-intervention information disclosure,
controlling for the initial disclosure level:
yit = β0 + T ′β1 + β2yit−1 +X ′β3 + it (1)
for individual i with T being a vector of treatment dummies T1 = Benefit and
T2 = Benefit + Cost and with X being a matrix of several control variables. yit−1 are
the pre-treatment outcomes.23
23The pre-analysis plan included a typo in the equation, i.e., multiplication between the betas. We
are not interested in heterogeneous effects based on pre-intervention entries in the main analysis as the
pre-analysis plan clearly indicates.
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As main dependent variables yit, we focus on 1) the extensive margin, i.e., whether
any profile category is filled after the treatment intervention, 2) the intensive margin,
i.e., how many profile categories are filled, and 3) whether users click on the link to their
profile. Clicking on the profile link in the pop-up corresponds to an intention to provide
personal data in our experiment. Because there is no baseline for clicking on the link,
Equation (1) simplifies to
yi = β0 + T ′β1 +X ′β2 + i. (2)
As secondary outcomes, we look at those categories, which treatment-blind students
assistants rate as more or less privacy-sensitive.24 Furthermore, we investigate the num-
ber of deleted and added entries separately, and look at previously filled but updated
categories. Reviewing categories may be of importance if, for example, IT proficiency or
work experience has increased since the last revision of the profile.
As controlsX, we include several context-related variables into our regressions.25 First,
we add course fixed-effects. These dummies do not only capture differences between
courses but also different durations between the respective course start date and the
publishing of the new profiles categories. Second, we use the enrollment date and the
first show-up in the course after course start to control for self-organization skills and the
level of commitment to the course, the latter included as a dummy for course access no
later than that of the median user. Third, we include a dummy variable for whether the
course is the first course the user takes on the platform in order to account for experience
with and potential trust towards the platform. Fourth, we control for different reactions
between different nationalities, for example, with respect to privacy concerns (Bellman
24Four student assistants rate each profile category on a scale from 1 = “not at all privacy-sensitive”
to 7 = “totally privacy-sensitive”. They are informed that they are rating user profile categories from an
online education platform and that these data are only shared with the platform but not with other users,
exactly as it is the case on the platform. We sum up the student assistants’ ratings for each category
and calculate the average privacy-sensitivity. We call a category privacy sensitive if its mean rating is
higher than the mean rating over all categories. The sensitive categories are one’s company affiliation,
the highest educational degree, professional experience, and the current job position.
25We pre-registered two more control variables: a dummy for whether a user allows web-tracking and
a dummy for whether the user clicks on the link to privacy protection guidelines in the pop-up. However,
web-tracking was not recorded correctly in all courses and only three users clicked on the profile link so
we refrain from including these controls.
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et al. 2004; IBM 2018) by including a dummy for course access from Germany, measured
by the browser location from which logged in users main access the platform.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Descriptive statistics
This section reports descriptive statistics of our baseline pre-intervention sample and
additionally allows to check whether randomization into treatments was successful. First,
we document the pre-intervention outcomes for all treatment groups in Panel (A) of Table
4.2 and with more content detail in Table 4.A.4 in the Appendix. 48.0% of users have at
least one entry in their profile before the intervention, and the average profile includes 2.6
filled categories out of 11. On the entry level, the share of missing information before the
intervention is at least 61.2%. For the two newly introduced categories, “main motivation”
and “regular computer use”, this share is much higher, i.e., 94.9% and 94.7%, respectively.
χ2-tests on the entry level do not detect any statistically significant differences across the
treatment groups in terms of the share of missing values pre-intervention (all p > 0.128).26
Second, we report the pre-intervention sample composition in Panel (B) of Table
4.2. For 18.9% of users in our sample, the course is the first course they take on the
platform. 87.0% access the course from a browser located in Germany. This high share is
not surprising given that three out of four courses in our sample are taught in German.
57.3% of users participate in the course “Data Engineering & Data Science”, 18.8% in “50
Years of Internet”, and 19.2% in “Network Virtualization”. Only 5.2% of users participate
in the English-speaking course “International Teams”.
Third, Panel (C) of Table 4.2 describes users’ pre-intervention course behavior and
related course information, and confirms that users across treatments are similar in these
domains. On average, users enroll 53.7 days prior to course start and begin working on
the material 2.7 days after the course start. Since our sample only includes users who are
still active in the second course week, we observe a high level of first-week activity: Users
access 92.3% of the material and complete 82.1% of all self-tests in the first course week.
26The entry with the largest difference between treatments is company affiliation (p = 0.128). However,
this is not surprising given that users in our sample report 563 different affiliations. All other differences
are insignificant with a p-value of at least 0.240.
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Table 4.2: Pre-intervention course activity and characteristics overall and by treatment
Pooled Control Benefit Benefit p-value
+ Cost
Panel A: Pre-intervention profile status
Share of users with any entries 0.480 0.480 0.478 0.481 0.974
(extensive margin) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500)
Number of profile entries per users 2.560 2.604 2.525 2.542 0.924
(intensive margin) (3.284) (3.304) (3.282) (3.265)
Panel B: Pre-intervention sample composition
Course is 1st course 0.189 0.184 0.189 0.1958 0.686
(0.392) (0.388) (0.391) (0.396)
Course accessed from Germany 0.870 0.875 0.870 0.865 0.672
(0.336) (0.331) (0.336) (0.341)
Course “International Teams” 0.052 0.051 0.050 0.053 0.886
(0.221) (0.220) (0.218) (0.225)
Course “50 Years of Internet” 0.188 0.184 0.188 0.192 0.778
(0.391) (0.387) (0.391) (0.394)
Course “Data Science & Engineering” 0.573 0.576 0.573 0.569 0.894
(0.495) (0.494) (0.495) (0.495)
Panel C: Pre-intervention course behavior
Days enrolled after start -53.7 -53.2 -56.3 -51.7 0.111
(83.9) (84.5) (86.0) (81.0)
Days until first action in course 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.7 0.701
(3.9) (3.9) (3.9) (4.0)
% material accessed in first week 0.923 0.922 0.926 0.921 0.460
(0.207) (0.207) (0.202) (0.211)
% self-test solved in first week 0.821 0.823 0.8263 0.815 0.666
(0.308) (0.304) (0.302) (0.319)
N 6155 2052 2060 2043
Notes: Mean values reported with standard deviations in parentheses. Participants enrolled in
more than one course are only included in the earlier course. p-values stem from χ2-tests of
independence of frequencies between treatments.
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In sum, for all pre-intervention characteristics, we find no statistically or economically
significant differences between treatments. All p-values from χ2-tests for equal distri-
bution over all treatments exceed the 10% significance level. Thus, randomization into
treatment was successful.
4.4.2 Main results
In this section, we investigate treatment effects on our three main outcomes of interest:
1) the extensive margin, i.e., whether any profile fields are filled after the intervention, 2)
the intensive margin, i.e., how many profile fields are filled after the intervention, and 3)
whether users click on the link to their profile in the pop-up.
For the first outcome, the extensive margin, i.e., whether a user has any filled pro-
file entry, we do not find differences between Control, Benefit, and Benefit + Cost. As
displayed in Figure 4.2, the number of users having any profile entry increases similarly
strongly in all conditions (all p > 0.305, ranksum test). OLS regressions controlling for the
pre-intervention profile status in columns (1) and (2) of Table 4.3, as specified in Equation
(1), confirm this finding independent of whether course fixed effects and other covariates
are included. Nonetheless, the 95% confidence intervals can only rule out effect sizes
beyond [-5.2%; 8.8%] for the Benefit treatment and beyond [-2.7; 11.3%] for the Benefit
+ Cost treatment relative to the share of users with any profile entry post-intervention
in Control. This means that our treatment effects are rather imprecisely estimated than
clear zero effects. Thus, at the extensive margin, we conclude that treatment effects point
into the hypothesized directions, but we do not find statistical support for our hypothe-
ses that emphasizing the public benefit of contribution, especially if paired with salient
privacy protection, increases personal data contributions.
For our second main outcome, the intensive margin, we detect a substantial and statis-
tically significant increase in the amount of profile entries as depicted in Figure 4.3. While
the average user has 2.6 profile entries before the intervention, we observe significantly
more entries after the intervention with 3.9 entries pooled over all treatments (p < 0.001,
paired t-test). This increase differs significantly between treatments. In line with our
hypotheses, the increases in profile entries in Benefit and Benefit + Cost are statisti-
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Figure 4.2: Extensive Margin: Increase in fraction of users with any profile entry by
treatment
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Notes: Figure displays the increase in the fraction of users with any profile entry filled from pre
to post and corresponding 95% confidence intervals.
cally significantly larger than in the Control group (p = 0.017 and p = 0.005, t-test).27
The largest increase appears in the Benefit + Cost treatment, in which the number of
filled profile fields rises from 2.5 entries before the intervention to 4.0 entries afterwards.
Controlling for pre-intervention profile completion in an OLS regression, as specified in
Equation (1), in column (3) of Table 4.3, we obtain positive point estimates for both
the Benefit and Benefit + Cost treatment dummies significant at the 5% and 1% level,
respectively. Precisely, users in Benefit contribute on average 0.18 additional profile en-
tries independent of their pre-intervention profile status compared to Control. In Benefit
+ Cost, users even disclose 0.22 additional entries. In other words, every fifth treated
participant in Benefit and Benefit + Cost fills out one more empty profile category than
the Control group participants do ex post. While the two treatment coefficients are not
statistically different from each other in column (4) with controls included (p = 0.653),
the larger increase in Benefit + Cost indicates that emphasizing privacy protection along
27The same conclusion holds if only inspecting profile entries which were already part of the profile in
the past, i.e., all entries except motivation to take courses on the platform and computer usage, as Figure
4.A.2 in the Appendix shows (p = 0.030 and p = 0.014, t-test).
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Table 4.3: OLS regression results of main outcomes on treatment
Any entry Number of entries Link clicked
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Benefit 0.005 0.005 0.184** 0.186** -0.052*** -0.052***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.080) (0.080) (0.014) (0.014)
Benefit + Cost 0.012 0.012 0.223*** 0.224*** -0.044*** -0.044***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.081) (0.081) (0.014) (0.014)
Any Entry pre 0.715*** 0.715***
(0.008) (0.009)
Entries pre 0.878*** 0.879***
(0.008) (0.008)
Constant 0.280*** 0.258*** 3.469*** 3.210*** 0.722*** 0.565***
(0.010) (0.018) (0.056) (0.134) (0.010) (0.025)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 6155 6155 6155 6155 6155 6155
R2 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.00 0.02
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls include dummies for the courses
“International Teams”, “50 Years of Internet”, and “Data Science & Engineering”, whether
the course is the first course on the platform, whether the course is accessed from Germany,
and whether it is accessed earlier than the median access, as well as the day of enrollment
relative to the course start. “Entries pre” in columns (3) and (4) are transformed to a mean
of zero. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
with the public benefit may generate somewhat more personal data contributions. In
short, for people with prior profile entries, we find evidence for Hypothesis 1 that salience
of the public benefit can encourage users to disclose more personal data. Albeit lacking
statistical significance, the point estimates also provide suggestive directional evidence
for Hypothesis 2, stating that such effects may be attenuated if privacy concerns are not
taken into account.
In Table 4.A.3 in the Appendix and the discussion thereof, we report further results on
the intensive margin with respect to heterogeneous reactions to treatments by different
user subgroups. We do not find any statistically significant heterogeneous effects and
therefore conclude that any version of the pop-up prompting users to complete their
profile attracts information from all subgroups alike.
Our third main outcome, clicking on the profile link, may indicate an intention to
contribute personal data. Surprisingly, significantly more users click on the link in the
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Figure 4.3: Intensive margin: Increase in number of profile entries by treatment
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Notes: Figure displays the increase in the number of profile entries filled from pre to post and
corresponding 95% confidence intervals.
Control group than in the Benefit and Benefit + Cost treatments as Figure 4.4 displays
(p < 0.001 and p = 0.002, ranksum test). Concretely, 72.2 % of Control group users click
on the link while 67.0% and 67.7% do so in Benefit and Benefit + Cost, respectively. The
same picture prevails if investigating treatment effects in an OLS regression framework
without and with control variables in columns (5) and (6) of Table 4.3, with treatment
effects corresponding to decreases of 7.2% and 6.1%, respectively, in Benefit and Benefit
+ Cost relative to the baseline.
While the higher share of users clicking on the link in the Control group is surprising
at first glance, it is well in line with convex effort cost of text reading time (Augenblick
et al. 2015). The Control group text is the shortest so users may be more likely to read
it to the end. The Benefit and Benefit + Cost texts are longer by one or three sentences,
respectively. Therefore, users may not read it to the end and are thus less likely to reach
the button with the profile link. In light of convex effort cost, the fraction of users clicking
on the link should be the lowest in the Benefit + Cost treatment which has the longest
pop-up text. However, this is not what we observe. Instead, users in the Benefit + Cost
exhibit an equally high intention to contribute their data than users in Benefit (p = 0.607,
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Figure 4.4: Participants who click on profile link by treatment
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Notes: Figure displays fraction clicking on profile link and corresponding 95% confidence inter-
vals.
ranksum test). This may indicate that higher effort costs of reading the longer text in
Benefit + Cost seem to be counteracted by reduced privacy cost of information sharing
due to the privacy protection statement in the Benefit + Cost treatment.
Overall, our main results suggest that at the intensive margin, pop-up wording matters.
Relative to the number of post-intervention entries in the Control group, the Benefit
treatment and the Benefit + Cost treatment increase available user information by 5.3%
and 6.4%, respectively, for those who had some entries prior to the intervention.28 At
the extensive margin, the prompt wording does not affect users’ willingness to share any
information significantly, but also suggests effects in the hypothesized directions. While
more users in the Control group show an intention to edit their profile by clicking on the
link more often, they do not eventually provide more information. In contrast, users in
the Benefit and Benefit + Cost treatments are less likely to click on the pop-up link, but
if they do, they seem to do so with a higher intention to actually provide data. This
makes up for the lower clicking rate and indicates that reference to public benefits and
28Remarkably, given that we observe a large increase from pre to post overall, a simple reminder
message by itself seems very effective to make users provide any personal details. However, this result is
only correlational and reminders are not the focus of our investigation.
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potentially overestimated privacy costs impacts people’s actual willingness to contribute
personal data.
4.4.3 Further outcomes: Types of changes
There may be different types of profile changes masked by the main outcomes. First, users
may react differently to treatments depending on how privacy-sensitive they perceive the
profile categories. Therefore, we study treatment effects both on the intensive and the
extensive margin regarding the sharing of sensitive and insensitive personal information,
respectively. Second, the intervention may induce changes in different directions. Hence
we analyze the effect on profile extensions, profile reductions, and updates of profile entries
separately.
First, not all personal data are equally sensitive. Therefore, we let student assistants
rate the profile categories by their privacy-sensitivity and count an entry as sensitive if
the mean rating of a category is higher than the mean of the individual mean ratings.29
We find significant increases both in the number of insensitive and sensitive profile fields
in the Benefit and Benefit + Cost treatments compared to Control as columns (1) and
(2) of Table 4.4 reveal. While point estimates for Benefit and Benefit + Cost look similar
for both entry types (p = 0.682 and p = 0.937, respectively), the underlying effect sizes
for sensitive and insensitive entries differ in magnitude. In particular, there are 5.1% and
6.1% sensitive entries more in Benefit and Benefit + Cost than ex post for the mean user
in Control, while the additional treatments effects are only 3.5% and 3.7% for insensitive
categories.30 This suggests that the emphasis on the public benefit, especially if paired
with reference to privacy protection, increases the willingness to share a larger amount
not only of rather insensitive but also of sensitive personal information. Table 4.A.1 in the
Appendix confirms this result including control variables. Consequently, we find strong
29The sensitive categories are company affiliation, highest educational degree, professional experience,
and job position. The insensitive categories are city and country, age, gender, current career status,
motivation for joining the platform, and computer usage. In fact, the categories rated as the most
sensitive are also those with the highest number of missing values in the pre-intervention sample when
ignoring the fields with the most potential outcomes to choose from besides affiliation, namely country
and city.
30Note that less categories are rated as sensitive than insensitive, namely four relative to seven. Hence,
even given a higher constant in column (2) than in column (1), there is more scope for improvement for
insensitive categories.
186
evidence in favor of Hypothesis 1 in the domain of both sensitive and insensitive profile
categories.
The inspection on the extensive margin, i.e., of having any sensitive or insensitive entry
in the profile, in Table 4.A.2 in the Appendix moreover reveals that there are significantly
more platform users having any sensitive entry in their profile if reference to the public
benefit or public benefit and privacy protection is added in Benefit and Benefit + Cost
compared to Control. For insensitive entries, there is no such difference. This means
that the Control message performs similarly well in motivating new users to fill in any
insensitive profile field as the Benefit and Benefit + Cost messages. In contrast, Benefit
and Benefit + Cost outperform the Control message to make new users contribute any
sensitive information. Hence, enhancing the salience of the public benefit of contributing
data with or without reference to data protection unveils sensitive information from new
people, which enhances the availability of potentially rare information on the platform.
Table 4.4: OLS regression results of further outcomes by treatment
Sensitive entries Type of changes
Yes No Extensions Deletions Updates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Benefit 0.060** 0.071* 0.185** 0.000 0.008
(0.027) (0.038) (0.080) (0.003) (0.009)
Benefit + Cost 0.071** 0.074** 0.225*** 0.002 0.011
(0.028) (0.038) (0.081) (0.003) (0.009)
Entries pre 0.852*** 1.011*** -0.119*** 0.003*** 0.019***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 1.167*** 2.013*** 1.293*** 0.004** 0.035***
(0.019) (0.026) (0.056) (0.002) (0.006)
N 6155 6155 6155 6155 6155
R2 0.64 0.77 0.02 0.01 0.05
Notes: The Table reports OLS regression results on the intensive margin. Ro-
bust standard errors in parentheses. “Entries pre” for sensitive and insensitive
categories correspond to only those ex ante filled entries classified as sensitive or
insensitive, respectively. All “Entries pre” are transformed to a mean of zero. *
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Second, our results are driven by profile extensions. As Table 4.4 shows, the interven-
tion triggered mostly profile extensions (column (3)) but nearly no deletions (column (4))
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or content updates (column (5)). The treatment indicators in the regression on deletions
in column (4) are close to zero and insignificant, and the constant is small in magnitude.
This means that our intervention does not come along with an unintended side-effect
of destroying information content. In contrast, effect sizes for extensions in column (3)
look very similar to those of the intensive margin in the main analysis in column (4) of
Table 4.3. We find that users extend their profile on average by 0.19 more profile entries
in Benefit relative to Control and by 0.23 in Benefit + Cost. While the difference be-
tween the two treatment dummies is insignificant (p = 0.636), it provides further support
that adding an emphasize on privacy protection if anything has a small positive effect on
users’ willingness to share more profile information. Hence, we again find evidence for
Hypothesis 1 and directional support for Hypothesis 2 when studying profile extensions.
4.4.4 Shifts in the distribution of personal characteristics
In this section, we evaluate whether our intervention on the online education platform gen-
erates more diverse voluntarily provided information about platform users. Particularly,
we investigate whether we do not only get more data from similar people, but also whether
the characteristics that users share are different from those previously available.31 Hence,
we look at the quality of contributed personal data in contrast to the analysis regarding
quantity in the previous sections.
For all profile categories, the distributions of pre- and post-intervention personal data
content differ.32 We quantify these distributional shifts via marginal effects from multi-
nominal logit regressions. In the multinominal logit models, we exploit the panel structure
of our data and introduce a dummy variable indicator for the post-intervention period.
This indicator captures the shift in the distribution of personal characteristics before
and after the intervention. The results are reported in Table 4.5. Marginal effects for
the pooled sample can be found in Table 4.A.5 in the Appendix along with graphical
depictions of the shifts in reported profile content from pre to post in Figure 4.A.3.
31We pre-registered to run analyses based on profile entry content, in particular to predict learning
behavior in previous courses. However, since we do not have enough users in our treated sample for
whom we also have data from previous courses, we cannot conduct this analysis. Therefore, we restrict
our attention to the distribution of profile entry content.
32We refrain from studying the profile categories country, city, and organizational affiliation because
this entries contain too many different realizations as outcomes.
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Table 4.5: Marginal effects of multinominal logit regressions regarding pre-post shifts in
profile content distributions by treatment
Control Benefit Benefit + Cost
Outcome Category Marg ef Std er Marg ef Std er Marg ef Std er
position department head 0.0080 0.009 0.0173 0.011 0.0288** 0.011
intern 0.0043 0.004 -0.0027 0.007 -0.0131** 0.005
project manager 0.0043 0.011 0.0131 0.013 0.0006 0.015
team leader -0.0032 0.009 -0.0031 0.010 -0.0002 0.010
technician -0.0134 0.012 -0.0247* 0.013 -0.0160 0.014
career status academic researcher 0.0027 0.004 0.0004 0.005 0.0066 0.004
other -0.0008 0.007 0.0122 0.008 -0.0020 0.009
professional -0.0006 0.010 -0.0061 0.011 0.0092 0.011
student 0.0012 0.006 -0.0018 0.006 -0.0044 0.005
teacher -0.0024 0.004 -0.0048 0.004 -0.0093** 0.004
professional life more than 10 years 0.0114 0.010 0.0005 0.010 0.0227** 0.010
up to 10 years -0.0184** 0.008 -0.0085 0.008 -0.0099 0.009
up to 5 years 0.0070 0.008 0.0079 0.008 -0.0128 0.008
highest degree bachelor 0.0033 0.007 -0.0021 0.007 0.0023 0.007
diplom 0.0381*** 0.010 0.0397*** 0.011 0.0672*** 0.012
high student -0.0112 0.008 -0.0035 0.008 -0.0174** 0.008
magister 0.0023 0.003 0.0095** 0.005 0.0037 0.004
master -0.0053 0.008 -0.0138 0.008 -0.0221*** 0.008
other -0.0266*** 0.007 -0.0383*** 0.008 -0.0409*** 0.009
phd -0.0007 0.006 0.0086 0.006 0.0072 0.006
gender female 0.0197*** 0.007 0.0087 0.008 0.0237*** 0.008
male -0.0197*** 0.007 -0.0087 0.008 -0.0237*** 0.008
age group <20 0.0034 0.002 0.0010 0.003 0.0060* 0.003
20-29 0.0090** 0.004 0.0158*** 0.006 0.0120** 0.005
30-39 0.0070 0.006 0.0035 0.006 0.0032 0.006
40-49 0.0055 0.006 -0.0152** 0.006 -0.0121** 0.006
50-59 -0.0081 0.006 -0.0088 0.007 -0.0084 0.006
60-69 -0.0098*** 0.004 0.0003 0.005 -0.0033 0.005
70+ -0.0070*** 0.003 0.0035 0.004 0.0027 0.003
Notes: Table reports average marginal effects from multinominal logit regressions for each
outcome in the leftmost column with standard errors clustered on user level. * p<0.10, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
For work-related characteristics, we see more senior users disclosing information, par-
ticularly in the Benefit + Cost treatment. For example, for job position, we see a 2.9
percentage points increase in users indicating they are department heads. This increase
is driven by users in the Benefit + Cost treatment, and shifts the distribution away from
interns and technicians in this treatment. In the same vain, fewer users report to be
teachers as a profession. This effect is again driven by significant distributional shifts in
the Benefit + Cost treatment. Moreover, the post-intervention distribution includes more
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users indicating more than 10 years of work experience rather than experience between 5
and 10 years compared to the pre-intervention distribution. While such effects may result
from updating the profile information content, the treatment-level analysis indicates that
the increase stems from users in the Benefit + Cost treatment while the decrease stems
from Control.
Focusing on demographics, we observe shifts that point to a more diverse user group
than the pre-intervention data suggest. We find a disproportionately strong increase in
users reporting a diploma as their highest educational degree. This pre to post increase
is significant in all treatments but particularly pronounced in Benefit + Cost with 6.7
percentage points. The shift goes along with a significant decrease in users reporting
a non-standard educational degree in all treatments, and additionally with significant
decreases in users indicating a Master degree or still being in high school in Benefit +
Cost. In Benefit, more users report a Magister degree. Moreover, after the intervention,
a higher share of users indicates being female. With an increase of 2.4 percentage points,
the shift is most pronounced in the Benefit + Cost treatment. Furthermore, we observe
more younger users in our sample. Both the shares of users younger than 20 years and
that of users in their twenties increase significantly after the intervention at the expense
of users between 40 and 69. While the increase in users in their twenties is significant
in all treatments, it differs by treatment which age groups are represented less in the
post-intervention sample. In Control, we observe fewer people in their sixties or older,
while in Benefit and Benefit + Cost, the main decrease occurs in the age group between
40 and 49.
For the new profile categories, which elicit motivation for taking courses on the plat-
form and computer proficiency, we see large overall increases of the available information
because very few participants had provided this information prior to the intervention.33
While we find significant shifts in the content for both new categories, we refrain from
interpreting these shifts due to the limited number of filled entries before the intervention.
33These categories are new, but were visible upon course start prior to the intervention. This means
the pre-intervention distribution shows the motivation and computer expertise of participants who had
filled these categories prior to the announcement.
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Rather, it is worth noting that most users report a professional motivation (66%) and high
or intermediate level of expertise in computer usage (50% and 45%).
Overall, we observe shifts in the distribution of voluntarily shared personal informa-
tion between the pre- and post-intervention datasets, most notably in the Benefit + Cost
treatment. This means that the intervention does not only increase the quantity of per-
sonal data contributions but also the quality since we observe not only more information
of the same kind but different content distributions. The more diverse database after
the intervention may help the public good provider to better tailor its services to fit the
needs of all users. Finding the most pronounced shift in the Benefit + Cost treatment
indicates that emphasizing privacy protection besides making the public benefit salient is
most effective in generating diverse personal information donations.
4.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we study how to increase the provision of personal data contributions to a
public good and address the individual-specific as well as privacy-sensitive nature of this
new contribution type. In a field experiment on one of Germany’s largest online education
platform, we test whether emphasizing the public benefit - a behavioral intervention that
has proven effective for other types of contributions (Andreoni 2007; Zhang and Zhu 2011)
- also significantly increases users’ willingness to contribute personal data. Furthermore,
we investigate whether overestimated privacy costs attenuate potentially positive effects
of a pure public benefit intervention.
We find that emphasizing the public benefit of sharing personal details significantly
increases users’ willingness to contribute more personal information. This effect is es-
pecially pronounced if privacy protection is made salient in addition to the pure public
benefit, mitigating potentially overestimated privacy costs. The effects we find are sub-
stantial given that users click more often on the link to their profile when they see a
brief control message rather than the longer treatment messages highlighting the public
benefit of data contribution and privacy protection. While we do not find clear evidence
that salience of public benefit and privacy protection can motivate users without any
prior profile entry to disclose personal data in general, it induces them to start sharing
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personal details rated as privacy-sensitive. Furthermore, we find significant increases in
the quality of provided information in terms of diversity of content, especially in the most
comprehensive treatment which highlights public benefits and privacy protection jointly.
Our results provide confirming evidence regarding the debate on whether the size of
beneficiaries indeed positively influences public good provision (Andreoni 2007; Chen et
al. 2019; Diederich et al. 2016; Goeree et al. 2002; Ledyard 1995; Ling et al. 2005; Wang
and Zudenkova 2016; Zhang and Zhu 2011). We find such an effect even on a fast-paced
online platform using simple and inexpensive pop-up messages. Besides field evidence
from Wikipedia in form of a massive disruption like its nationwide shut-down (Zhang
and Zhu 2011) and, in combination with private benefit, via a sophisticated targeting
mechanism by Chen et al. (2019), our results show that emphasis of public benefits works
for a different individual-specific contribution type to a public good, namely personal
data. Via simple and easy-to-implement pop-up messages highlighting public benefits, we
generate sizable effects in the domain of user information provision.
Furthermore, our results imply that the privacy-sensitivity of the type of contribution
needs to be taken into account when tackling underprovision of public goods most effec-
tively. In the treatment, in which we do not only make the public benefit more salient but
also the personal data protection standards, we consistently find stronger effects compare
to the control group than when only the public benefit is made salient. Hence, in contrast
to laboratory findings by Marreiros et al. (2017) but in line with evidence from illusory
privacy protection on Facebook (Tucker 2014), emphasizing privacy protection seems to
indeed positively influence personal data sharing in the field.
Overall, we conclude that reference to public benefits, especially if paired with refer-
ence to privacy protection, can help increase available information about online platform
users and thereby may help the online education platform to improve their educational
services for the social good. Making costs and benefits salient prevails to have sizeable ef-
fects both on the quantity and the quality of provided information. With more diverse and
representative user information, the platform can target their public services more pre-
cisely. On a more general stance, our findings suggests that taking the privacy-sensitive
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nature of personal data as contributions into account can help digital public goods to
overcome their particularly pronounced risk of underprovision.
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4.A Appendix: Additional results
Figure 4.A.1: Screenshot of interventional pop-up message
Notes: Benefit + Cost treatment displayed.
Figure 4.A.2: Increase in number of old profile entries by treatment
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Notes: Figure displays the increase in the number of profile entries filled from pre to post and
corresponding 95% confidence intervals. Old entries exclude most recently added profile fields
“main motivation” and “regular computer use”.
Heterogeneity on the intensive margin
Besides our main hypotheses, we check for heterogeneity between different groups of
users defined by always available platform process data. First, treatment effects may be
stronger for first-time users, i.e., user for whom the treated course is the first course they
take on the MOOC platform. These users have no experience with the platform so they
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Table 4.A.1: OLS regression results of further outcomes with controls by treatment
Sensitive entries Type of changes
Yes No Extensions Deletions Updates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Benefit 0.060** 0.073* 0.186** 0.000 0.008
(0.027) (0.038) (0.080) (0.003) (0.009)
Benefit + Cost 0.072*** 0.070* 0.226*** 0.002 0.012
(0.028) (0.038) (0.081) (0.003) (0.009)
Entries pre 0.853*** 1.026*** -0.118*** 0.003*** 0.019***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.008) (0.001) (0.002)
Constant 1.103*** 1.804*** 1.030*** -0.000 0.001
(0.047) (0.060) (0.134) (0.005) (0.012)
N 6155 6155 6155 6155 6155
R2 0.64 0.78 0.03 0.01 0.05
The Table reports OLS regression results on the intensive margin. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. All specifications estimated with controls including dummies for the courses
“International Teams”, “50 Years of Internet”, and “Data Science & Engineering”, whether
the course is the first course on the platform, whether the course is accessed from Germany,
and whether it is accessed earlier than the median access, as well as the day of enrollment
relative to the course start. “Entries pre” for sensitive and insensitive categories corresponds
to only those ex ante filled entries classified as sensitive or insensitive, respectively. All
“Entries pre” are transformed to a mean of zero. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
more likely underestimate the size of the user community and hence the public benefits
of personal data contribution compared to users with previous course experience. Hence,
first-time users may show a stronger reaction to the Benefit treatment. However, we find
no support for such an effect. In an OLS regression reported in column (1) of Table
4.A.3, the interaction effect between first-time course taking and Benefit is insignificant
and small in magnitude.
Besides the potentially underestimated public benefit, less experience with the plat-
form may also mean that first-time users have less trust in the platform so they may be
less willing to share sensitive personal data with the platform than experienced users.
Mitigating this obfuscation may therefore additionally lead to stronger responses to the
Benefit + Cost treatment for first-time compared to experienced users. While there is a
sizeable interaction term of Benefit + Cost with first-time course taking, it is not distin-
guishable from the interaction with Benefit at conventional significance levels (p = 0.193).
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Table 4.A.2: OLS regression results of disclosing any (in)sensitive entry on treatment
Sensitive Insensitive
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Benefit 0.023** 0.023** -0.007 -0.007
(0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006)
Benefit + Cost 0.023** 0.023** -0.007 -0.007
(0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006)
Any Entry pre 0.795*** 0.794*** 0.918*** 0.919***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006)
Constant 0.190*** 0.157*** 0.087*** 0.079***
(0.008) (0.017) (0.007) (0.010)
Controls No Yes No Yes
N 6155 6155 6155 6155
R2 0.58 0.58 0.87 0.87
Notes: The Table reports OLS regression results on the extensive margin. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Controls include dummies for the courses “International Teams”, “50
Years of Internet”, and “Data Science & Engineering”, whether the course is the first course
on the platform, whether the course is accessed from Germany, and whether it is accessed
earlier than the median access, as well as the day of enrollment relative to the course start.
“Any entry pre” for sensitive and insensitive categories corresponds to only those ex ante
filled entries classified as sensitive or insensitive, respectively. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01.
Consequently, we find no clear support for first time users reacting differently to any of
our treatments than experienced users.
Second, we divide our sample based on pre-intervention commitment to the course,
i.e., we call a user committed if she shows up in the course earlier than the median user
to work on the first week’s course material. We expect that committed users are more
willing to reciprocate the platform’s course offer by contribution data. Yet, we do not find
support for such an effect. As column (2) of Table 4.A.3 reports, the interactions of early
first course action with Benefit and Benefit + Cost are negative, small in magnitude, and
not statistically significant at any conventional level. Hence, commitment to the platform
in form of early course action does not lead to more reciprocal behavior via contributing
more personal data.
Third, heterogeneous responses to treatments may exists between Germans and non-
Germans. Since previous research indicates that Germans hold comparably strong privacy
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Table 4.A.3: OLS regression results: Heterogeneity by treatment
Number of entries
First course First action Germany Entries pre
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Benefit 0.184** 0.195 0.005 0.064
(0.085) (0.124) (0.237) (0.164)
Benefit + Cost 0.161* 0.249** 0.085 0.069
(0.085) (0.127) (0.233) (0.167)
Entries pre 0.879*** 0.879*** 0.879***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
First Course -0.191
(0.164)
Benefit # First Course 0.014
(0.232)
Benefit + Cost # First Course 0.328
(0.238)
Early First Action 0.123
(0.111)
Benefit # Early First Action -0.015
(0.162)
Benefit + Cost # Early First Action -0.041
(0.165)
Germany -0.147
(0.176)
Benefit # Germany 0.208
(0.252)
Benefit + Cost # Germany 0.159
(0.248)
Zero Entries Pre -3.246***
(0.149)
Many Entries Pre 3.842***
(0.133)
Benefit # Zero Entries Pre 0.270
(0.309)
Benefit # Many Entries Pre -0.082
(0.267)
Benefit + Cost # Zero Entries Pre 0.164
(0.212)
Benefit + Cost # Many Entries Pre 0.122
(0.190)
Constant 1.302*** 1.271*** 1.392*** 4.434***
(0.130) (0.136) (0.180) (0.168)
N 6155 6155 6155 6155
R2 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.48
p: Benefit + Benefit # Subgroup = 0.193 0.799 0.720 0.719
Benefit+Cost + Benefit+Cost # Subgroup 0.860
Notes: Table reports OLS regression results on the intensive margin. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. All specifications estimated with controls including dummies for the courses
“International Teams”, “50 Years of Internet”, and “Data Science & Engineering”. Additional
controls for first course, early first course action, and access from Germany are always included
even if not listed in the Table. The last row reports p-values of testing for treatment differences
between Benefit and Benefit + Cost for the respective user subgroups in the column. p<0.10,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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concerns (Bellman et al. 2004; IBM 2018), the Benefit + Cost treatment may generate a
stronger positive effect on personal information disclosure for Germans than non-Germans.
We measure this variable based on whether the most frequently used platform access lo-
cation when logged in lies in Germany or not. However, we do not find that the privacy
protection emphasis in Benefit + Cost makes German users more willing to contribute
their data. While the interaction effect of the Benefit + Cost dummy with the Germany
dummy in column (3) of Table 4.A.3 is larger than zero, it is not significant. Moreover, it
is smaller in magnitude than the interaction effect with Benefit and statistically indistin-
guishable in a joint test for equal reactions across treatments as specified in the last row
(p = 0.720). Thus, in our context, there is no statistical support for Germans reacting
more to privacy protection than non-Germans.
Fourth, users with few profile fields filled before the intervention may be more prone
to privacy concerns regarding data sharing. In order to study this, we split our sample
into three categories: user with no initially filled profile entries, users with at least one
but not more than median entries, and users with more than median entries. If privacy
concerns limit initial disclosure, we may see more additional entries generated in the
Benefit + Cost treatment for users with relatively few initial entries due to salient privacy
protection standards in this treatment. Nonetheless, we do not find evidence that users
with different many ex ante entries react differently to the intervention. There are no
significant interaction effects of the pre-intervention profile completion status and the
Benefit and Benefit + Cost treatment dummies in column (4) of Table 4.A.3, and the
reactions of users with zero or many initial entries, respectively, to Benefit and Benefit
+ Cost are indistinguishable (p = 0.719 and p = 0.860, respectively). Consequently,
emphasizing privacy protection in the Benefit + Cost treatment does not motivate user
with fewer initial entries to disclose more.
In sum, we find no evidence for heterogeneous responses between treatments for sub-
groups defined by process data. In other words, any version of the pop-up prompting
users to complete their profile will attract information from all subgroups alike. This sug-
gests choosing the most effective version in terms of intensive margin changes, the Benefit
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+ Cost wording, to provide the platform with a solid non-selective boost in available
information.
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Figure 4.A.3: Histograms of profile entry content before and after the intervention
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Notes: Figure displays histograms of which data content is contributed before and after the
intervention for different profile fields.
200
Table 4.A.4: Content of pre-intervention profile entries
Control Benefit Benefit + Cost
Outcome Category Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev
position missing 0.777 0.416 0.789 0.408 0.798 0.401
department head 0.035 0.184 0.030 0.170 0.023 0.152
intern 0.005 0.070 0.011 0.105 0.008 0.091
project manager 0.068 0.251 0.068 0.253 0.070 0.254
team leader 0.032 0.176 0.025 0.155 0.029 0.168
technician 0.083 0.276 0.077 0.267 0.071 0.258
career status missing 0.667 0.472 0.669 0.471 0.676 0.468
academic researcher 0.011 0.105 0.010 0.100 0.009 0.093
other 0.048 0.214 0.038 0.192 0.046 0.210
professional 0.243 0.429 0.244 0.429 0.229 0.420
student 0.015 0.120 0.021 0.143 0.018 0.132
teacher 0.017 0.128 0.018 0.133 0.022 0.147
professional life missing 0.680 0.467 0.684 0.465 0.691 0.462
more than 10 years 0.243 0.429 0.245 0.430 0.234 0.423
up to 10 years 0.041 0.198 0.036 0.187 0.037 0.188
up to 5 years 0.036 0.186 0.034 0.181 0.039 0.193
highest degree missing 0.671 0.470 0.673 0.469 0.678 0.467
bachelor 0.031 0.174 0.033 0.179 0.034 0.182
diplom 0.092 0.289 0.097 0.296 0.088 0.283
high student 0.057 0.231 0.053 0.225 0.050 0.219
magister 0.006 0.076 0.006 0.079 0.008 0.088
master 0.058 0.233 0.057 0.232 0.059 0.236
other 0.049 0.216 0.054 0.227 0.059 0.236
phd 0.037 0.188 0.026 0.158 0.023 0.150
gender missing 0.642 0.479 0.659 0.474 0.646 0.478
female 0.051 0.220 0.055 0.229 0.064 0.244
male 0.307 0.461 0.285 0.452 0.291 0.454
age group missing 0.604 0.489 0.620 0.485 0.611 0.488
20-29 0.023 0.150 0.026 0.158 0.027 0.162
30-39 0.079 0.270 0.074 0.262 0.072 0.258
40-49 0.093 0.291 0.096 0.294 0.097 0.296
50-59 0.121 0.326 0.115 0.319 0.114 0.318
60-69 0.048 0.214 0.042 0.201 0.054 0.226
70+ 0.027 0.162 0.018 0.135 0.017 0.130
<20 0.004 0.066 0.009 0.093 0.008 0.088
motivation missing 0.947 0.224 0.954 0.210 0.945 0.228
credits 0.000 0.022 0.001 0.031 0.000 0.000
other 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.000
personal 0.016 0.126 0.016 0.124 0.013 0.114
professional 0.037 0.188 0.029 0.168 0.042 0.200
computer use missing 0.947 0.224 0.950 0.219 0.943 0.231
easy 0.001 0.031 0.003 0.058 0.001 0.038
high 0.028 0.164 0.026 0.160 0.031 0.173
intermediate 0.024 0.154 0.021 0.143 0.024 0.155
Notes: Table reports mean shares of entry content pre-intervention and corresponding standard
deviations.
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Table 4.A.5: Marginal effects of multinominal logit regressions regarding pre-post shifts
in profile content distributions
Outcome Category Marginal effect Standard error
position department head 0.0173*** 0.006
intern -0.0035 0.003
project manager 0.0068 0.008
team leader -0.0022 0.006
technician -0.0183** 0.007
career status academic researcher 0.0031 0.003
other 0.0031 0.005
professional 0.0007 0.006
student -0.0016 0.003
teacher -0.0054** 0.002
professional life more than 10 years 0.0116* 0.006
up to 10 years -0.0123** 0.005
up to 5 years 0.0007 0.005
highest degree bachelor 0.0013 0.004
diplom 0.0485*** 0.006
high student -0.0108** 0.005
magister 0.0052** 0.002
master -0.0138*** 0.005
other -0.0351*** 0.005
phd 0.0046 0.004
gender female 0.0176*** 0.005
male -0.0176*** 0.005
age group 20-29 0.0123*** 0.003
30-39 0.0046 0.004
40-49 -0.0072** 0.004
50-59 -0.0085** 0.004
60-69 -0.0043* 0.003
70+ -0.0004 0.002
<20 0.0035** 0.002
motivation credits -0.0007 0.005
other 0.0124 0.010
personal 0.0305 0.024
professional -0.0421* 0.025
computer use easy 0.0229* 0.014
high -0.0319 0.025
intermediate 0.0091 0.025
Notes: Table reports average marginal effects from multinominal logit regressions
for each outcome in the leftmost column. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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